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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a case study of Congressional- 
Executive Branch relations with respect to intelligence 
policy. The project utilizes the methods of secondary 
source assessment, interviews with key governmental 
officials, and formal content analysis to highlight 
important contextual elements that help to explain 
institutional behaviors and policies since the end of the 
Cold War. The evolving degree of presidential interest in, 
and control over, the intelligence community, is assessed. 
Additionally, the extent and character of post-Cold War 
Congressional intelligence oversight is found to be unique 
in several respects.
Chapter 1
Explaining Post-Cold war Intelligence Policy
The Congreas always suspects that the CIA is still the 
president's hand-maiden— doing what he wants. And ironically, 
as a result of a more intrusive intelligence oversight process 
for the last twenty years, presidents have felt like CIA was 
more responsive to Congress than it was to him. And so they're 
both deeply suspicious of %Aere the Agency's loyalties lie and 
where it will report first if something happens— in the 
Congress ' case whether they'11 report and in the president'a 
case, how quickly they're going to go to the Hill. It's a 
peculiar political menage a trois, with the Agency caught in 
the middle and, in general, getting screwed. You can quote me.
-Robert M. Gates^
Nature of Inquiry
This dissertation is a case study of Congressional- 
Executive Branch relations. The case examined is the 
interbranch relationship dealing with the formulation and 
conduct of intelligence policy. The case study focuses 
primarily on the role of the Director of Central 
Intelligence in mediating Congressional-Executive Branch 
relationships during the post-Cold War period, defined as 
1991-2000. Since its creation in 1947, the office of DCI 
has been a "multi-hat" job, and consideration will be given 
here to its three main functions: the president's chief
intelligence officer. Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and manager of the overall US intelligence
^Interview with author, 6 Dacarabar 1999, Taxas A & M Uni varsity.
community, which today is comprised of 13 organizations or 
agencies— more than half of vdiich are within the Department 
of Defense.
In exaunining inter branch relationships and intelligence 
policy in the post-Cold War era, the study will attempt to 
assess: (a) the relative powers of the Presidency and the 
Congress in controlling intelligence policy, and (b) the 
extent and character of Congressional oversight of 
intelligence community performamce. It is asserted that in 
the post-Cold War era under consideration, these two 
phenomena are observably and in^rtantly different than two 
preceding, but quite distinct, periods «rhich together 
comprise the Cold war era. The study then considers the 
larger question: what factors influence interbranch
relationships in the formulation and conduct of intelligence 
policy? In identifying a number of such factors, the study 
seeks to explain, at least in part, how and why the post- 
Cold weir era has changed from eairlier eras in terms of both 
(a) the relative power of presidents and Congress over the 
intelligence community, and (b) the extent and nature of 
Congressional oversight of intelligence policy.
Drawing on in-depth interviews with many key 
participants ^ a review of many documents and a massive 
secondary literature, as well as a formal content analysis 
of selected Congressional hearings, it becomes clear that 
interbranch relationships dealing with intelligence policy 
are shaped by a number of complicated but identifiable 
factors which make up the broad historical emd political 
context in which humans in organizations live auid %*ork.
This context is both more complex and more subtle than some 
of the formal models of Congressional oversight generated by 
mainstrecUD social science, and also more multi-dimensional, 
fluid and idiosyncratic than might be suggested by some of 
the formal or "grand" theories maintained in the field of 
international relations. There is a tendency of some of 
this scholarly work to put premiums on parsimony and on data 
which can be guamtified, and in so doing to miss isgwrtamt 
parts of the picture. While this project explicitly 
attends to build upon and extend previous political science 
research on Congressional oversight of intelligence and on 
interbranch relationships, it also seeks to cast a wider 
net. It reports that a wide range of factors contribute in 
important ways to the historical and political context in
which the Congress and the Executive Branch have interacted 
in formulating amd implementing intelligence policy.
Moreover, it is only through identifying and clarifying 
the impact of these elements of the larger context that one 
can explain the changes observed in the post-Cold Weir era.
In trying to understand interbranch relationships dealing 
with intelligence policy, at a minimum scholaurs must 
acknowledge and elucidate the impact of at least the 
following elements of the larger context: (a) institutional 
structures and the dispositions they create, (b) the role of 
personality and the nature of specific personal 
relationships among individuals holding institutional 
positions, (c) the degree of consensus— or absence of 
consensus— in overall American national security policy, (d) 
individual events, such as election results, the revelation 
of misconduct or intelligence feLilure, or events external to 
the nation, (e) medium-term trends in the political 
environment and in organizational culture; as examples of 
such trends, this study will attempt to assess the impact of 
changes in presidential administrations and the policy focus 
and priorities of indvidual presidents, and of the emergence 
and evolution of a new "DCI culture," meaning the conception
held by DCIs of the nature of their office auid their 
responsibilities in interbranch relations.
In asserting the need to consider such a complex and 
multi-dimensional context, especially one that includes some 
variables which are difficult to measure and certainly to 
quantify, and one that also suggests a role may be played by 
idiosyncratic events, one seems to challenge the aspirations 
of social science for developing generalizations that may be 
at least potentially testable, and thus at least potentially 
may lead to scientific theory and predictive power. But the 
reality of humans living and working in organizations is 
complex and multi-dimensional, and it does involve variables 
that are best studied by a variety of methods, including 
qualitative ones such as in-depth elite interviewing and 
observation, as the research method of Richard Fenno has so 
productively demonstrated.%
While focusing on a larger and more coo^lex reality 
may nmke generalization across cases more difficult, it is 
nonetheless a necessary step for building a useful social 
science that truly explains the formulation and
^See Richard F. Fenno, Watching Polifcleianat Xaaav on Participation 
Obaervation (Berkeley, CAt Institute of Government Studies, 1990);
flCIDtltylgi M— «bar, -ii^ Their Districts (Boston, MA: Little,
Bro%m, Ct Co., 1978).
implementation of policies by national governments and 
their component institutions and organizations. And the 
utility and value of such an approach can be demonstrated 
when it provides a plausible and non-obvious explanation 
for phenomena that are otherwise inexplicable or 
unforeseen. To cite just one example, this study will 
report that the relationship between the Congressional 
oversight Committees and the intelligence community during 
the post-Cold Weu: era has been, in an overall sense, 
harmonious and cooperative— even benign. This has been the 
case despite a number of highly visible instances of 
intelligence (and counter-intelligence) failure, 
interbranch conflict over specific policies, and some 
alleged bureaucratic misconduct.
Given such potentially disruptive and controversial 
events— events which might easily lead to interbranch 
conflict and increasingly adversarial relationships— why 
has the overall tone of Congressional relationships during 
the post-Cold War era been generally harmonious? It will 
be shown in the chapters that follow that identifiable 
elements of the larger context provide a solid explanation 
for this apparently paradoxical reality. First, however.
it is useful to consider the evolution of interbramch 
relationships with respect to these matters.
Institutional Relations in Three Eras
Key to the task of more fully explaining the current 
reality is to understand the evolving intelligence policy 
relationship among various governmental actors. During the 
post-World War II period, the relationship can be viewed as 
evolving through three distinct historical phases. The 
first two periods comprise the Cold War. From 1947 to the 
early 1970's, there existed a strong consensus among both 
the general public and policy-making elites, auid between 
Congress and the Executive Branch, that the overriding 
threat to the United States was the existence and influence 
of communism. During this First Era, the Executive Branch 
was clearly dominant with respect to national security 
policy. Presidents prosecuted a virtually unrestrained, 
militant response to Soviet subversion, with the Congress 
playing a distinctly subordinate role in issuing blank 
checks to the Executive Breuich. The relationship during 
this period mras much less one of comity than of overriding 
anti-communist consensus and of trust in the Executive 
Branch to take care that Congressionally deferred power
would not be abused. Indeed, in describing Congressional 
oversight of intelligence agencies. Loch Johnson has called 
this first period the "Era of Trust.
The vietnam-era breakdown of the Cold War consensus and 
instances of Executive Branch misconduct revealed in the 
early 1970's motivated the Congress to assert its own 
authorities in the national security arena. Thus began a 
second euid very different era of Executive-Congres s ional 
relations.^  This Second Era, running from the early 1970's 
through 1990, is characterized mainly by significamt levels 
of controversy over the substance and conduct of national 
security policy.^ The earlier Cold War perspective was 
still strongly embraced by some political leaders and a 
segment of the general public, but those views were 
explicitly challenged and disputed by other leaders and
^och K. Johnson, si— Smcrmt Power : Tha CIA j" « rvmocrstie
Society (Mew York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 9.
^Richard Melenson has built on the work of others in outlining the 
extent to idiich foreign policy consensus has been rebuilt. See 
Richard M. Melenson, Reconstructing Consensus: ameriffsn Foreign
Policy Since the Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); 
David J. Vogler and Sidney R. Waldnan, Congress namAr-racv.
Alexander George. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy:_XtUI
Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1980). This project will substitute Volger and Waldman's term 
"value" consensus for Melenson' s use of the term "cultural" 
consensus.
Examples of the institutional behaviors that ware products of this 
contest may be found in Kenneth B. Sharpe, "The Post-Vietnam Formula 
under Siege: The imperial Presidency and Central America," Political
Science Quarterly 102 (Winter 1987-1988): 549-569.
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segments of the public. Scholeirs have noted the impact of 
consensus--or the lack of consensus— on institutional 
relations.^  The absence of consensus clearly affected 
interbranch relations and national security policy, 
including intelligence policy. Among the most visible of 
the many manifestations of this were events such as the 
passage of the War Powers Act, the Clark and Boland 
Amendments, and the Iran-Contra affair.
The end of the Cold War, followed by the administration 
of President Bill Clinton, marks a third distinct era: the
post-Cold War era. Compared to the previous two periods, it 
is unique. On the one hand, the post-Cold War era is 
similar to the initial Cold War period involving high 
degrees of national security cooperation between 
governmental branches. Disputes over policy ends have, in 
this current era, seldom produced the level of acrimonious 
debate and aggressive Congressional inquiry which 
characterize the era between 1975 and 1990. On the other 
hand, the current era may appear to be characterized by a 
lack of policy consensus similar to that seen in the 1975 - 
1990 period. The Third Era (1991-2000) has also been
^See David J. Voglar and Sidnay R. Waldman, Conoraa* n—  
(Washington B.C.: CQ Press, 1985), Chapter 7, "Foreign Policy and the 
Search for Consensus,” 123-144; Melenson, Reconstructing Consensus.
characterized by divided government and increased 
ideological polarization. As the following chapters will 
show, the current era has actually witnessed an increased 
legislative intact on national security affairs, as Congress 
fills the vacuum created by the most recent president's more 
exclusive focus upon domestic concerns. To fully understand 
the current intelligence policy relationship between 
Congress and the Presidency, it is necessary to see it as 
evolving through these three distinct historical phases.
Presidential and Congressional Influence on Intelligence 
Policy in the Three Eras
One of two main goals of this research is to assess the 
relative influence of the Presidency and the Congress on 
intelligence policy. In the course of the three periods 
outlined above, there has been a marked shift in the 
relative influence of these two bramches over the 
intelligence community. The degree of value, policy and 
procedural consensus that characterized each era produced a 
degree of institutional influence over intelligence policy. 
The changes can be viewed as movements of the community 
along a continuum of Presidential-Congressional influence.
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Figure 1.1 displays the relationship of periods and relative 
institutional influence.
During the First Era, the Presidency enjoyed unfettered 
control over virtually every aspect of community management 
and intelligence policy. Congress annually authorized
Figure 1.1 Degree of Institutional Influence 
on the Intelligence Coanunity in 
Three Bras
Era I 
■ 1
Intelligence
Community
------------------ ^
Era II Era III
■
Influence
of
Presidency
Influence
of
Congress
appropriations but these legislative actions were typically 
con^leted in secrecy, with the involvement of very few 
members, and with astonishing informality. This period is 
the Golden Age of American intelligence, characterized by 
personalities such as President Eisenhower's DCI, Allen 
Dulles amd a number of successful intelligence operations 
overseas. It was a period of almost complete Congressional 
acquiescence to Executive Branch control of the intelligence 
community.
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The Second Era represents a major shift in 
institutional influence over intelligence policy. As the 
consensus over national security policy began to erode. 
Congress asserted its influence over the community and its 
actions. Congress increased its influence by creating such 
statutes as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 (which 
restricted funding of intelligence activities to those 
deemed of interest to the national security by the 
Presidency and required that the Congress be notified of 
such findings) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 (which placed new restraints upon the community's 
domestic counter-intelligence efforts). Interbranch 
competition placed the community near the middle of the 
continuum of influence, illustrated in Figure 1.1. During 
the time of Iran-Contra, then Deputy DCI Robert Gates 
expressed the relationship this way:
The result of these realities is that the CIA today 
finds itself in a remairkable position, involuntarily 
poised nearly equidistant between the executive and 
legislative branches. The administration knows that 
the CIA is in no position to withhold much information 
from Congress and is extremely sensitive to 
Congressional demands; the Congress has enormous 
influence and information yet remains suspicious and 
mistrustful.^
^Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Affairs 66 (Winter 1987-1968): 225.
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This Second Era, thus represents an era of contested control 
of, and dual-influence over, the intelligence community emd 
intelligence policy.
The Third Era, the post-Cold War era in which we find 
ourselves now, is the period during which most of the 
following study is based. It will be shown that, in terms 
of influence over the intelligence community and matters of 
policy, the Congress may now be slightly more influential 
than the Presidency. This study will present factors and 
evidence to support this assertion emd better explain 
institutional relations and policy outputs.
Congressional Oversight in the Three Bras
The second main goal of this research is to asses the 
extent and character of Congressional oversight of 
intelligence community performance. In the course of the 
three periods outlined above, aspects of the extent and 
character of Congressional oversight have changed 
remarkably." As with the degree of relative institutional 
influence over intelligence matters, variations in
"Frank Smist offer# a thorough history of Congreaaional intelligence 
activities in Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence 
Canmunitv 1947-1994 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 
1994).
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Congressional oversight have been shaped by the nature of 
consensus during the three eras. Table 1.1 displays the 
amount and character of oversight pursued by Congress in 
each of the three time periods. During the First Era, with 
anti-communist sentiments running high and a strong 
consensus on the ends and means of American foreign policy, 
there was so little Congressional oversight of the 
intelligence community that what did take place warrants
Table 1.1 Amount and Character of Congressional Oversight 
During the Three Bras
Conaressional Oversight
Amount Character
Bra I
1947 - 1974 Zero to Minimal Deferential
Bra II
1975 - 1990 Extensive Adversarial
Bra III
1991 - 2000 Extensive Cooperative
little comment except to note its near absence. The Second 
Era is characterized by Congressional oversight that is 
quite prevalent and aggressive. This period commences with 
the so-called "Year of Intelligence” (1975) in which the 
Church-Pike Committees were created within Congress to 
investigate reported misconduct on the part of the 
intelligence community. The policy trust and deference 
bestowed by Congress upon the Executive Brauich vanished, to
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be replaced by cynicism, suspicion, and Congressional 
assertiveness. The establishment of permanent intelligence 
Committees in the Congress institutionalized contested 
control with the Presidency over intelligence matters. With 
respect to oversight, the Third Era is again unique. The 
research reported in the following chapters indicates that 
the extent of oversight remains relatively high in this 
latest era. However, the character of this oversight is in 
marked contrast to that of the Second Era in that its tone 
is l«irgely cooperative. Why would this be the case?
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States 
has not achieved a national security policy consensus. 
Certainly, there are shared sentiments regarding the use of 
intelligence to protect the nation from the effects of 
phenomena like terrorism auid the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction but even these issues do not produce the 
overarching and fundamental agreement present during much of 
the Cold var. The consensus, if one presently exists, seems 
to be that there is no comprehensive post-Cold War foreign 
policy. There is a strong consensus that such a 
comprehensive paradigm is needed but much less articulation 
or debate over alternative approaches. However, unlike the
15
Second Era, the Third Era is not characterized by 
adversarial relations with respect to intelligence policy. 
Why should a government — one lacking a comprehensive foreign 
policy, one that is more ideologically polarized and divided 
institutionally along paurty lines, and one in which 
Congressional oversight remains extensive— be characterized 
by intelligence policy cooperation? The research reported 
in the following chapters suggests that a constellation of 
contextual factors can serve to explain the current state of 
affairs.
Project Overview
This project proceeds by examining in Chapter 2 the 
historical roots of the intelligence relationship between 
Congress and the Executive Branch. This will help to 
clarify the foundation of original expectations auid national 
values which serve as the basis of the relationship. It 
will also clarify the ingrained institutional dispositions 
which are an important contextual factor for explaining 
current interbranch interaction. Chapter 3 discusses the 
Cold War relationship between individual presidents and 
their OCXs. A review of this history helps to illuminate 
the growing role of personality and personal relationships
16
as a critical factor in the formulation and conduct of 
intelligence policy. Chapter 4 proceeds with an examination 
of the Third Era of intelligence policy. Based upon 
extensive interviews with three post-Cold War DCIs—  
including the sitting one— and a number of confidential 
interviews with current intelligence community personnel, 
members of Congress, and Congressional staff. The chapter 
further traces the development and present significance of 
contextual factors %diich explain Executive-Congressional 
relations in intelligence. These factors include personal 
relations, the role of consensus, and individual political 
events such as revelations of alleged intelligence failure. 
Finally, Chapter 5 likewise utilizes interviews, am 
extensive body of original documents and secondary 
literature, as well as a formal content analysis of recent 
Intelligence Committee hearings to assess the current extent 
and character of Congressional intelligence oversight. 
Chapter 6 offers a summary as well as a brief set of 
concluding remarks.
The contextuality and human aspects of political 
phenomena such as intelligence policy and interbranch 
relations make atteoqpts to reach formulaic conclusions
17
elusive. The best which can be accomplished are 
descriptions and likely explanations for observed events and 
governmental outputs. To this end, a multi-method research 
design has been employed here involving: the study of
genetic source material such as the Federalist, the 
Congressional Record, and various national security acts and 
intelligence reform proposals; formal content analyses of 
Committee hearings ; and more than twenty field interviews 
conducted with current and former policy officials at the 
highest levels of both Congress and the Executive Bremch. * 
Scholarly access to these individuals is practically 
nonexistent. These interviemrs provide a strong foundation 
for the conclusions which are asserted in this study. They 
confirm, perhaps more solidly than any other evidence 
uncovered, the important role that specific, identifiable 
contextual factors play in helping to assess Executive- 
Congressional relations as they relate to the formulation 
and conduct of intelligence policy in the post-Cold War era.
more detailed description involving these methods and tht 
interview process may be found in Appendix A of this work.
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Chapter 2
The Business of Intelligence and Original intent
The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and 
need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add is 
that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon 
secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind and, 
for want of it, they are generally defeated, hotrever well 
planned and promising a favorable issue.
-George Washington^ 
Constitutional Design and Institutional Dispositions
One in^rtant factor for understanding current 
inter branch relations in the eurea of intelligence policy is 
that of institutional structures and the dispositions they 
create. The entire question of interbranch relationships 
derives from American Constitutional structure. The 
Constitution was designed, in part, to address concerns of 
national security. Under the Articles of Confederation, the 
national government possessed significantly less of the 
energy, dispatch, cuid secrecy needed to effectively 
formulate and execute policies to protect the nation and its 
interest. The creation of am Executive Branch headed by a 
single president %ras intended to fulfill this need. By 
design, the Framers incorporated into the Presidency certain
^Letter from Georg* Washington, dated 26 July 1777, Reprinted (with no 
addressee specified) in, Intelligence and the Mir of Indmpmndmncm, CIA 
Publications , <http : //www.odci. gov/cia/publications/warindep/letter. 
html>, 4 February 2000.
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powers— as well as certain ambiguities— that would eneüole 
presidents to meet the challenges posed by the realities of 
diplomacy and security. They exclusively vested certain 
authorities in the Executive while dividing others with the 
Congress. From its inception, the Presidency has 
increasingly been viewed as the nation's chief protector.
An assessment of original thought on these matters indicates 
that the Framers deliberately conveyed to the Executive 
certain powers to fulfill this responsibility without 
hindrance. Their effort was mainly a product of their own 
experience and resulted in an ingrained set of institutional 
dispositions which have been éuqplified by periodic crises of 
national security. These dispositions are an important 
contextual factor for explaining conten^rary Congressional- 
Executive relations.
Democracy and Mational Security
One of Alexis de Tocqueville ' s observations of American 
government was that
Foreign policy does not require the use of any of the 
good qualities peculiatr to democracy but does demand 
the cultivation of almost all those which it lacks.
It has little capacity for combining measures in secret 
and waiting patiently for the result. Such qualities
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are more likely to belong to a single man or to an 
eiristocracy. 2
Tocqueville further notes that American democracy is the 
type of government in which sympathies and passions are more 
readily obeyed than strategic calculations of state 
interests.2 Given that one attribute of American democracy 
is its concept of majority rule, Tocqueville was skeptical 
of the young nation's ability to conduct its engagements 
abroad with reason and prudence. The Framers of the 
Constitution were well aware of the potential for a passion- 
driven majority to run amuck. In Federalist 10, Madison 
notes this central concern saying that
the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of 
rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, 
not according to the rules of justice and the rights of 
the minor party, but by the superior force of an 
interested and overbearing majority.^
The Premiers of the Constitution noted the desirability for 
certain matters of state to be carried on by means %diich 
were, in essence, less than democratic— particularly if 
these matters involved vital interests of the nation. A
2Alexia de Tocqueville, Democrmcy in x m m r i t r a n a .  George Lawrence, 
ed. J.P. Mayer, (Garden City, NY: Anchor Booka, 1969), 228-229. 
Succeaaful national efforta during auch eventa aa The Second World 
War are at iaaue with thia aaaertion, however.
3ibid., 229.
<Federaliat Panera. No. 10.
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primary example was the firm placement of the power to make 
treaties in the hands of the Executive, with an enlightened 
Senate empowered to consider such agreements and approve of 
them after the fact. The idea was that the security and 
potential energy of a single Executive could best protect 
the interests of the nation with respect to such matters. 
Thus, Convention delegate John Jay states in The Federalist 
that
[t]hose matters which in negotiations usually require 
the most secrecy and despatch, cure those preparatory 
and auxiliary measures vdiich are not otherwise 
important in a national view, than as they tend to 
facilitate the attainment of the objects of 
negotiation. For these, the President will find no 
difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance 
occur Wiich requires the advice and consent of the 
Senate, he may at any time convene them.^
In these respects, the Executive was to be "the general 
Guardian of the National interests. "^
The conduct of foreign policy is inherently executive. 
That is not to say that its formulation is exclusively so. 
The Framers of the Constitution recognized the danger of 
placing the power to make and to execute policy in the hands 
of one institution or individual. Their skeptical regard
^Federalist Pspsrs# mo. 64.
^Delegate Govarnaur Horria quotad in Max Par rand, ad., Ty»» nmcorda of 
the Federal Convantion of 1787 (Mew Bavan: Tale University Press, 
1966), Vol. 2, 540-541.
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for the nature of man and his inability to resist the 
temptation to abuse power was a product of their 
intellectual and political experiences. No less a supporter 
of executive authority them Alexander Hamilton proclaimed 
the need for Legislative checks on the Presidency.
The history of human conduct does not warrant the 
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it 
wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and 
momentous a kind, as those which concern its 
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole 
disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as 
would be the President of the United States... .The 
joint possession of the power in question, by the 
President and the Senate, would afford a greater 
prospect of security than the separate possession of it 
by either of them.^
However, even Thomas Jefferson— certainly a critic of 
centralized authority— concluded that the conduct of foreign 
affairs is "executive altogether. American foreign 
policy— of which intelligence policy is a part— therefore 
presents us with a classic dilemma of modem, republican 
democracies. An Executive that is restricted in his 
exercise of power may provide little peril to American 
democracy, but, additionally, such and Executive will likely 
be too weak to serve and protect American interests abroad.
^Fedcraliat Paperm. No. 75.
^hcmaa Jaffaraon quotad in Char las W. Kaqlay and Sugana R. Wittkopf, 
American Foraion Policy; Pattam and Proeaaa (New York: St. Martin'a 
Press, 1991), 4th ad., 494.
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An Executive that is unrestricted in utilizing his 
administrative powers to conduct foreign policy may 
eventually acquire a preponderance of power— which, if 
abused, could contribute to an abandonment of democratic 
principles, such as accounteüaility. Additionally, the 
secret and sometimes discretionary nature of intelligence 
activities, information, and funding offer potential 
difficulties in an open democracy where a premium is placed 
upon public debate and consensus.
Lock* and th* Executive mature of Intelligence
The delegates came to the Constitutional Convention 
having previously been made aware of these political 
dilemmas through their life long education emd practical 
experiences. John Locke was among the most influential 
scholars to shape the minds and political values of many of 
the Framers. Much of the general procedural, policy, and 
value consensus attained at the Constitutional Convention is 
attributable to the broad influence of Locke. Locke 
recognized the need, not only for an executive entity, but 
for a distinct form of executive power to ensure that what 
was consented to by the majority would be expediently 
carried out.
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[BJecause the laws, that are at once, and in a short 
time made, have a constant emd lasting force, and need 
a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; 
therefore it is necessary there should be a power 
always in being, which should see to the execution of 
the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus 
the legislative and executive power come often to be 
separated.^
Locke went on to clearly indicate that all powers, including 
those of the executive, are subordinate to the legislative 
power. He asserts that "the legislative power is the 
supreme power...for what can give laws to another, must 
needs be superior to him. "lo However, Locke also states that 
the executive power may easily be divided in two distinctive 
powers, the executive and federative.
These two powers, executive and federative, though they 
be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending 
the execution of the municipal laws of the society 
within its self, upon all that are peurts of it; the 
other the management of the security and interest of 
the public without, with all those that it may receive 
benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost 
united. And though this federative power in the well 
or ill management of it be of great moment to the 
common-wealth, yet it is much less capaüble to be 
directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than 
the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the 
prudence and wisdom of those, whose hamd it is in, to 
be managed for the public.. .%#hat is to be done in 
reference to foreigners, depending much upon their 
actions, and the variation of designs and interests, 
must be left in great part to the prudence of those %dio 
have this power committed to them to be managed by the
9john Locke, Second Treetiee of Gov(»t-tm— n».. ed. G.E. Hecphereon 
(Zndienepolis, IN: Beckett Publishing Ccn^eny, Inc., 1980), 76. 
10Ibid., 78.
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best of their skill, for the advantage of the common­
wealth .
Locke recognized the special nature of the power to deal 
with other nations— a task filled with uncertainty %diich, at 
times, inherently seems to require a healthy degree of 
authoritarianism. Therefore, he prescribes the federative 
power be recognized within the entity which holds the 
executive power so that those granting their consent to be 
governed gain in their leaders a more effective protection 
of their society's interests. Locke makes no such provision 
for the legislative power. The only recourse that the 
legislative power has is to enact new la%*s to attempt to 
constrain the executive power. Locke's supreme legislative 
power contains no explicit provision relating to the conduct 
of affairs external to the state.
Further, Locke asserts that a certain "power to act 
according to discretion "i^  should be conferred upon the 
individuals who hold the executive power. Specifically, 
Locke states that
the good of society requires, that several things 
should be left to the discretion of him that has the 
executive power: for the legislators not being able to
i^Ibid., 77. 
12Ibid., 84.
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foresee, and provide by law, for all that may be useful 
to the community...
Many things there are, which the law ceui by no means 
provide for; and those must necessarily be left to the 
discretion of him that has the executive power in his 
hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and 
advantage shall re<^ire: nay, it is fit that the laws 
themselves should in some cases give way to the 
executive power...
This is the essence of %diat Locke defines as prerogative.
It represents those discretionary actions taken in the 
pursuit of the public good without the guidelines of 
prescribed statutes and taken, in some instances, against 
existing laws. Locke goes on to add that certain actions, 
taken with regard to defending the public's interests, aure 
necessary amd do not at all lend themselves to the slow 
deliberative body %diich holds the legislative power.
[F]or since in some governments the lawmaking power is 
not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and 
so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; 
and because also it is in^ )08sible to foresee, and so by 
laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that 
may concern the public...
Locke cautions against the dangers of "weak and ill 
prince [ s ] " vdio would utilize prerogative powers in the 
pursuit of gains which are outside of those that are in the
l^Ibid., 84.
14Ibid., 84.
15Ibid., 84. 
l«Ibid., 86.
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best interests of the state. Despite this danger, Locke 
notes the tendency for prerogative to be a constant source 
of executive power, though its scope changes and is "always 
largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes. "
Locke makes this comment in reference to the power as it was 
exemplified in English history. However, similar 
observations may be made about this type of power in the 
American political experience, with the right context, we 
allow presidents with the stature of Washington, Lincoln, 
and Roosevelt a wider latitude of executive prerogative them 
we do of those assertive presidents whom we perceive as 
being less devoted to the public good.
Locke raises the inevitable question of "who shall be 
the judge Wien this power is made a right use o f T o  this 
question, he presents the murky prescription that the 
people, having no judicial powers in these matters, may 
"appeal to h e a v e n o v e r  those actions which they feel have 
been questionably undertaken. However, Locke gives 
assurances that, in his conception of government, this 
reliance upon providence would not lead to an erosion of 
order.
Ibid., 86. 
l«Ibid., 87. 
l^Ibid., 87.
28
Nor let amy one think, this lays a perpetual foundation 
for disorder; for this operates not, till the 
Inconvenlency Is so great, that the majority feel It, 
and are weary of It, and find a necessity to have It 
amended.
The varying circumstances, and the uncertainties Inherent In 
relations among nations, con^l Locke to balance the need 
for executive prudentlalllty In order to protect the public 
Interest— and conform to general principles of good 
government. 21 unlike the contenqporary debate between 
realists and Idealists, the terms of principle and prudence 
were complementary for both Locke and the Freumers. 22
The Framers and ■a-tiooal Security
Locke ' s writing contributed to the Framers ' discontent 
with the Articles of Confederation. The Convention 
delegates who stridently asserted the need to amend the 
Articles of Confederations were convinced to do so. In large 
part, due the glaring Ineptitude of the Articles to deal 
effectively with matters of national security. Legions of 
British troops remaining to the North, hostile Native
2°ibid., 88.
22Hathan Tarcov, "Principl#, Prudanca, and tha Conatitutional 
Division of Foraign Policy," in Poraicm Policy and tha Constitution, 
ed. Robert A. Goldwin and Robert A. Licht (Washington D.C.: Tha AEI 
Press, 1990), 28.
22Ibid., 28.
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Americems to the West, and treachery on the high seas 
convinced most of the delegates long before the Convention 
of the need to create a governmental entity empowered with 
the requisite traits of decisiveness and energy necessary 
for the effective conduct of matters involving national 
security.
Much has been written about the so-called "original 
intent" of the Constitution's Framers. Through Convention 
notes and The Federalist Papers, %#e can most assuredly say 
what were the most contentious concerns of the meetings.
Two primary concerns addressed during the Convention are of 
utmost importance in explaining the national security 
relationship between Congress and the Presidency. First, 
there is the matter of Executive power. Despite their 
familiarity with Locke, and the painful lessons learned 
under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers of the 
Constitution had significant misgivings about a powerful 
Executive. The Framers believed— as expressed by Locke—  
that the potential for abuse inherently existed in the 
centralization of power— particularly in matters of foreign 
affairs— in the hands of an individual.
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The other concern was that of provisions pertaining to 
the common defense. As with the dilemma over the proper 
scope of Executive power, the delegates were confronted with 
the dangers inherent in maintaining forces Wiich were most 
likely to be controlled through Executive authority. The 
failure of the Articles of Confederation clearly 
demonstrated a need for an apparatus of some sort to be 
maintained in order to achieve and maintain national 
security. Much of the debate was over the issues of 
standing armies and war powers. Too little attention paid 
to questions of national security invited foreign 
intervention. However, the idea of a standing army 
heightened fears that it could be used to ix^rudently 
venture into foreign conflicts, or worse, be utilized by a 
highly abusive Executive for suppressive domestic purposes.
The debate over Executive power in foreign policy did 
not commence until September of 1787— rather late in the 
Convention. The matter first surfaced on June 1 when a paurt 
of the Virginia plan «ras debated. The portion in question 
would vest in a president all of the executive types of 
power which were held by the Congress under the Articles of
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Confederation.South Carolina delegate Charles Pickney 
stated that some of these powers "might extend to peace and 
war which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the 
worst kind, towit an elective one. Delegates Pickney and 
Jeunes Madison were early advocates of the notion that 
Executive power was not to include matters of war and peace.
Virtually nothing else was debated with respect to 
these matters until the last %#eeks of the Convention. For 
most of the summer, it was assumed that the Congress—  
particularly the Senate— vrould be the premier institution 
for handling matters of diplomacy and security. The 
delegates were clearly more comfortable with allowing a more 
deliberative and longer-tenured set of Senators deal with 
these matters than with exposing them to the more intense 
political passions of the lower chamber. Additionally, it 
was not clear from the outset as to how valued>le expediency, 
secrecy, and energy would be in regards to foreign affairs.^s 
However, scholars have noted that these attributes were 
recognized to some extent by the Framers and would have been
23jack N. Rackov*, "Making Foraign Policy— Tha Viaw from 1787," in 
Foreign Policy and tha Conmtitution. ad. Robert A. Goldwin and Robert 
A. Licht (Washington D.C.: Tha American Enterprise Institute Press, 
1990), 6.
Farrand. Records. Vol. 1, 65.
25Rackove, "Making Foreign Policy," 6-7.
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particularly on the minds of the delegates with regard to 
the prudent conduct of treaty and alliamce negotiations 
overseas.26 with the division of the appointment and treaty 
powers between the Senate and the Executive, the Framers 
began to define some aspects of independent Executive 
authority. However, the records of the Federal Convention 
indicate that the Framers of the Constitution did not 
participate in lengthy, open debate for the purpose of 
making detailed delineations of the Executive's foreign 
policy power.
On the other hand. Congressional power with respect to 
these matters was clearly enumerated in the Constitution. 
Among the powers stated in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution are:
exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce
exclusive power to define and punish offenses
against the laws of nations
exclusive power to declaure war
exclusive power to grant letters of marque and
reprisal
exclusive power to make rules concerning captures 
on lamd and water
exclusive power to raise and support military 
forces 27
26ibid., 10.
27Art. I, Sec. 8, OS Conmtitution.
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with its exclusive control on matters of appropriations and 
maintaining a military, as well as the Senate’s power to 
impact appointments and treaties, the Congress would seem to 
possess the more solid claim for control of the nation's 
intelligence apparatus and activities.
Indeed, the Constitution was defended quite forcefully 
in the Federalist Papers by asserting the notion that a 
federal government would be the consummate trustee of 
national interests and security. Alexander Hamilton stated 
that the powers to raise, maintain, and direct a nation's 
security forces
ought to exist without limitation, because it is 
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety 
of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and 
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy 
them.
As the duties of superintending the national defence 
and of securing the public peace against foreign or 
domestic violence involve a provision for casualties 
and dangers to which no possible limits can be 
assigned, the power of making that provision ought to 
know no other bounds tham the exigencies of the nation 
and the resources of the community.
The Framers intended that this power of conducting 
national security policy be fully controlled by the federal 
government. Despite their desire to balance national 
security powers between the legislature and the Executive, a
ZBpederalist Paperm. No. 32.
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number of Convention delegates intended the Executive to be 
an independent force with certain attributes which would 
enable it to manage foreign affairs— to include an 
intelligence apparatus— more effectively. According to Jay 
in The Federalist, we see that in managing aspects of 
foreign policy
perfect secrecy and immediate despatch are sometimes 
requisite. There are cases vdiere the most useful 
intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing 
it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. 
Those apprehensions will operate on those persons 
Wiether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly 
motives; and there doubtless are many of both 
descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the 
President, but who would not confide in that of the 
Senate and still less in that of a large popular 
Assembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in 
so disposing of the power of making treaties...although 
the President must in forming them act by the advice 
and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to 
manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as 
prudence may suggest.
Additionally, many of the most important Convention 
delegates arrived in Philadelphia with significant 
intelligence experience. Delegates Franklin, Jay, Hamilton, 
Wilson, Morris, Mifflin, and Gerry all served as either 
field agents or members of secret committees during the war 
for independence.George Washington is regarded as the
29pederalimt Pmpmrm. Mo. 64.
Madison was tha only major contributor to tha dabata who 
possessad no intalliganca axparianca. This anunaration is basad upon 
Central Intalliganca Agancy, Intalliaanea in tha war of Tndanandanea
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nation's first spymaster, possessing a professional life­
long experience in matters of espionage and disinformation. 
One scholarly assertion has been that con^tent espionage 
was so vital during the War for Independence that the 
colonies would have lost the conflict were it not for 
Washington's adept intelligence skills. with so many of 
the delegates aware of this fact, and possessing significant 
intelligence experiences of their own, it is unlikely they 
did not foresee a future for an intelligence appairatus of 
some sort— most likely foreseen in the nation's diplomatic 
corps. Finally, according to historian Stephen Knott, the 
central intelligence-related issue debated at the Convention 
was the danger of foreign penetration of, and influence on, 
the national government. In his effort to derail a 
proposal vrtiich he thought vrould discourage distinguished 
persons from holding office, Pennsylvania delegate 
Gouverneur Morris "mentioned the case of the Commander in 
Chief's presenting his account for secret services, %diich he
(Washington O.C.: CIA, 1976), 8-11; and Stephen F. Knott, Secret and 
Sanctioned: Covert Qperafcione end the American Presidency (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 42-43.
3lprank Smist, Congress Oversees The United States Intelligence 
Conmunity 1947-1994 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 
1994), 2nd ed., 1.
32see Thomas Fleming, "George Washington, Spymaeter, " American 
Heritage. February/March, 2000, 45-51.
33Knott, Secret and Sanctioned. 43
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said was so moderate that every one was astonished at it; 
and so simple that no doubt could arise on it. "^ 4 This 
contingency fund, in-,part designed and utilized for 
clandestine activity, is a less well-kno%m but firm 
precedent set by George Washington with the full legislative 
cooperation of the First C o n g r e s s .
There are several points to emphasize in this 
discussion. First, the present existence of a significant 
governmental intelligence con^nent is not merely a product 
of the National Security Act of 1947. The United States has 
a tradition of intelligence which dates back to the War of 
Independence and founding of the nation. Intelligence 
policy was public policy for more than a century and a half 
before the Cold War. Second, the Framers eased their 
discomfort with Executive authority by specifically granting 
to Congress those foreign policy powers that had been 
traditionally abused by monarchs. vesting the Presidency 
with "the Executive Power," however, the Framers sought to 
present the Executive Branch with enough discretion to 
implement legislation and to exercise prerogatives %diich 
would be in the security interests of the nation. The
^James Madison's Convention notes of July 26, as cited in Knott, 
Secret and Sanctioned. 44-45 
35Ibid., 49-50.
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Framers were attempting to construct something that seems 
almost destined to be problematic— an unprecedented system 
of government in %diich national security policy could be 
constructed and maintained without sacrificing the 
democratic ideals to which the Constitution was committed. 
Finally, though the Convention, the Constitution, and early 
precedents may have intended that Congress and the Executive 
be co-equals in determining national security policy— of 
which intelligence policy is a part— clearly a dramatic 
change has occurred in the diplomatic history of the 
Republic. In fact. Congress knowingly delegated some of the 
most ia^)ortant aspects of its intelligence-related powers to 
the Executive Branch long before the current relationship 
developed between the two branches.
The next section illustrates two primary examples of 
this delegation in order to support an argument that the 
current interbranch relationship with respect to the conduct 
of intelligence policy is, to an extent, a product of 
contextual factors involving institutional dispositions. A 
Congressionally-induced disconnect over intelligence policy 
began during the time of the Framers and culminated in the 
intelligence revelations of the Vietnam era. Congress
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deferred to the Presidency on these matters, en^>owering 
presidents to handle intelligence matters unilaterally. The 
reported abuses of unchecked Executive power in the early 
1970's illuminated this institutional disposition. The 
political ire it inspired was a strong motivating factor for 
the modem intelligence policy relationship which developed 
between Congress and the Executive Branch.
Congressional Delegation and the Intelligence Policy Gap
Intelligence Funding
Congress passed in 1790 a statute which set up a secret 
discretionary account to be utilized by the Presidency "for 
the support of such persons as he shall commission to serve 
the United States in foreign parts. " The law authorized 
the Presidency to account openly for such expenditures "as 
in his judgment may be made public, and also for the aunount 
of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to 
specify. " ^7 The legislation was extended three years later 
with even less statutory restrictions upon Executive Branch. 
Controversy over this aspect of intelligence accountability
Stat. 128-29 (1790) cited in Louie Fisher, Presidential wei-mmki 
(Lawence, KN: University of Kansas Press, 1995), 165.
37ibid., 165.
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was virtually nonexistent throughout out the next century 
and a half.3»
The exigencies of prosecuting national crusades to stop 
the forces of global fascism and communism, caused marked 
and unprecedented increases in the amount of secret funds 
requested and authorized. As Louis Fisher notes, for 
exeunple, "the Roosevelt administration hid money in 
appropriations accounts during World War il to fund the 
Manhattan Project, which developed and produced the atomic 
bomb, and only a handful of legislators knew of the more 
them $2 billion spent on this p r o j e c t . I n  1945, Congress 
passed the Independent Offices Appropriations Act Wiich 
stated that agencies in existence for more than a yeaur may 
only receive funding through specific appropriations made by 
Congress.40 with the National Security Act of 1947, Congress 
further delegated direct control over intelligence policy by 
authorizing that intelligence appropriations be "disguised 
and buried else%diere"4i— mainly in the annual defense budget.
38ibid., 166.
^^Louis Fisher, ”Confidential Spending and Government 
Accountability," Georoe Waahinaton Law Review. 47 (1979): 361-362. 
40pat M. Bolt, Secret intmlligmmem MitA Public Policy: A Dil—  
Democracy (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 28. 
4iibid., 29.
40
In short, "the CIA has never received a specific 
appropriation by Congress.
Today, the specific line-items of the intelligence 
budget remain classified. The current Director of US 
Central Intelligence agreed to the publication of the 
aggregate figure appropriated for 1997 and 1998, although 
requests to disclose the 1999 and 2000 numbers have been 
denied for security reasons.*3 Throughout the 1990's, 
intelligence budget figure typically ranged between $26-28 
billion.** In a democracy, secrecy and control over 
information represents power and control to some extent. 
When in September of 1995, it was disclosed that the 
National Reconnaissance Office— responsible for developing 
and maintaining the nation's system of spy satellites— had 
accumulated over $1 billion in unspent funds, new debate 
concerning accountability in this area of public policy 
emerged.*5 Accumulated money %#ould give an agency a way to
*^Save for "hou«*k**ping" itams auch aa paraonnal ratirament funds. 
Holt, Secret Intalliaanea. 29.
*^See Justin Brown, "The Top Secret' at CIA: Its Own Budget,”
Christian Science Monitor. 26 May 2000, from Federation of American 
Scientists Web Cite, <www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/05/000526—nfip.htm>.
**See Staff Reporting, ”Intelligence Bottom Line Disclosed,” 
Congressional Ouarteriv aim.».,. (Washington D.C.t CQ Press, 1997), 8- 
48.
*^The Washington Post made the disclosure on 24 September 1995; cited 
in J. Whitfield Larrabee, ”Black Holesi How Secret Military and 
Intelligence ^ipropriations Suck Op Your Tax Dollars,” «4-
56 (May-June 1996): 9.
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circumvent democratic accountability, insofar as the agency 
could conduct research and development in specific areas 
without being forced to seek a legitimizing nod from the 
Congress in the form of statutorally-authorized 
appropriations. Article l, Section 9, of the United States 
Constitution— the "Statement and Account” clause— provides 
to the Congress the Constitutional authority to conduct 
forms of oversight. The question is %diether or not this 
authority can be in-part delegated to the Executive Branch 
on intelligence-related matters of national security. 
Despite recent controversy, most of the intelligence budget 
remains classified, as desired mainly by the Executive 
Branch.
CovBrt Warmaking and the Constitution
Another aspect of Congress ionally-delegated power with 
respect to the intelligence community is covert warmaking. 
This matter, perhaps more than any other, offers insights as 
to the current intelligence-related dynamics between 
Congress and the Executive.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that 
exclusively to the Congress shall be granted the power "to
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declare War" and to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal."** 
A letter of Marque is an expressed permission to cross 
borders to obtain redress and a letter of reprisal 
authorizes "the use of force to secure compensation for an 
unlawful taking of property or goods."*’ At the time of the 
Constitutional Convention, letters of marque and reprisal 
"came to signify any intermediate or lov-intensity hostility 
short of declared war that utilized public or private 
forces."** Many of the Framers, including Hamilton, 
supported this definition amd recognized the power as 
belonging to Congress alone.*^ Many statesmen of the time 
considered such letters to be a democratic solution to 
engaging in hostilities which did not rise to the level of a 
formally declared conflict.** The decision to authorize 
paramilitary types of activities was thought by Madison to 
ensure "immediate responsibility to the nation in all those 
for whose conduct that nation itself is to be responsible."*^
**Art. X, Sec. 8, OS Conefeitution.
*’jules Lobel, "Covert War and Congreseional Authority: Bidden War 
and Forgotten Power, " Oniveraity gf P*»nnavlvania Law Review. 134 
(June 1986): 1042-1043.
**Ibid., 1045. Italics in original.
**Ibid., 1046.
*®Ibid., 1046.
*lFederaliat Papers. No. 44, Cited in Lobel, Covert War. 1052.
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This interpretation suggests that the Congress today is 
intended to possess much more of a role in conducting the 
nation's covert activities— particularly of the paramilitary 
variety. In fact. Congress has all but formally delegated 
its power to approve such use of force, utilizing instead 
its nonenumerated power of oversight to register its 
approval after the fact. It is not by coincidence that this 
delegation of power has closely paralleled— if not mirrored- 
-that of the war power.
As Robert Katzmann notes, few issues so graphically 
illustrate the problems of allocating national security 
responsibility between Congress and the Presidency as that 
of war p o w e r s . 2^ Both constitutional scholars and historians 
have struggled to uncover the true meaning of the war power 
in the Constitution. Most experts seem to agree that, in 
terms of this power, the frame%#ork of the document itself 
was intended to perpetuate a clear division of 
responsibility between Congress and the Presidency with 
neither branch having a completely lopsided allocation.
^^Robert A. Katanann, "War Powars: Toward a New Accommodation, " in A 
Oueation of Balançat Tkm Prmmiamnt. Canarmmm. and Faraion Policy, ad. 
Thcmaa Mann (Washington D.C.: Tha Brookinga Instituts, 1990), 35.
For othar sourcaa saa Louis Bankin, Foraion xffaira and tha 
Constitution (Minaola, NT: Foundation Prass, 1972); Abraham D.
Sofaer, War. Foraicm Affairs, and Constitutional Powari Tha Origins 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976).
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Clearly, this intent with respect to aspects of intelligence 
policy does not exist. Not all covert activities involve 
military types of operations. However, a substantial 
portion of them involve the use of military force but are 
seemingly immune from Congressional regulation. What was 
the original intent on this matter?
The war power debate at the Constitutional Convention 
began during the first few weeks of June 1787 when the 
delegates were attempting to initially set up an Executive 
Branch.53 within roughly the first two %«eeks of the 
convention, delegates of several states offered a number of 
unique plans concerning the nature of the Presidency; 
however, none of these plans touched on the pertinent area 
of Executive war powers.5« Delegate Charles Pinckney's plan 
offered to invest the "Executive Power" in a single man who 
was to be "Commander in Chief of the arxy and navy of the 
United States..." and was eventually combined with aspects 
of delegate Alexander Hamilton's plan %diich, in part, 
stated:
53por excellent background eee David Locke Hall, The Reaoen a
Conatitutional Peraneetlve on War Power# and the Preaidencv (Boulder, 
CO; Weatview Frees, 1991), 1-32.
54 Ibid., 11.
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The President...shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. He shall be the commander in 
chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of 
the Militia within the several states...all treaties, 
conventions and agreements with foreign nations shall 
be made by him, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate.55
Ultimately, the delegates voted in favor of a draft which 
incorporated many of the powers mentioned in these plans. 
Additional debate occurred concerning the conferring upon 
Congress of power to "make" war. Delegates such as Charles 
Pinckney objected to this, contending that the problem of 
expediency %#ould not be answered in granting such a power to 
the full body of Congress. He believed that only the 
smaller and more knowledgeable Senate should handle such 
matters. Delegate Pierce Butler noted that if efficiency 
was desired, the Presidency should be given the power to 
make weur to vrhich delegate Elbridge Gerry responded for am 
incredulous majority that "[he] never expected to hear in a 
republic a motion to enqpower the Presidency alone to declaure 
war. "56
As a result, the draft was once again amended, striking 
out Congressional power to "make" war, which was already 
interpreted in the draft to be an Executive function in
55ibid., 11-13.
56oavid Gray Adler, "The Conatitution and Presidential Warmaking: The 
Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly. 103 (Spring 1988): 4.
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terms of repelling attacks, and in its place granting 
Congress the power to "declare" — interpreted then as 
meaning "commence” war.57 Additionally, the Congress, unlike 
the Presidency, was granted a host of other plenary war- 
related powers, including sole power over military 
appropriations, the power to raise and maintain an army and 
a navy as well as powers over the militia, and the power to 
grant letters of marque and reprisal— all potters tdiich 
relate to contemporary intelligence activities. 5» The 
Framers were quite naturally content to limit the Executive 
potter due to the misgivings they possessed with respect to 
monarchical systems of government.
This is not to say that the Framers completely 
disapproved of any sort of Executive prerogative in the 
scope of the war powers. Abraham Sofaer has contended that, 
in the granting of the appropriations power to Congress, the 
Framers were aware of its potential as a check on Executive 
warmaking.59 The Framers were conducive to the idea that 
military appropriations adopted for a neirrowly specified 
purpose could at times constitute Congressional approval for
57 Ibid., 6.
59MichaeI Glannon, Commtitutionml r x ( P r i n c e t o n ,  MJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 73.
59sofaer, War. Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power. 26-33.
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a specific Executive actlon*°~e.g. deterring piracy on the 
high seas by funding a navy. Other scholars such as David 
Hall note that Sofaer's contention Is consistent with both 
Madison and Hamilton.Hall quotes Madison's assertion 
that:
This power over the purse may. In fact, be regarded as 
the most complete and effectual weapon with which any 
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of 
the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance 
and for carrying Into effect every just salutary 
measure.
In addition to this, scholars have asserted that the 
Presidency possesses two other points of Executive war power 
despite the lengthy list of war powers the Framers allocated 
to C o n g r e s s . These two aspects are worth noting here In 
order to complete the framework of original Intent that has 
perpetuated the debate over war powers as they potentially 
relate to Intelligence policy. The first of these Is the 
Commander In Chief clause of the Constitution. Aspects of
The Rmaamn Warm. 15.
IS. The idea of legislative support of an action through 
continued appropriations is painfully obvious in the contsmporary 
exan^le of continued Congressional funding of U.S. operations in 
Vietnam despite Legislative apprehension during the same time 
concerning U.S. involvesient in Southeast Asia.
^^See Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking," 8-17; 
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the 
President (Lawrence, KSi University of Kansas Press, 1991), 3rd ed. 
247-250.
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David Hall's work assert that this clause signifies original 
Intent:
Set against the Legislative power to declare war was 
the President's power to act as Commander-ln 
Chief....The absence of recorded debate seems to 
suggest an absence of dissent on the question of 
whether the President should have command of the armed 
forces...The Framers concluded that Congress should not 
"make" war, but should be en^iowered to "declare" It.
The President was left with the power to "make" war to 
"repel sudden attacks." During such an emergency, as 
Hamilton pointed out, a declaration of war Is 
unnecessary because the nation Is "already at war."
Such exigency presents precisely the circumstances 
under which the Framers Intended and foresaw unilateral 
presidential warmaking.^
The argument that all war powers are vested In Congress 
by virtue the power to declare war Is Inconsistent with 
the historical role of declaration of war. The Framers 
clearly were familiar with the Idea of undeclared %*ar. 
Most eighteenth-century wars were u n - d e c l a r e d .
In light of Hall's argument, one cannot easily refute the 
general existence of emergency powers with respect to the 
Commander In Chief clause— It Is the scope of the powers 
that seems to be the focus of disagreement.
The final point of contention over war powers Is the 
"Executive po%«er” clause. Article II, section I of the 
Constitution states: "The Executive power shall be vested
In a President of the United States of America." The 
majority of the Framers rejected the notion that this clause
Tha Xmmgmn Warm. 17. 
65 Ibid., 19.
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should mean anything other than a mere execution of the laws 
and Executive appointments.^^ Delegates James Wilson and 
James Madison agreed that this power should deal solely with 
the ability to maintain the duties of the office, and 
delegate Roger Sherman went so far as to say that the 
Executive power was but a tool of the legislature for 
putting its will into effect.
Hamilton argued to the contrary. He asserted that the 
Presidency's enumerated Article II powers were not a 
"complete and perfect specification" of his Executive 
powers. Some powers are specified, "leaving the rest to 
flow from the general grant of that [Executive] power."
This interpretation of Executive power was accepted in 1926 
by the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States.^ The most 
recent Presidencies, including those of Carter and Clinton, 
have recognized an existing intent which permits the 
Presidency to deal with intelligence-related situations such 
as rogue development of weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, naircotics trafficking, and hostage rescue efforts
^^ Henlcxn, "Foreign Affaire and the Conatitution," 286.
S^Farrand, The Xeeorda of the rederal Convention of 1787. vol. 2, 
185, cited in Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking, 
14-15.
^Bpreceding portion of paragraph paraphrased from Ball, The Remamn 
Bara, 22.; 272 a.s. 52, 118 (1926>.
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through the clandestine use of military and quasimilitary 
force. *9
As with secret funding. Congress was soon delegating 
powers in the area of quasi-military policy as well. In 
1793, President George Washington issued a proclaunation 
which declared that the U.S. would remain neutral in a war 
occurring between France and Great B r i t a i n . it can be 
argued, and was by Madison, that it is not in the power of 
the Presidency to legislatively decide between a state of 
weu: £uid a state of peace for the nation; however, the action 
went officially unchallenged.^^
Similarly, President Thomas Jefferson took what was 
then considered to be scmievrhat extraordinary steps to ensure 
the safety of American merchant vessels from piracy. In 
1801, Jefferson ordered U.S. naval vessels to engage hostile 
elements from Tripoli without Legislative consent. Congress 
retroactively authorized these responses eight months after
^9see John Lehman, Making War: The 200-rear-Cld Battle Between the 
President and Conoreea over am.rica Goee to War (Mew York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992).
^^Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking,* 18. 
^^President Washington acted similarly in avoiding confrontations 
with Spain and in his orders authorizing preemptive action against 
the Miami Indians. During this century, scsw of the nation's largest 
paramilitary operations such as in Central Mnerica, Iran, and 
Afghanistan brought the nation into the twilight zone just outside of 
declared war.
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their Initiation. The war power seeds sown by these early
Presidencies were strong precedents which en^ xTwered future 
office holders. The scope of the war powers steadily 
changed due to the use of these precedents — especially 
during the crises of the past century. The perceived abuse 
of these powers culminated in the controversial war powers 
legislation of the 1970"s. "Thus," as John Lehman notes, 
"the very earliest precedents established one pattern that 
has often been followed since. To wit, the President 
initiates military action without Congressional 
interference, often with ipso facto blessing if it has gone 
well."73
In addition to following early precedents. Chief 
Executives have encountered a vast array of extraordinary 
emergency powers. Prominent examples of these include the 
Supreme Court's Civil WaLC era decision in the Prize Cases, 
stating that "[The President] does not initiate the war, but 
is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any
^^Lehman, Making War. 76-77. Jaffaraon'a dacialon ia often referred 
to aa actiona taken againat Barbery raidera. Intereatingly, thia 
particular precedent ia remarkably aimilar to Preaident Reagan ' a 
1987-88 reflagging and protection of Kuwaiti oil tankera in the 
Peraian Gulf. Retroactive Congreaaional approval in war powera and 
intelligence activities ia as old as the Constitution itself. 
73ibid., 77.
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special legislative authority. In this case. President
Abraham Lincoln's wartime measures were approved on the 
grounds that they were necessary to save the union and the 
very fabric of its laws. Large leeway was also granted to 
President Franklin Roosevelt for coping with world War II. 
These grants of authority augmented the various types of 
guasi-legal justifications that those holding the office of 
the Presidency would utilize to authorize extended actions 
abroad.
The point here is not necessarily to make a detailed 
historical examination of the apparent expansion in 
presidential waunnaking but rather to argue that the 
political context of "emergency" has increased Congressional 
deference to the Presidency on matters of national security- 
-most assuredly intelligence policy. Justice Jackson, 
writing his concurrence in the 1952 steel seizure case, 
stated that "emergency powers tend to kindle emergencies. " 
This context is the most important explanation in attenqpting
^^Joan Biakupic, "Conatitution'm Conflicting Clauaoa Underacored by 
Iraq Criaia," Conaraaaional Quarterly Weekly Report. 12 January 1991, 
36.
^^For example, Rooaevelt inatituted a number of dcmeatic control 
meaaurea, auch aa wage and price contrôla, to more effectively 
proaecute the war.
'^^Foungstown Sheet C Tub» Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Juatice 
Jackaon concurring.
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to link theories of original intent with current 
governmental practices.
The Cold War represented warmaking in a manner %diich 
the Framers could never have anticipated. This was a type 
of war in which formal declarations were not feasible. 
Rather, it was a conflict waged almost entirely by 
clandestine services during its initial stages. If ever 
there existed Justice Jackson's "twilight zone" of foreign 
policy power with respect to the Constitution, it was in a 
high stakes %rar fought mainly by spies and paramilitary 
types. The Cold War was unprecedented in its nature, 
scope, and level of peril. Unlike clashes over religion, 
territory, and perceived power relationships, the Cold War 
was a con^tition of ideas which created and justified vast 
national security states amd bureaucracies. So great were 
the dangers and stakes of this conflict for the US that an 
unprecedented array of prerogatives were bestowed upon the 
Executive Branch— all for the in^rtant goal of maintaining 
the security of the country and its interests. Nuclear 
weapons afforded only minutes to make decisions and demanded 
the best of intelligence services. Widespread, fear-driven
77Ibid.
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bipartisanship over the need to avoid a nucleeu: Pearl 
Harbor, and to contain Communist aggression, could be 
mollified by allowing the Presidency to take vigorous action 
abroad with little regard for democratic principles in 
decision naking.
The much ballyhooed consensus over Cold War foreign 
policy in the wake of the Second World War was as much a 
product of this climate of national emergency as it was a 
meeting of the minds between the likes of Republican Senator 
Arthur Vandenburg and President Truman. The discretion and 
powers legislatively granted to the Executive Branch during 
the Cold War were a continuation of an American political 
tradition. Like the Congressional deference paid to the 
unprecedented Executive actions of Washington and Jefferson, 
and similar to the delegations of authority to Lincoln and 
Franklin Roosevelt, the Executive latitudes afforded by the 
Congress during the Cold War have been lasting. Once an 
institution of government grants expressed or tacit approval 
to the actions of another brauich, then power is delegated—  
often without legis lation— and in a manner %diich makes 
official change quite difficult.^* The fact is that, apart
^^The War Power# Act ha# don# littl# to curb pr##id#ntial warmaking 
or increase a priori Congreaaional involvement in these matters.
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from presidentialist arguments which state that the 
Executive is best suited to handle intelligence policy due 
to the need for secrecy and dispatch. Congress developed 
what some describe as a "culture of deference" with respect 
to matters of national security and foreign policy.^® 
Congress and the Executive became virtually disconnected 
from one another with respect to intelligence policy.
It was not until the Vietnam-inspired erosion of the 
Cold War consensus that serious réévaluation began 
concerning the national security policy relationship between 
the Chief Executive and the Legislature. The Legislature 
was increasingly unwilling to be deferential to the national 
security initiatives of the Chief Executive. The volatile 
political context of the times was exacerbated by several 
remarkable disclosures concerning US domestic intelligence 
activity and various US-sponsored assassination attempts 
overseas. Congress attempted to regain some control of 
intelligence policy through its unenumerated power of 
oversight. The reality of oversight has made a significant
^®St«phen R. W*i#«man, A Culture of Dmfmrmnc*: Contra»»* Rmilure of
Leaderahip in Foreign Policy (New York: Harper Colline, 1995).
®°For an excellent aasessment of this transformation see Lawrence C. 
Dodd, "Congress, the Presidency, and the American Experience: A
Transformational Perspective, ” in CizidSdLQHBBSCAfiXf ed. James A 
Thurber (Washington B.C. : Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991), 275- 
302.
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impact upon the formulation and conduct of intelligence 
policy.
Congress and the President: The Oversight Linkage
The preceding section has argued that, despite original 
intent. Congress has formally delegated virtually plenary 
national security powers to the Presidency. This abdication 
of power was most notable with respect to Congress ' 
responsibility for key areas of intelligence policy. Also, 
in terms of democratic notions of accountability and limits 
upon bureaucratic discretion. Congressional delegations 
created a disproportional amount of policy influence between 
the two branches— clearly not something the Framers 
generally intended to promote. The volatile political 
context of the early 1970's, combined with a collapse of the 
American consensus on the Cold War, culminated in a 
resurgence of Congress against an "imperial" Presidency. 
There was a significeuit attempt by Congress to once again 
command some level of impact upon national security policy. 
It did not find success in attending to regain through 
statutes the power and influence which it had long since 
delegated to the Executive. Instead, it acquired— created
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to some extent— power and influence by utilizing the 
activity of oversight.
One does not find the term oversight in the text of the 
Constitution. The Framers did not anticipate the existence 
of the large bureaucratic-administrative state into which 
the United States government has evolved. Nevertheless, the 
"necessary and proper" and "statement and account” clauses 
grant the legislature a broad notion of po%#er with respect 
to regulating Executive agencies.
A set of models developed by Richard Stillman are 
useful with respect to understanding the intelligence 
oversight relationship between Congress and the Presidency. 
Of the oversight relationship between the two branches, 
Stillman says that there are essentially three views which 
can be traced back to the Framers of the Constitution. The 
Jeffersonian view of bureaucratic oversight stressed limits 
on governmental authority and discretion. It is also 
characterized by
* extensive popular participation, as opposed to full­
time professionals.
* maximum decentralization of functions to limit 
activities and ensure "constant popular scrutiny."
I, S«c. 8, OS Conatitution.
^^Diacuasion based upon Richard Stillman, r-mn auraaucracv:
The Core of Modem Govammant (Chicago: Nelson-Ball, 1996), 2nd ed., 
360-394.
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’ operational simplicity and economy.
■ strict legal limitations that clearly spell out 
organizational purposes and limit discretion.
* administrative power that flows from the bottom up.*^
The Jeffersonian model dominated the oversight relationship 
during most of the 19th Century because the political 
character of the country was typified by highly localized, 
agrarian interests and the relatively small role and size of 
the Executive Branch.
The Hamiltoniam view, by contrast, places a premium 
upon administrative effectiveness, while paying less 
attention to other democratic values such as public 
accountability and the representation of interest group 
concerns. Other characteristics include
* broad discretionary and activist roles for agencies.
* strong, centralized, decisive leadership.
* unified organizations, preferetbly led by one 
individual.
* preference for paid, trained professionals.
■ popular control through election of capable chief 
executives supplied with adequate political power.
This model became predominant as the United States emerged 
as an industrial and international power during the late 
19th and early 20th Centuries. This period culminated with
83ibid., 362-363. 
84Ibid., 361-362.
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the recommendations of the Brownlow Commission of the 
1930's. The recommendations included:
* placing the Presidency in charge of an independent 
Executive Branch.
* transferring authority for budgeting, personnel and 
planning to the White House.
* giving the Executive complete responsibility for 
accounts and current financial transactions.**
Stillman contends, however, that the current oversight 
relationship is better depicted by the Madisonian model, 
which en^hasizes the importemce of pluralism and the 
satisfaction of organized interests rather than the values 
of efficacy emd accountability. This model emphasizes the 
fact that Executive agencies are immersed with other 
political actors in national politics and that they share 
power with the other branches of government. Power is more 
fluid in this model, flowing to and from all levels of the 
organization. "Social consensus and equilibrium between 
coopting interest groups, not organizational efficacy nor 
accountability to an abstract will of the people, should be 
the primeucy aim of public officials.
The intelligence oversight relationship bet%peen the 
Executive and Legislative Branches of government does not
85Ibid., 373-374. 
86lbid., 364.
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fit the Madisonian model as outlined by Stillman. This is 
due mainly to the nature of intelligence policy. This type 
of public policy is unique in terms of its national 
constituency emd special activities. Agencies within the 
intelligence community possess a unique set of clients and 
constraints vdiich are wholly unlike those of the more 
prevalent forms of policy agencies*^.
Intelligence activity, even more than diplomacy, is 
inherently Executive.** The requirements of managerial 
hierarchy, expediency of decisionmaking, and discretion in 
pursuing policy goals are most suited to the 
Hamiltonian model. Like Stillman's application of this 
model to the Marine Corps, the Hamiltonian model is 
currently dominant in the intelligence %#orld, due to its 
reliamce upon a professionalized staff, a pyramidal 
hierarchy of authority, and, aunong other traits, an 
assumption that there will be a separation between politics 
and administration. ** In matters of national security, the
*^Regulatory and redistributiva policy, for inatanca, must contend 
with organized interests such as the oil and gas producers or the 
American Association of Retired People. These groups comg»ete %rith 
others to influence the behaviors and outputs of Congress and 
relevant agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission and th« 
Social Security Administration.
**Leaving aside questions of whether or not it ought to be idiolly 
conducted by presidents alone.
**Stillman, ammrican Bureaucracy. 385.
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American citizenry— like many of the Framers— have 
en^hasized Executive Branch efficacy over public 
accountability. The Congress was institutionally disposed 
to see that power euid decisionmaking in national security 
were delegated to the Executive Branch to deal with periodic 
national crises. Hence, the protracted, apocalyptic nature 
of the Cold war— with its anti-Communist consensus— meant 
that delegations of this type necessarily became continuous. 
Policy consensus during this time revolved around the notion 
of containment and the veurious presidential doctrines in 
which it was manifested. The breakdown of all three 
components of consensus— value, procedural, £uid policy—  
occurred during the Vietnam era.
As a result of this breéücdown, there occurred what 
Samuel Huntington has termed a "democratic surge," in which 
a new consensus formed around the value of accountability.*) 
Policy consensus with respect to the means of achieving the 
containment of ccxmnunism dramatically dissipated with 
respect to intelligence policy, as revelations concerning
^^Cited by Stillman from Samuel P. Huntington, "The United States," 
in Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, an Joji Watanuki, eds., The 
Crisis of namocracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 74-
75.
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covert activities shocked the public.Procedurally^ the 
Congress no longer possessed an overriding consensus that it 
should remain wholly deferential to the Executive Branch in 
matters of intelligence— or matters of diplomacy and 
national security generally. In conjunction with the outcry 
over intelligence power êüsuses, a new procedural consensus 
significantly emerged with the reform-minded Congress in the 
mid-1970's. They attempted to reconstitute the Hamiltonian 
model of intelligence policymaking to incorporate major 
aspects of the Jeffersonian model, including accountability 
and more narrowly defined Executive discretion. This was 
achieved mainly through adoption of Investigative 
Oversight.92 The intelligence policy relationship of the 
past twenty-five years has been largely affected by this 
attempt to splice together aspects of both the Hamiltonian 
and Jeffersoniem views.
To summarize, this chapter has presented research 
concerning original intent with respect to the intelligence 
policy relationship between Congress and the Executive 
Branch. Its purpose has not been to prove that the
9^For exang»le see, Seymour Her ah, "Huge CIA Operation Reported in OS 
against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," New York 
Times. 22 Dec. 1974, Al.
92The nature of which is reviewed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.
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Presidency should be preeminent in this policy area.
Rather, the purpose has been to outline key aspects of 
original intent vrtiich contribute to certain institutional 
dispositions. In the course of history. Congress has been 
disposed to afford the Presidency degrees of latitude for 
dealing with matters of national security. In doing so. 
Congress largely removed itself from the formulation and 
conduct of important types of policy, such as intelligence 
policy. Congressional deference clearly helped to 
perpetuate a tradition of Executive preeminence with respect 
to intelligence matters. The unprecedented nature of the 
Cold War served to increase this trend— at least until the 
erosion of consensus began in earnest during the late 
1960's. The changing nature of this consensus, in the wake 
of Vietnam and Watergate, caused the intelligence policy 
relationship bet%#een the two branches to shift dramatically. 
Congress utilized its power of oversight to contest the 
total control that the Presidency enjoyed over intelligence 
policy. Congressional abstinence from intelligence policy 
was replaced by adversarial forms of oversight. Part of the 
explanation for this advesarial response and for more recent 
trends in Executive-Congressional relations can be
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attributed to the contextual factor of institutional 
dispositions. The following two chapters examine the 
relationship between Chief Executives, their OCXs and the 
congress in order to illuminate other important contextual
factors.
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Chapter 3
Cold War Intelligence and the Executive Branch
To the Central Intelligence Agency, a necessity to the President
of the United States, from one who knows.
-President Harry Truman^
What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?
-President Richard Nixon^
Consensus, Personality, and Personal Relationships
This chapter assesses the evolving relationship between 
presidents and their Directors of Central Intelligence 
during the Cold War. Certain contextual factors useful for 
helping to explain post-Cold War interbranch relations with 
respect to intelligence policy emerge during this period. 
From its inception in 1947, the modern intelligence 
community has been a unique tool of the Presidency. In the 
realm of national security, the community goes beyond the 
role of providing presidents with prescient intelligence and 
analysis to one of supplying policy options, like covert
^President Truman ' s inscription on a photograph of himself which he 
presented to the CIA, 9 June 1964, cited in Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, "Our First Line of Defense: Presidential Reflections on 
US Intelligence," <http://www.odci.gov/csi/nionograph/firstln 
/Washington.html>, Downloaded 4 February 2000.
^Quoted in Robert M. Gates, "An Opportunity Unfulfilled: The Use and
Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House," The Washington 
Quarterly 12 (Winter 1989): 35.
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actions, that are alternatives to the more binding extremes 
of war and diplomacy. However, as a component of the 
Executive Branch, the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
other elements which make up the intelligence community are 
similar to other bureaucratic actors in the sense that they 
compete for resources and influence. Presidents have varied 
considerably in the amount of attention they give to, and 
guidance they accept from, the intelligence community— as 
personified by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
The Cold War period (1947-1990) encompasses the era of 
greatest presidential influence on the intelligence 
community as well as the post-Vietnam era in which 
presidents faced a contest for control of intelligence 
matters, as the Congress began to assert itself.
Differences between these eras highlight inçortant 
contextual factors for explaining interbranch relations and 
policy.
During the initial stages of the Cold War, presidents 
chose their own DCIs and provided them with varying degrees 
of access and policy influence without regard to the 
Congress. The personal proclivities of individual 
presidents may be the strongest factor in explaining events
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during the first part of the Cold War. However, beginning 
in 1975, the era of contested control witnessed DCIs who 
were compelled to be more sensitive to the Congress. This 
shift in the attention of DCIs created a new dynamic in 
Executive-Congressional relations and, as a consequence, 
greatly affected the formulation and in^lementation of 
intelligence policy. The changes which occurred also made 
increasingly inçxjrtant contextual factors involving 
personality and personal relationships. In the post-Cold 
War era, these contextual elements have become primary 
explanatory factors, thus making an understanding of their 
origins an inç>ortant part of this study.
The Modem US Intelligence Apparatus
The grounds of the Central Intelligence Agency^ are the 
repository for a section of the Berlin Wall. The artifact 
rests serenely on a small grassy knoll— its Western side 
colorfully spray-painted with an array of slogans, its 
Eastern side characteristically stark and unaltered.^ The 
portion of the Wall represents the Agency's victory over its 
main opponent, the Soviets Union's KGB. In a larger sense.
^Hereafter, the "Agency."
^Author's research visit, CIA Headquarters, 1 September 1999.
68
it represents the head of a slain dragon and America's 
triumph over an ideological foe of five decades.
The displayed portion of the Wall is indicative also of 
the nature and pace of political change that has come to 
characterize our time— change that is happening so rapidly 
that observers cannot seem to define precisely their present 
state of diplomatic affairs but, instead, utilize the past 
to provide some sort of bearings as to what should be the 
nature of American national security. Nearly ten years 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, government 
officials, commentators, and academics still speak of our 
current dilemmas in this "post Cold War" era. Utilization 
of this expression has become so commonplace that, with 
respect to matters of national security, a certain set of 
assumptions and priorities have become widely accepted.
These include increased regional instability due to the loss 
of world bipolarity, proliferation and dissemination of 
weapons of mass destruction and related technological 
information, decreased American hegemony and increased 
independence of those who enjoyed the Cold War umbrella of 
US military protection, and a significant shift in the 
nature of power such that nations acquiring the newest
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advances in technology are counted among the emerging cadre 
of elite states.
The Framers of the Constitution could not have imagined 
the course of events which would test the structure and 
mechanics of the government they constructed. Similarly, 
despite their experience with intelligence and their 
assumption that the Executive Branch would experience the 
continuous need for intelligence-related services, the 
Framers had little foreknowledge of— and in some cases 
desire for— an America that was widely and deeply engaged 
abroad. In fact. President Washington warned his successors 
in government that, despite the young nation's proven 
ability to secure itself, the United States should minimize 
its relations with other states. In his Farewell Address he 
stated, "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to 
foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to 
have with them as little political connection as possible. 
Following Washington, President John Quincy Adams stated 
that "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to 
destroy.”  ^ The nation abided by these foreign policy maxims
^Cited in Walter A. McOougall, Promised Land. Crueader State; The 
American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1997), 46.
®Ibid., 36.
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and, relative to our own time, America's political role on 
the world stage in the 19th century was quite limited.
The Executive push for an expanded American role in 
foreign affairs began with President McKinley's prosecution 
of a war with Spain. Theodore Roosevelt's use of US naval 
vessels in defending national interests, and pursuing his 
"big stick" style of engagement, accentuated this trend.
The American proclivity for nonentanglement began to erode 
in earnest by the time of World War I and President Woodrow 
Wilson's doomed pleas for an increased international role 
for the country. America's failure to support the League of 
Nations, the intensely perverse nature of totalitarian 
regimes, and the terrible costs of modern warfare helped to 
set the stage for a new consensus regarding America's need 
to be internationally engaged.
From an intelligence policy standpoint, clearly the 
intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor, and the global threat 
of communism, weighed heavily on the minds of those "present 
at the creation " of America's new foreign policy in the late 
1940's. After the first successful nuclear tests conducted 
by the Soviet Union in 1949, the matter of intelligence 
became of central importance. The age of atomic diplomacy
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and the high levels of superpower summitry that were taking 
place caused presidential needs for timely, accurate 
intelligence to increase dramatically.
Forewarning and the ability to dictate the course of 
events, rather than merely react to them, contributed to the 
country's power and deterred a communist-inspired Pearl 
Harbor. To this end, the role of the US intelligence 
community was viewed as critical to the foreign policy 
objectives of containment. As described in Chapter 2, the 
Executive Branch expected Congressional deference on matters 
of national security— particularly with respect to 
intelligence activity. Each president vigorously defended 
his intelligence prerogatives despite the formation of, and 
episodic assertiveness displayed by, the Congressional 
Committees cheurged with intelligence oversight. However, 
the Executive Branch now faces the task of constructing a 
post-Cold War justification for an intelligence community in 
a highly polarized, fiscally-challenging political 
environment. This period has witnessed unprecedented debate 
and conflict over confirmation hearings, intelligence
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reform, and what security threats should be allotted 
significant intelligence resources.^
One phenomenon that emerges from this history—  
especially the early Cold War portion— is a trend for 
legislative intentions and textbook democratic processes to 
be subordinated to situational imperatives and the varying 
levels of policy consensus produced at different moments in 
political time. Research about the origins and historical 
management of the Cold War intelligence community shows that 
leadership personalities and political realities, together 
with the varying degrees of consensus they produce, are key 
factors for understanding interbranch relations and 
intelligence policy. But what are the legislative intents 
that have been significantly subordinated by the increasing 
role of certain elements of context? The following sections 
of this chapter attempt to address this question through an
S^ee, for example, George Tenet, "Does America Need the CIA?," Vital 
Speeches Of The Dav. 15 January 1998, 197-199; Roy Godson, Ernest R. 
May, and Gary Schmitt, eds., US Intelligence at the Crossroads; 
Agendas for Reform (Washington D.C.: Brassey'a, 1995); Roger Bilsman, 
"Does the CIA Still Have a Role?," Foreign Affairs 74 
(September/October 1995): 104-116; Loch K. Johnson, "Now That the 
Cold War is Over, Do We Need the CIA?," in The Future of American 
Foreign Policv. ed. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 301-306; David L. Boren, "The 
Intelligence Camnunity: How Crucial?,” Foreign Affairs 71 (Sumner 
1992): 51-62; Graham E. Fuller, "Intelligence, Imnaculately 
Received," The National Interest 26 (Winter 1991-1992): 95-99.
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examination of the origins of the modern intelligence 
community.
In the Beginning: The Bational Security Act of 1947
The Second World War is the starting point for 
examining our modern intelligence community. Contrary to 
the popular notion, the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor 
is not as infamous as the attack itself. The problem was 
not that federal government possessed no prescient 
information regarding an imminent move by the Imperial naval 
forces of Japan. Rather, it was the lack of a centralized 
entity for the pooling, examination, and expedient 
distribution of vital information which contributed greatly 
to our first modern "intelligence failure."
The current structure of the us intelligence community 
is a product of President Harry Truman's desire to 
centralize intelligence functions^ and make more expedient 
the distribution of the community's work.^ Truman was 
irritated by the redundant efforts of, and rivalry between.
^Collection and analysis. For a discussion of the structure and 
mechanincs of the CIA, see Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA; Revealing 
the Secrets of the World’s Most Powerful Sp v  Aoencv (New York: Pocket 
Books, 1992).
^David Ray, "Intelligence Accountability After the Cold War: 
Continuity and Change in Congressional Oversight, 1991-1997,” paper 
prepared for presentation at the Southwestern Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, Chorpus Christi, March 18-21, 1998, 1.
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existing intelligence elements within the government and the 
armed services. He described the process and structures he 
inherited from Roosevelt this way:
Before 1946 such information as the President needed 
was being collected in several different places in the 
government. The War Department had an Intelligence 
Division— G-2— and the Navy had an intelligence setup 
of its own— the ONI. The Department of State, on the 
one hand, got its information through diplomatic 
channels, vdiile the Treasury and the Department of 
Commerce and Agriculture each had channels for 
gathering information from different parts of the 
world— on monetary, economic, and agricultural matters.
During world War II the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
had some operations cd)road, and in addition the Office 
of Strategic Services...operated abroad...
The Central Intelligence Agency was created as an 
upgraded replacement for the Office of Strategic Services. 
The OSS was created by President Franklin Roosevelt "in 
order to supplement the intelligence activities of the 
Department of State and the armed services. In an effort 
to consolidate existing intelligence entities and fulfill 
the war-time need for complicated, large-scale covert 
operations the OSS was established as the primary agency to 
conduct espionage and to tactically execute "special
10Ibid.
ilHarry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hopc (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 55-56.
i^Harold F. Gosnell, Truman's Crises; A Political Biooraphv of Harrv 
S. Truman (Westport, CT: Greemmood Press, 1980), 285.
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activities." This operational legacy was not lost on the 
CIA; nor did the Agency relinguish the unique bureaucratic 
turf of "special operations" bestowed on the OSS during the 
crisis of the war. Truman abolished the OSS in August 
1945^ ,^ not because there no longer existed a need for 
intelligence, but due to the fact that he was "wary of a 
peacetime spy agency"prosecuting clandestine operations of 
the OSS variety.
Nevertheless, Truman had long been convinced of the 
need to strengthen and centralize the federal government "s 
intelligence capabilities. He writes :
This scattered method of getting information for the 
various departments of government first struck me as 
being badly organized when I was in the Senate. Our 
Senate committees, hearing witnesses from the executive 
departments, were often struck by the fact that 
different agencies of the government came up with 
different and conflicting facts on similar subjects...
I have often thought that if there had been something 
like co-ordination of information in the government it 
would have been more difficult, if not in^ssible, for 
the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl 
Harbor, is
l^ay, "Intelligence Accountability," 1.
1^ Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention; The United States.
the Third World, and the Cold War. 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 38.
IS Ibid., 56. In 1944 Roosevelt requested a preliminary plan to 
centralize intelligence functions. The existing turmoil must have 
been significant for FDR to attempt to eliminate the administrative 
competition which he thrived on and utilized to make his decisions.
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As part of a letrger vision for unity and coordination among 
the national security agencies and armed services, Truman 
conducted a series of meetings in January 1946, in order to 
"examine the various plans suggested for a centralized 
intelligence authority. In a classic example of age-old 
competition, the State Department and the armed services 
submitted opposing plans. The State Department felt that 
it "should be in charge of all intelligence,""^® while the 
services believed every department should retain its own 
intelligence capability with the proposed agency being a 
collective pool for organizing and disseminating 
information. Truman favored the latter and was firm in 
dealing with those who would foot-drag over the bureaucratic 
changes. Confronting some resistance from an agency head, 
Truman said,
I know you have expert intelligence men in your office, 
but I like this plan. If your people can make it 
better, that s all right. But I have been waiting to 
do this for a long time. So you appoint your men...and 
let " s get it done. "
l^Ibid., 57.
^^Characterization of the plans taken from Truman, Memoir a. vol. 2,
57.
"ibid., 57.
"ibid., 57.
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The Central Intelligence Group was created by Executive 
Order on January 20, 1946. The CIG was placed under the 
direction of a national intelligence authority, which was 
created by a presidential directive two days l a t e r . T h e  
national intelligence authority consisted of the Departments 
of State, War, Navy, and the president's own representative. 
Truman wrote of this interim arrangement,
under the new intelligence arrangement I now began to 
receive a daily digest and summary of the information 
obtained abroad. I also was given all information sent 
abroad by the State Department to our ambassadors, as 
well as that sent by the Navy and War Departments to 
their forces, whenever these messages might have 
influence on our foreign policy. Here, at last, a co­
ordinate method had been %#orked out, and a practical 
way had been found for keeping the President informed 
as to what was known and what was going on.^ i
Truman pressed on towards his goal of reorganizing the US 
national security apparatus at large. On 26 February 1947, 
Truman sent the Speaker of the House and his chief ally in 
the Senate, Republican Arthur Vandenburg, a bill which would 
accomplish this aim.
On 26 July 1947— with some compromises to the armed 
services— Truman signed the National Security Act as he
2°Mark M. Lowenthal, 0.5. Intelligence; Evolution and Anatomy 
(Westport, CT: Fraeger, 1992), 2nd ed., 15. 
ziRarabell, Architects of Intervention. 58.
78
boarded the presidential aircraft to fly home to M i s s o u r i . 22 
Current Executive-Congressional intelligence relations have 
their origins in the National Security Act of 1947. The 
Act’s purpose, in part, was "to promote the national 
security by providing for.. .the coordination of the 
activities of the National Military Establishment with other 
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with 
the national security. " 22
The main purpose of the Act was to unify the Armed 
Services into what would eventually emerge as a central 
Department of Defense. The Act's creation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency has been described as "almost 
incidental." 2< Establishment of the CIA was an attempt to 
centralize the functions of intelligence collection and 
analysis as well as eliminate the pervasive bureaucratic 
rivalries and duplicitous efforts eunong various 
intelligence con^nents of several government agencies 
including the War Department, the Federal Bureau of
^^Truman «rished to beat the Congreasional recess and have James 
Forrestal named as Secretary of Defense with the passage of the Act. 
The final Congressional signatures came as the President waited to 
travel home to see his ailing mother %#ho, unbeknownst to Truman, 
would die before his plane landed in Missouri. See David McCullough, 
Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 571.
22National Security Act of 1947, PL 253, 80th Congress, 1st Sees.
24pat Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policv; A Dilemma of
Democracy (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1995), 28.
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Investigation, and the State Department's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research. The Central Intelligence 
Agency, in addition to duties of intelligence collection 
and analysis, was charged with covert and paramilitary 
operations as well as overseas counterintelligence.
The Act also created a Director of Central intelligence 
(DCI) to "centralize" the activities of intelligence 
community and report directly to the Presidency. The DCI 
possesses a dual role as head of the CIA and manager of the 
US intelligence community. The community itself encompasses 
a number of agencies and bureaucratic turfs which have been 
fragmented since the Act's inception. This fragmentation 
has increased as specialized agencies such as the National 
Security A g e n c y ^ s  the National Reconnaissance Office^®, and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency^^ were created as the Cold 
War progressed. The DCI faces enormous challenges in 
attempting to fulfill the role of community manager— not the 
least of Wiich is the fact that most of the annual
^^Created by President Truman in 1952 and today is mainly responsible 
for the SIGIHT (signals intelligence) and ELIMT (electronic 
intelligence).
^®Created by President Eisenhower and has been responsible for 
maintaining the nation's system of aerial reconnaissance platforms—  
mainly "spy" satellites.
^^Created in 1961 by President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert 
McNamara and created to manage the intelligence activities of the 
four Armed Services.
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intelligence budget falls under the control of the Pentagon 
and the Secretary of Defense. Nearly all of these Executive 
agencies perform the intelligence functions of collection 
and analysis with covert actions and paramilitary warmaking 
being the specific purview of the CIA.^s The Act's only 
intelligence-related section. Sec. 102, declares the duties 
of the Central Intelligence Agency and its Director in 
rather short order.
Section 102 is divided into six subsections (a-f). 
102(a) states that
There is hereby established under the National Security 
Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director 
of Central Intelligence, %dio shall be the head thereof. 
The Director shall be appointed by the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from 
among the commissioned officers of the armed services 
or from among individuals in civilian life. The 
Director shall receive compensation at the rate of 
$14,000 a year.”
Sec. 102(b) exclusively discusses the career status and pay 
grade of a commissioned officer serving as DCI. The framers 
of the legislation were wary of combining an officer's 
military command authority with that of the office of 
Director— lest the views of the Pentagon color the 
intelligence product. At the same time, legislators did not
2®Ray, "Intelligence Accountability," 2.
29ibid.
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wish to preclude from the highly managerial role of DCI 
those senior military personnel who displayed outstanding 
leadership abilities. Prospective DCIs within the ranks of 
the armed services worried that agreeing to serve the 
president as Director would hurt or even halt their military 
careers. These fears were laid to rest in Sec. 102(b).
Sec. 102(c) deals solely with the DCIs authority to 
terminate the employment of any Agency official if such an 
action is warranted by the security interests of the United 
States.
Sec. 102(d) represents the heart of the Act's 
discussion concerning the duties of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. The Agency's main role of "coordinating the 
intelligence activities of the several Government 
departments and agencies in the interest of national 
security" involved five main functions to be conducted by 
the Agency "under the direction of the National Security 
Council."
(1) [T]o advise the National Security Council in 
matters concerning such intelligence activities of the 
Government departments and agencies as relate to 
national security[.]
(2) [T]o make recommendations to the National Security 
Council for the coordination of such intelligence
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activities of the departments and agencies of the 
Government as relate to the national security[.]
(3) [T]o correlate and evaluate intelligence relating 
to the national security, and provide for the 
appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within 
the Government using where appropriate existing 
agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency 
shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, 
or internal-security functions: Provided further. That 
the departments and other agencies of the Government 
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and 
disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided 
further. That the Director of Central Intelligence 
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence 
sources an methods from unauthorized disclosure[.]
(4) [T]o perform, for the benefit of the existing 
intelligence agencies, such additional services of 
common concern as the National Security Council 
determines can be more efficiently accomplished 
centrally[.]
(5) [T]o perform such other functions and duties 
related to intelligence affecting the national security 
as the National Security Council may from time to time 
direct.^
The language of Section 102 is remarkably broad in 
terms of the Agency's potential activities— a fact which 
could not have been lost on the authors of the legislation. 
From an Executive viewpoint, the language may be described 
as en >^owering, since the most explicit portions of wording 
only detail what may not take place or how an entity may not 
be defined. For instance, fears of developing a Gestapo- 
like police force compelled the Act's creators to make 
explicit the prohibition of the new Agency involving itself
30ibid.
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in matters of police, subpoena, or law enforcement. In 
short, fears held since the beginning of the republic were 
addressed by clearly barring the Agency from participating 
in matters of internal security.
Section 102 (d)(5), with its undefined reference to 
performing "such other functions and duties" as directed by 
the National Security Council, is potentially very 
empowering. The legislation which emerged from Congress did 
not address the implications of this wording. This 
particular sub-section of the Act is the main basis for 
covert operations in which the Agency has been engaged. The 
other basis is the operational legacy of the OSS and the 
interim CIG. Past and present members of Congress on both 
sides of the aisle remain committed to the covert action 
capability of the Executive Branch.This is significant in 
the wake of excesses such as the Iran-Contra matter and the 
end of the Executive-empowering, constant sense of crisis 
characteristic of the Cold war.
Sec. 102(a) clearly places the Agency "under the 
National Security Council. " The Act sets up the NSC as a
^^ Hhen. asked "Do you think It was intended, and do members of 
Congress still desire, that the president have a covert action 
capability?” one Congressional insider said "Of course. It's simply 
naive not to want this for the country. " Confidential interview with 
author, 18 October 1999, Washington D.C..
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purely Executive entity with rather open-ended 
responsibilities. The NSC was created "to advise the 
President with respect to the integration of domestic, 
foreign, and military policies relating to the national 
security so as to enable the military services and other 
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more 
effectively in matters involving the national s e c u r i t y . "32 
Specific duties of the Council are
to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and 
risks of the United States in relation to our actual 
and potential military power, in the interest of 
national security, for the purpose of making 
recommendations to the President in connection 
therewith; and33
to consider policies on matters of common interest to 
the departments and agencies of the Government 
concerned with the national security, and to make 
recommendations to the President in connection 
therewith. 34
The Council shall, from time to time, make such 
recommendations, and such other reports to the 
President as it deems appropriate or as the President 
may require.35
The NSC, therefore, owns a distinct role as a policy 
making body. Its structure, access, and activities are a 
product of presidential styles and inclinations. Presidents 
Truman and Eisenhower were committed to the "old" school.
32public Law 253, The National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 101(a). 
33ibid., Sec. 101(b)(1).
34Ibid., Sec. 101(b)(2).
35I b i d ., Sec. 101(d).
85
whereby foreign policy was largely the domain of Secretaries 
of State.Presidents Kennedy and Reagan were activists in 
foreign affairs who often circumvented the large bureaus and 
legislative mazes by centralizing the formulation and 
implementation of national security policy in the White 
House under the NSC. It is no coincidence that both Kennedy 
and Reagan placed a premium on the covert intelligence 
activities they conducted in Southeast Asia and Central 
America. Where presidents go astray legally, lies not in 
the nature of most intelligence activities. ^7 They 
experience trouble to the extent to which they keep 
themselves and the Congress informed about these "other 
functions and duties" as they are constructed and 
in^lemented by the intelligence community via the NSC. 3* 
Therefore, in order to better understand the current view of 
Executive Branch view towards intelligence policy, it is 
useful to compare and contrast the relationship between Cold
^®Daniel N. Farnsworth, "Presidents and Their Foreign Policy 
Advisors," in The American Presidency; A Policv Perspective from 
Readings and Documen»» ed. David C. Kozak and Kenneth N Ciboski 
(Chicago: Nelson Ball Press, 1985), 185.
^^Except specifically outlawed activities like assassinating foreign 
heads of state.
^®The Congress has not attenqpted to modify these sections of the Act. 
Rather it has passed legislation mainly to keep itself more informed. 
The Intelligence Oversight Acts of 1980 and 1991 both have 
Congressional notification (as opposed to authorization) requirements 
with respect to covert action.
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War and post-Cold War presidents and the intelligence 
community, as personified by the DCI.
Cold War Presidents and the Intelligence Coesninity
Truman and Eisenhower
President Truman was the first modern president to 
forcefully and publicly advocate support for a national 
intelligence capability. He stated:
[tjhere had never been much attention paid to any 
centralized intelligence organization in our 
government.
The war taught us this lesson— that we had to collect 
intelligence in a manner that would make the 
information available where it was needed and when it 
was wanted..
Plotting the assassination of a foreign head of state may 
not have been envisioned by Truman, upon reflecting on both 
the creation of the CIA and the activities that the Agency 
engaged in years after he left office, Truman stated:
I think it was a mistake. And if I had known what was 
going to happen, I never would have done it.^ °
^^ Trumaui, Memoirs. cited in Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
"Our First Line of Defense."
coprésident Truman quoted in Merle Miller, Plain Speaking; An Oral 
Biography of Harrv S. Truman (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 
391.
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I never had any thought that when I set up the CIA that 
it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger 
operations.
However, Truman did do it and, at least initially, the 
Agency satisfied his demand for centralized, expedient 
communication of i n t e l l i g e n c e . credible evidence suggests 
that Truman was convinced early in the life of the Agency of 
the need for special types of operational activities.
Truman was influenced by the author of "containment,” George 
Kennan, on this fact. Kennan writes:
In 1948-1949, several government officials, including 
myself, were concerned with the problem of how to 
frustrate Communist efforts at penetration and 
subversion of governmental systems of Western Europe 
and other continents. We concluded that the united 
States had a need for some sort of facilities through 
which, from time to time, it could conduct operations 
in the international field that it would not be proper 
for any regular departments or agencies to take 
responsibility or for which the regular agencies of 
governing were too cumbersome. In other words, an 
agency for secret operations.
National Security Directive 10/2 established an entity 
known as the Office of Policy Coordination in order to carry 
out these activities.^ 4 in effect, the OPC "subordinated
^^Preaident Truman quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to mohalim; 
American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Mew York: Penguin Books, 1993), 
7th ed., 93.
42solt, Secret Intelligence^ 192.
^^George F. Kennan, Memoirs. 1950-1963 (Boston, MA: Little Bro%m, 
1972), 202.
James W. McKenney, "Presidential Leadership and the CIA,” in Zh£ 
American Presidency; A Policy Perspective from Readings and
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intelligence collection and analysis to covert o p e r a t i o n s  
a fact which could not have been lost upon the Truman 
administration. Further, Truman gave voice to the 
developing situational imperative of the time— that of 
countering totalitarian aggression around the world. This 
imperative was a derivative of the deep-seated cultural 
commitment against the dark forces of totalitarianism. The 
resulting Cold War consensus allowed him to establish an 
unprecedented intelligence apparatus which was almost 
exclusively overseen and controlled by the Executive Branch.
This Agency puts the information of vital importance to 
the President in his hands. He has to know what is 
going on everywhere at home and abroad, so that he can 
intelligently make the decisions that are necessary to 
keep the government running...
You are the organization, you are the intelligence arm 
that keeps the Executive informed so that he can make 
decisions that always will be in the public interest 
for his own country, hoping always that it will save 
the free world from involvement with the totalitarian 
countries in an all-out war— a terrible thing to 
conten^late.
Despite his support for intelligence work, Truman 
guarded presidential prerogatives, stating flatly "I make
Documents. ed. David C. Kozak and Kenneth N. Ciboski (Chicago: Nelson 
Hall Press, 1985), 193. McKenney states that the bureaucratic 
tension which resulted from this exists today— an assertion confirmed 
by the interviews conducted for this project.
«Ibid., 193.
4Gpresident Harry S. Truman, News Conference, 4 October 1951, cited 
in CSX, "Our First Line of Defense."
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American foreign policy. Truman's first three DCIs were 
bureaucratically weak and fulfilled his primary desire for a 
coordinator of information whom he could rely upon to help 
deal with the decisions he faced. The large foreign policy 
initiatives of the administration— the Marshall Plan, 
containment, and NATO— all heavily involved the Secretary of 
state, with Truman making the final decisions. Clearly, 
during the Act’s infancy, the intelligence related sections 
were interpreted quite narrowly. This fact, combined with 
the newness of the community, served to provide little 
support for serious Congressional involvement in 
intelligence policy.
Dwight Eisenhower entered the presidency with a high 
regard for accurate intelligence and perhaps the highest 
public regard euid trust of any recent president. This trust 
would be crucial to maintaining the Executive monopoly over 
intelligence activities. His war-time tenure as Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe introduced him to the high stakes 
world of intelligence, disinformation, and aspects of covert 
warmaking.
47cited in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign 
Policy; Pattern and Process (Hew York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 4th 
ed., 494.
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In war nothing is more important to a commander than 
the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and 
intentions of his opponent, and the proper 
interpretation of those facts. In peacetime, the 
necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal 
with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes 
prevailing in the world. They and their correct 
interpretation are essential to the development of 
policy to further our long-term national security and 
best interests.
No task could be more important. Upon the quality of 
your work depends in large measure the success of our 
effort to further the nation's position in the 
international scene.
Like Truman, Eisenhower relied heavily upon his Secretary of 
State for undertaking major initiatives abroad. However, 
his DCI, Allen Dulles (brother of Eisenhower's Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles) received more presidential leeway 
with respect to expanding the activities of the intelligence 
community, especially the Agency. This was due in peirt to 
the confidence Eisenhower had gained in Allen Dulles as a 
result of the latter s success in predicting what would take 
place in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death.
While the Agency's operational latitude widened during 
the Eisenhovier administration, it did not achieve the 
autonomy sometimes suggested by its successes in Iran and 
Guatemala. In his presidential biography of Eisenhower,
^®President Dwight Eisenhower, Commenta upon laying of cornerstone 
for CIA building, 3 November 1959, cited in CIS, "Our First Line of 
Defense."
^^Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), 476-
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William Ewald contends that DCI Dulles did not enjoy an 
unusual amount of access to the president.
Eisenhower did not direct CIA actions via private one- 
on-one conversations with Allen Dulles. This fact the 
White House appointment records abundantly confirm: In
1953 the two met in the Oval Office (apart from NSC amd 
Cabinet meetings) exactly sixteen times, in 1954 
sixteen times, in 1955 seven times, in 1956 twenty 
times, in 1957 sixteen times, in 1958 twenty-seven 
times, in 1959 twenty-four times, in 1960-61 twenty- 
four times. These 150 meetings average 19 a year. Of 
those 19, approximately 80 percent included at least 
one additional person... sometimes for less than ten 
minutes ...5°
Eisenhower's style has been characterized as a "hidden hand' 
type of management. Ewald discusses, for instance, the 
extent to which the president knew of Dulles' cable to the 
station chief in the Congo: "Targets of opportunity may
present themselves to you. You can act on your own 
authority."51 Ewald interviewed every surviving member of 
the administration who attended meetings concerning the 
Congo situation in order to verify that Eisenhower did not 
issue such an order and that he would never do so under any 
circumstance. 52
50william Bragg Ewald, Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days. 1951-
1960 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 253-280.
5ixbid., 253. The Church Conmittee investigating intelligence abuses 
suggested that he did know about the order. Ewald tells of a CIA 
agent who was sent with material to poison Congo leader Patrice 
Lumumba whom was suspected of being a puppet of the Soviets.
52Ewald, Eisenhower the President. 273-280.
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In fact, Eisenhower recognized the alarming growth in 
the Agency’s operational ambitions, a rate of activity not 
matched by its lack of success in other areas, such as 
penetrating Soviet Intelligence. 3^ The initial process by 
which activities were approved has been described by 
Eisenhower’s National Security Advisor as "pretty damn 
i n f o r m a l .  "5^ Eisenhower sought to retain firm control over 
intelligence activity through establishing the President ’ s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The Board's first 
report was less than complimentctry of Dulles ' management 
skills. Eisenhower, ho%#ever, refused to make any personnel 
changes. "With all his limitations," Eisenhower said, "I’d 
rather have him as chief of intelligence than anyone else I 
can think of. In that business you need a strange kind of 
g e n i u s . "55 After the u-2 debacle, Eisenhower issued a 
directive that "in no circumstances did he ever want to meet 
with the CIA alone," because he was suspicious of the Agency
53perret, Eisenhower. 477.
‘^Gordon Gray quoted in Ewald, giaenhower the President. 267. Perret 
contends that Truman had let the Agency conduct covert operations 
"entirely on its own authority, " *rith no prior approval from any 
quarter. Truman's registered shock at the activities of the CIA 
years after he left office is even less compelling in light of this 
possibility.
55zwald, Eisenhower the President. 266.
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claiming that they "privately" received his approval for its 
activities. ^6
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations represent a 
high-water mark in terms of the level of interbranch 
consensus and trust with respect to intelligence matters.
In fact, this phenomenon was a spillover from the larger US 
foreign policy consensus. Public— and Congressional— anti­
communism was so resolute that the Executive Branch "devoted 
80% of the Agency’s resources to waging the Cold War and 20% 
to intelligence gathering" during this time p e r i o d .
Despite its status as the premier Cold War weapon,
Eisenhower— much more than Truman— "kept a close watch on 
the CIA. "5® At the close of his presidency, in the wake of 
the u-2 affair, Eisenhower remained publicly committed to 
the work of the intelligence community, saying that "these 
activities have their own rules and methods of concealment" 
and are "a distasteful but vital n e c e s s i t y .  "59
Kennedy and Johnson
5^Ibid., 271. The fact ia that Eisenhower personally approved of the 
u-2 program from its inception through each and every mission. 
57perret, Eisenhower. 477.
5®stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower? soldier and President (New York: 
Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1990), 377.
5^President Eisenhower, News conference, 11 May 1960, quoted in CIS, 
"First Line of Defense."
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Cold War bipartisanship sustained Executive Bremch 
dominance over intelligence policy throughout the 1960's. 
Upon President Kennedy's arrival at the White House, the CIA 
had become a significant piece of national security 
apparatus. The most pertinent foreign policy issues of the 
1960 presidential can^aign were the loss of French 
Indochina, the missile gap, and "Republican failures in 
Cuba. " The Agency was increasingly tasked to address these 
problem areas. Arthur Schlesinger describes the Agency's 
increased stature.
The CIA's budget now exceeded State's by more than 50 
percent. Its staff had doubled in a decade, in some 
areas the CIA had outstripped the State Department in 
the quality of its personnel; it had almost as many 
people under official cover overseas as State; often 
the CIA station chief had been in the country longer 
than the ambassador, had more money at his disposal and 
exerted more influence.
President Kennedy was intrigued by the success of the 
Agency in Latin America and the Middle East. He was an 
attentive pupil to Dulles' briefs— particularly those 
regarding plans and actions against communist Cuba. His 
faith in, and trust of, the Agency significantly declined 
after the failure of the CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in
^°Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 205. 
^^Arthur H. Schlesigner, Jr., A Thousand Dav: John F. Kennedy in
the White Bouse (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 427.
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April 1961— to the point of feeling "betrayed" by the 
A g e n c y . still, he retained his penchant for circumventing 
State ' s bureaucratic morass by relying on the Agency for 
information and special tasks. Dulles was soon replaced by 
Republican John McCone, who had served in both the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations. Schlesinger's account is 
again useful in describing McCone.
McCone had the reputation of a rigid cold-warrior who 
viewed the world in moralistic stereotypes. McCone did 
lack the expansive personality of his predecessor, but 
he turned out to be a cautious, realistic and self- 
effacing head of the CIA. He repaired morale within 
the Agency, instituted measures to subject venturesome 
proposals to critical scrutiny and did his best to keep 
the CIA and himself out of the newspapers. He restored 
its relations with the State Department and the 
Congress.. .And, declining to allow his own views to 
prejudice the intelligence estimates, he showed a fair- 
mindedness which shamed some of us Wio had objected to 
his appointment.®^
Kennedy was especially taken with McCone's low-key demeanor 
and approach to the work of the intelligence community.
McCone is most acclaimed for arguing against the analysis of
Secret Intelligence. 193. Seymour M. Hersh offers a unique 
account of the Kennedy ' s relationship with the Agency and its anti- 
Castro efforts in The Dark side of Camel(Boston, MA: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1997), 169-177 and 268-293.
®^See Richard Reeves, President Kennedy; Profile of Power (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1993), 71-72.
Schlesinger, A Thousand Pavs. 429.
Sorensen, Kennedy. 631.
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his Agency professionals in predicting correctly that Soviet 
offensive nuclear missiles would be placed in Cuba.®®
The new president was committed to the steady growth of 
the nation's paramilitary capacities. Ho%^ver, he 
transferred much of the responsibility for these activities 
from the Agency to the Pentagon— specifically the Army and 
its newly constituted Special Forces units. According to 
Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy's closest personal aid, "the 
President did not doubt the necessity or the legitimacy of 
dirty tricks, " and he ordered the CIA to retain 
responsibility for these measures.*? However, Kennedy 
closely monitored the Agency ' s activities by revan^ing the 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and, more 
significantly, by creating a more powerful NSC to ensure 
that Agency activities were congruent with the 
administration's létrger foreign policy goals.
... I have looked through the record very carefully over 
the last nine months, and I could go back further, to 
indicate that the CIA has done amything but support 
policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to
®®Holt, Secret Intelligence. 193. Despite this fact. Bolt claims 
that McCone retained "great respect” by the Agency's career officers. 
®?Ibid., 630-631. See also, Sorensen, Kennedy. 670-671. Sorenson 
details the extent to which personal analysis indicated that surface 
to air missile sites seen in reconnaissance photo's led McCone to 
believe that they were installed to protect a nuclear capability. 
Career Krenlinologists based their negative conclusions on the 
historical tendency for the Soviets to base such missiles on their 
home turf, where they could be better protected.
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execute it in those areas where it has competence and 
responsibility...! can just assure you flatly that the 
CIA has not carried out independent activities but has 
operated under close control of the Director of Central 
Intelligence, operation with the cooperation of the 
National Security Council and under my instructions.®®
In fact, under Kennedy, the National Security Advisor became 
a premier source of policy guidance for the president, with 
the Secretary of Defense a close con^titor. Nevertheless, 
at the insistence of Kennedy, DCI McCone and the Agency 
received weekly access to the president in the form of 
informal discussions about current world events and 
potential crises abroad.
President Lyndon Johnson was more concerned with 
domestic policy than he was with foreign affairs. Still, he 
did not wish to be accused of "losing " regions of the world 
to the communists. His obsession with not losing— an 
obsession fed primarily by fears of attacks from the 
political Right that he was "selling out Vietnam"— led him 
to make military commitments in that country which would
®®President Kennedy, News conference, 9 October 1963, quoted in CIA, 
"First Line of Defense."
®^ At the expense of the State Department which, under Kennedy, saw 
itself moved to a peripheral status in the day to day conduct of 
diplomacy and crisis management.
^°Holt, Secret Intelligence. 194.
^^Merle Miller, Lvndont An Oral Bioaraphv (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1980), 488.
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rival his Great Society programs and ultimately doom the 
possibility of a second term of office.
Johnson continued Kennedy's trend of centralizing 
national security decision making in the White House. The 
Secretary of Defense and the National Security advisor 
continued to build their status as the primary agents of 
policy influence. DCI McCone left the administration in 
1966, not because he enjoyed less access to the president, 
but because Johnson was not inclined to seek the Agency out 
for serious consultation.
After the year-long, caretaker term of Admiral William 
F. Raborn, Johnson promoted Richard Helms from Deputy 
Director to DCI. Helms' intelligence experience dates back 
to his days in the OSS. At the time of his nomination as 
DCI, he had spent virtually all of his time in the (covert) 
operations side of the Agency. Under Helms, the Agency did 
not experience an upgrade in its status among presidential 
courtiers; ho%#ever, Helms %^s included among the regulars at 
Johnson's Tuesday lunches.In fact. Helms asserted that 
Johnson had no interest in, or knowledge of, the 
intelligence community, and was concerned only to the extent
72 Ibid., 194.
73*1 Her, Lvndon. 488.
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that he received the products he needed. When information 
was not forthcoming, particularly that which might confirm 
Johnson's suspicions that foreign money was behind much of 
the New Left's protests, he is reported to have angrily 
shaken a finger at Helms while exclaiming, "I simply don't 
understand why it is that you can't find out about that 
foreign money. " This exchange is indicative of Johnson ' s 
relationship with the intelligence community; in addition it 
lends credence to the likely possibility that the president 
was aware of and supported domestic activities conducted by 
the Agency.
Nixon and Ford
As Vice President, Richard Nixon had persuaded Senator 
Joseph McCarthy not to wage a communist witch hunt within 
the ranks of the Agency. This was done at the request of
74 Ibid., 194.
7^Hugh Sidey, quoted in Miller, Lvndon. 488. Johnson was angered by 
bureaucratic eccentricities. Hugh Sidey states that he strongly 
insisted that information presented to him be boiled down to a page 
or less. Upon receiving one CIA report he said, “I told them to put 
it on one page, so they have to show roe who is boss." The report ran 
one line on a second page. See Hugh Sidey, A Very Personal
Presidencv; Lvndon Johnson in the White House (New York: Atheneum,
1968), 250.
7^Detailed discussion of this possibility found in Vaughn Davis 
Hornet, The Presidencv of Lvndon B. Johnson (Latnrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 1983), 205-208.
77see Stephen B. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician.
1913-1962 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 315.
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President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles— not because Nixon had 
an affinity for the Agency. In fact, in his memoirs, Henry 
Kissinger describes Nixon as being distrustful— even 
disdainful— of the Agency and its staff of "Ivy League 
liberals who behind the facade of analytical objectivity 
were usually pushing their own preferences."'^® Though Nixon 
did not feel comfortable with DCI Helms personally,
Kissinger urged the president to strive for greater 
continuity in the position and, thus. Helms was retained.7* 
Kissinger's personal description of Helms provides some 
insight into the DCIs relationship to the Nixon 
administration as well as the president's preference that 
the Agency refrain from any sort of advocacy role.
Disciplined, meticulously fair and discreet. Helms 
performed his duties with the total objectivity 
essential to an effective intelligence service.**
He never volunteered policy advice beyond the questions 
that were asked of him, though never hesitating to warn 
the White House of dangers even when his views ran 
counter to the preconceptions of the President or of 
his security advisor. He stood his ground where lesser 
men might have resorted to ambiguity.®i
... I never knew him to misuse his knowledge or his 
power. *2
^®Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, & 
Company, 1979), 11.
"^9Ibid., 36.
®*Ibid., 37.
®ilbid., 37.
®2ibid., 37.
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Helms grew increasingly confounded by the limitations 
he faced in his attempts to manage the intelligence 
community. Though responsible for all of the community’s 
activities. Helms noted in 1969 that, in reality, he 
possessed control of less than 15 percent of its assets— the 
other 85 percent of which were controlled by the Pentagon.®^ 
Helms left the Agency in 1973 amidst publicity about 
assassination plots and other questionable intelligence 
activities.
Nixon's appointment of James Schlesinger as DCI marked 
the beginning of a tumultuous time for the intelligence 
community. Schlesinger in^lemented a series of reforms 
within the community, the most notable of which was a 
reduction in the Agency's Directorate for Operations®^— a 
trend which was politically driven by the air of scandal 
surrounding the community in the 1970's and a trend which 
would continue through to the Presidency of Ronald Reagan. 
Schlesinger was quickly reassigned to the Pentagon, but his 
reforms were carried on with mixed success by his successor 
as DCI, William Colby.
Jeffrey T. Rlchelson, The O.S. Intelligence Co«Mmini»y (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1999), 4th ed., 387.
®^The covert action people.
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Gerald Ford gained intelligence Insight early In his 
Congressional career through his appointment. In 1956, to 
the House subcommittee which controlled the Agency’s 
appropriations. Of Colby, Ford has written that he was 
"smart; he possessed both Integrity and guts and I liked and 
respected him very m u c h . " ® ®  Ford stated that, as president, 
he Instructed DCI Colby that he "simply wouldn't tolerate 
any violations of the law" and that the Agency ' s charter was 
to be upheld.®® Political developments and revelations would 
outrun Ford's attempt to manage the community.
The president's pardon of Richard Nixon only aggravated 
the more aggressive tone of those who were skeptical of the 
community. Colby's tenure as DCI was overshadowed by 
scrutiny of alleged Agency wrongdoing. ®^ Both he and his 
Immediate predecessor compiled "the family jewels— a listing 
of the vétrlous occasions over the past twenty-five years In 
which the CIA had stepped over the line of Its proper 
activity."®® Colby warned Ford of the imminent publication 
of some of these details. In particular the Agency's past
®®Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R.
Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 325.
®®Ibid., 229.
®'^ Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence. 39.
®®William E. Colby, "Discussant," in, vol. 2, Gerald R. Ford and the 
Politics of Post-Wateraate America, ed. Bernard J. Freestone and 
Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, CT: Green%food Press, 1991), 490-491.
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domestic activities. The post-Watergate period in which 
the disclosure occurred— a time dominated by high degrees of 
public mistrust of government and accentuated by an 
aggressive Congress— significantly influenced Ford to 
establish a blue-ribbon commission to investigate 
allegations of misconduct. The panel preceded investigative 
committees established in Congress to conduct its own 
investigations.®® Political climate clearly affected the 
personalities and relationships involved. As John Robert 
Greene notes :
It is possible that after the Hersh story [alleging a 
massive domestic spying operation] Ford saw an 
opportunity to reform the intelligence community. Yet 
it is highly unlikely that Ford would have availed 
himself of this opportunity had it not been for the 
tempest that Hersh*s story was causing. Ford thus had 
to involve the Executive Branch in investigating the 
CIA, if for no other reason than to beat Congress to 
the punch, with the 1976 election in mind, the 
president could not afford to bring up the rear on this 
issue. ®i
Ford ' s concern is evident in his own writings.
What worried me most was the fact that Congress seemed 
determined to take over the act. [Tjhey wanted to look
®®Ford, A Time^  to Beal, 229.
®®Many in Congress and the media «lere suspicious of Nelson 
Rockefeller's appointment to head the president's panel. Rockefeller 
had served in intelligence-related posts in the Eisenhower and Nixon 
administrations «diich served to question his objectivity. See John 
Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1995), 106.
®^Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. 106.
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at everything in the files. Back in the 1950's and 
early 1960...no more than ten or twelve members of 
Congress were fully and regularly informed about the 
budget and the activities of the CIA. By 1975, 
however, that number had swollen to between fifty and 
seventy-five. Inevitably, there were leaks, public 
embarrassment followed, and the agency was having 
trouble doing its job.®^
Ford made a series of national security personnel 
changes, one of which was the appointment of George Bush as 
DCI. Bush was an "able administrator" and had served in a 
variety of major political posts. In research for his own 
work on intelligence. Bob Woodward remarked that— when he 
inquired of Bush's CIA contemporaries as to what Bush did—  
many stated that they could not remember him doing much of 
anything.33 %n fact. Woodward claims, it was Bush "who 
established a normal working relationship with the 
Congress. 34
Carter and Reagan
From the inception of his campaign for the presidency, 
Jimmy Carter attempted to reform the intelligence community, 
with his dismissal of George Bush, he was the first 
president to fire an incumbent DCI. Carter's abortive
32pord, A Time to Heal. 265.
33Bob woodward, ’Diacuasant,' in, vol. 2, Gerald R. Ford and the 
Politics of Post-Wateraate America, ed. Bernard J. Freestone and 
Alexej Ugrinsky (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), 501.
34Ibid., 501.
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attempt to appoint Kennedy counsel Theodore Sorenson^* as DCI 
led to his appointment of Admiral Stans field Turner. Turner 
shared Carter's view that the main source of almost all of 
the uncovered abuses— intelligence operations— needed to be 
scaled back in favor of greater emphasis upon collection. ** 
Consequently, the Directorate for Operations saw its share 
of the Agency’s budget fall from more than sixty percent in 
the late 1960's to less than five percent during the first 
part of the Carter administration.
Turner also shared the president's view that the DCI 
should be given additional discretion, to fulfill his 
management responsibilities. Turner ordered Agency reforms 
and approved significant cuts in selected personnel. These 
events did not sit well with the entrenched intelligence 
professionals within the community— many of whom had served 
under several previous administrations. Turner publicly 
exposed scandals and disciplined agents to demonstrate his 
firm grip on the Agency*® He achieved fairly regular access
*^See Garland A. Haas, Jinmv Carter and the Politics of Frustration 
(Jefferson, NO: McFarland & Co., 1992), 56-57.
*^See Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy; The CIA in 
Transition (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).
*7John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (New York:
Manchester University Press, 1993), 199.
*®John Orman, Comparing Presidential Behavior:— Carter. Reaaan. and 
the Macho Presidential Stvle (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987),
92.
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to the president but was disliked by those inside the 
Agency. Finally, Turner must have realized that serious, 
and more consistent. Congressional oversight was a reality 
which he would have to face. His strategy was to keep the 
overseers as informed and involved as possible in order to 
quell operational misgivings and give the Agency allies to 
defend itself from other members of Congress.
The administration's misreading of events in Iran has 
been characterized as a failure of the Executive Branch. 1°° 
Carter notes in his dietry that
American intelligence reports during the summer, 
however, indicated no cause for serious concern. 
According to a CIA assessment, issued in August, Iran 
' is not in a revolutioneiry or even a prerevolutionary 
situation.' The report went on to say that the 
military was loyal to the monarchy and that those who 
were in opposition, both the violent and the 
nonviolent, did not have the capacity to be more than 
troublesome in any transition to a new regime.
The militancy of the post-revolutionary Iranian government, 
and the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan, caused the carter administration to relax 
considerably the leash on covert activities.
^^ Duinbrell, The Carter Preaidgncv. 193.
lOOsee Alexander Moena, "Preaident Carter ' a Advxaora and the Fall of 
the Shah," Political Science Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 211-237; 
Holt, Secret Intelligence. 197.
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoira of a President (New York:
Bantam Hooka, 1982), 438.
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The start of Ronald Reagan's first term did not find 
the Agency disposed to wage the campaign of covert 
activities for which it would become known in the wake of 
Iran-Contra. In fact, one insider described the Agency's 
climate early on;
Almost all of those in the upper echelons of the agency 
who had been lucky enough to survive the purges [of the 
1970's] were determined that anything was better than a 
replay of those catastrophes, and the organization that 
Bill Casey inherited was little inclined to take risks. 
Once a beehive of activity, the CIA in early 1981 was a 
relatively quiet place, and most of the top officials 
had little interest in aggressive new enterprises.
The events of Iran-Contra damaged much of the 
institutional trust which had been established between 
Congress and the Presidency since Watergate. As part of his 
program to more aggressively confront the Soviet Union, 
Reagan promised during his ceunpaign to loosen restrictions 
on intelligence activities. To complete this task, his 
administration desired an assertive DCI who was close to the 
president personally. Reagan selected amd gave cabinet 
rank to OSS veteran William Casey, who had chaired Reagan's 
successful caa^ign. Casey was committed to addressing Cold 
war problem areas around the world through the use of covert
^o^Michael A. Ledeen, Periloua Statecraft; An Insider'» Account of 
the Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 27,
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action. The intelligence budget is described as having 
increased nearly twenty percent a year during Casey's 
tenure. Intelligence community insider Michael Ledeen 
describes Casey and his relationship to the president this 
way:
William Casey was one of the two most powerful 
directors in the history of the CIA. Like Allen 
Dulles...Casey enjoyed a close personal relationship 
with his president, and consuming interest in spycraft, 
and the high respect and personal affection of his top 
officers at the agency.
...Casey was one of the smartest and most disciplined 
men in the administration. A voracious reader and 
tireless worker, he exhausted his colleagues both 
physically and intellectually.
... no previous CIA director ever met with so many 
"outsiders ' as he. For Casey had learned one of the 
basic lessons of large organizations: Bureaucracies
have a built-in tendency toward intellectual 
paralysis.. .Casey was determined that the CIA keep pace 
with the rapidly changing world.
Policy disputes in the Reagem administration were 
seldom more bitter than those between DCI Casey, Secretauy 
of State Shultz, and the Congress. Robert Gates, who was 
Casey's Deputy DCI, described this relationship.
Shultz especially would always be aggravated that we 
were up on the Hill briefing on a particular problem 
before the Executive Branch had figured out v^at it 
wanted to do.
Secret Intelligence. 197.
104 Ledeen, Perilous Statecraft. 23-24.
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And if you get a suspicious secretary of State like 
Shultz y then their view is that, in fact, CIA is trying 
to sabotage the president ’ s policy or the Secretary of 
State * s policy.
The lack of consensus, both within the white House and 
between it and the Congress, led to serious policy 
disagreements, especially in the face of such events as the 
passage of the Boland Amendments %diich outlawed attempts to 
aid anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua. The eroding 
consensus over the means utilized to prosecute the Cold War 
is epitomized by the Boland Amendments. These legislative 
restrictions combined with Reagan's rather distant 
management style to place the administration on its perilous 
course in Central America. The legal fallout from Iran- 
Contra signaled an end to the comity between Congress and 
the Executive Branch in intelligence policy.Reagan 
attempted to limit political fallout from the crisis by 
replacing Casey with Federal Judge William Webster.^®® For 
the remainder of the administration, Webster steered the
^°^Robert M. Gates, interview with author, Texas A & N University, 6 
December 1999.
I06por more on the institutional dynamics during the Iran-Contra 
affair see Gregory F. Treverton, "Intelligence: Welcome to the
American Government," in A Question of Ballance: The President, the
Congress, and Foreign Policv. ed. Thomas E. Mann (Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1990), 70-108.
^°^Confidential interview.
lo^Casey suffered a fatal medical condition in the Spring of 1987.
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Agency through the remaining Centra Investigations and 
Initial Cold War post-mortems. Webster was clearly a 
caretaker Director of the Agency; his personal and 
professional credentials led to a noncontroverslal 
appointment and tenure as Director. He was Insulated from 
much of the Agency's day-to-day activities and his Deputy 
Director, Robert Gates, was seen from some quarters as the 
person running day to day activities In reality.lo*
Cold War Context and Intelligence
Conclusions drawn from the historical evidence support 
the assertion that personal factors and degrees of policy 
consensus during the Cold War help to explain Intelligence 
policy. In large part, the most troubling times for the 
Agency occurred when there were ruptures In the Cold War 
foreign policy consensus. During the Truman and Elsenhower 
administrations, this policy consensus— namely the war 
against communism— was airtight. Following the total It air Ian 
horrors of the 1930's and the 1940's, the nation was 
resolved to contain forces %dilch would undermine the freedom 
of Individuals. The procedural consensus, which was a 
product of the value and policy agreement of this period.
^°®Confidential interview.
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led to Executive preeminence to do what it took to 
successfully wage war on behalf of the Free World. Trust in 
government was high and only improved with each of the 
intelligence community's initial successes, such as in 
Guatemala and Iran. There was comparatively little interest 
in the Congress in pursuing a player's status with regard to 
intelligence policy. During this time, personality was a 
significant contextual factor only in as much as it affected 
the personal relationships between presidents and their 
DCIS.
It was the era of Vietnam in which we witnessed the 
destruction of the elements of consensus and trust in the 
intelligence policy relationship between Congress and the 
Presidency. The cultural value consensus over our 
involvement in Vietnam— and in a larger sense the manner of 
our involvement in the affairs of other nations—  
disintegrated. This process was expedited by the publicity 
surrounding alleged Agency abuses during a rather explosive 
moment. The lack of value consensus undermined the policy 
consensus over America's interventionism and intelligence 
activities. This, in turn, eliminated Congressional 
willingness to sit on the sideline and, thus, procedural
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consensus evaporated as well. The intelligence policy 
relationship changed from one of institutional deference to 
one of suspicious investigation. In the era of the 1970's, 
a more fully informed Congress and a lack of consensus 
produced a more adversarial intelligence relationship. OCXs 
were forced to focus an increasing portion of their 
attention upon the concerns of the Congress. DCI William 
Casey's contempt for, and recalcitrance towards. 
Congressional oversight is an exception to this trend. 
However, the events which resulted from his tenure, most 
notably the Iran-Contra affair, served to force the 
Executive Branch to make even greater consessions to the 
Congress. Casey's successors have abided by these 
concessions. And, as will be asserted in the following 
chapter, Robert Gates— Casey's deputy— embraced a 
relationship with the Congress which was altogether new.
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Chapter 4
Post-Cold War Intelligence Management
The joke around town was that it was really (DCI)
Jim Woolaey trying to get in to see the President.
-Robert M. Gates^
You %ron ' t need a statute to have me come notify you.
-George Tenet^
Contextual Factors in the Post-Cold War Bra
This chapter will assess the post-Cold War role that 
certain, identifiable factors of context play in determining 
the character of interaction between presidents, their DCIs 
and the Congress. This assessment will help to explain 
current interbranch relations with respect to intelligence 
policy.
The post-Cold War era presents a paradoxical reality. 
Like the era of more adversarial relations Wiich preceded 
it, the post-Cold Wair period offers few points of consensus 
on foreign policy and national security matters. In terms 
of intelligence matters, the Congress of the post-Cold War
^Referring to a 1994 incident in «rhich an individual stole a small 
aircraft and deliberately flew it into the side of the White House; 
interview with author, Texas A & M Uni variety, 6 December 1999. 
^Confirmation testimony offered in response to questions regarding 
the notification of Congress about covert actions. See Congress, 
Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Georae J. 
Tenet To Be Director of Central Intelligence. 105th Cong., 1st aess., 
6 May 1997, 102.
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"knows almost everything the president knows. Logic 
suggests that intelligence policy should remain quite 
contentious, but presently it is not. This is the case 
despite the absence of consensus on overall foreign policy 
and the existence of divided government. Executive- 
Congressional relations in this area are essentially 
cooperative, resembling none of the divisions and full-blown 
investigations prevalent during the preceding period. Why 
is this relationship so much better today and why is the 
intelligence community enjoying among the best intelligence- 
related interaction it has ever experienced with the 
Congress? An assessment of post-Cold War interbranch 
relations and policy events of the past decade illuminates 
factors which help to answer this question.
Contextual Continuity and Change
Senator David Boren of Oklahoma likes to share stories 
with students in the political science classes he conducts. 
He often recalls the flurry of events surrounding the fall 
of the Soviet Union. One moment that stands out in his mind 
is the memory of President Bush's Secretary of State, James 
Baker, looking strangely glum during a press conference
^Confidential interview.
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convened to discuss America's very recent victory in the 
Cold War. Secretary Baker began his remarks by stating 
almost with remorse that events in the former Soviet Union 
had not unfolded in accord with the administration's 
predicted timetéiblel The administration's reaction to world 
events was understandable in light of the speed and relative 
tranquility that characterized the death of the Soviet 
Union. America's victory in the Cold War produced the 
sobering consequence that the usual business of maintaining 
the nation ' s security was about to be subjected to new types 
of scrutiny and change.
The question of whether or not the end of the Cold War 
caught America by surprise is still being contested. Cracks 
in the Soviet system were spotted more than a decade before 
the events of 1991. Still, the post-Cold War shift in 
priorities experienced by the nation's national security 
apparatus was enormous; moreover, the pressures upon the 
intelligence community were especially marked. This was 
attributable in large part, to the conclusion drawn by many 
that the community had been created and maintained in order 
to combat Soviet communism. Certainly, if one examines 
budgetary allocations bet%«een 1949 euid 1989, one can see the
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importance placed upon national security relative to other 
governmental services provided by the federal bureaucracy.
Lost in the decades of grappling with the Soviets was 
the single fact that the Agency was created to provide the 
government with timely, finished intelligence that is useful 
for assisting the president and members of his 
administration in preempting surprise and in making informed 
policy choices. It was only with the growth of Soviet 
expansionism that the community's focus became the Cold War. 
Situational imperatives, like the goal of winning the Cold 
War, have the notable effect of subordinating agency 
charters, legal statutes, and even democratic values to the 
protection of one's country, budget, or elected seat.
The 1990's were remarkable years for the intelligence 
community. Amid the initial post-Cold War war anticipation 
of peace dividends euid reduced military spending came calls 
for the elimination of the Central Intelligence Agency.*
The disappearance of the Soviet threat led some to believe 
that strategic intelligence needs could be conçetently met 
by the State Department and that tactical intelligence
^Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) sponsored legislation which 
would have eliminated the Agency. See Donna Cassata, "Experts: CIA
Needs Reform But Hot a Czar," Congressional QuarterIv Weekly Report. 
27 May 1995, 1517.
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requirements could be fulfilled by the Intelligence 
divisions of the individual armed services. Others, in both 
the Bush and Clinton administrations, concluded that the 
intelligence community, while not so suddenly unimportant as 
to warrant elimination, was in dire need of reform and new 
direction. To this end, the decade witnessed a host of 
intelligence reform proposals that, in large part, have not 
been enacted into law. Periodic Congressional ire has 
emerged as Agency blunders came to light, and the tenure of 
post-Cold War DCIs have averaged only two years. However, 
inter branch relations have improved a great deal. Again, 
the question arises: What can account for the post-Cold War
interbranch ccmity %diich currenty exists with respect to 
intelligence policy?
Much of the explanation lies in the character of 
relations between post-Cold War presidents, DCIs, and the 
intellience Commitee membership in the Congress. Factors 
which impact these realtions, and have contributed to the 
surprisingly positive relationship include personality and 
personal relations, the degree of consensus, and medium-term 
trends— most notably the shift in presiential policy 
priorities and changes in the culture of the DCI.
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The Bush Admini stration
No president was in a better position to effect change 
in the intelligence community than George Bush. He is the 
only former Director of Central Intelligence to become 
President of the United States. Scholars rank him alongside 
Allan Dulles for the improvements he made with respect to 
the Agency's morale and Congressional standing.^ Biographer 
Herbert Parmet outlines one exanqple of Bush's impact on the 
Agency.
A Story soon made the rounds describing Bush during a 
morning meeting with his senior staffers at the 
beginning of his tenure with the troubled agency. He 
turned to them, according to accounts that made his 
career at Langley almost legendary, and said, "What are 
they trying to do to us?" He was, he wanted them to 
know, one of them. He understood their shattered 
morale.®
Bush served in a number of important, security-related 
posts before becoming DCI, including envoy to China and 
ambassador to the United Nations. Later, during his 
presidential administration, his White House staff was made 
up of individuals, such as Richard Cheney and Lieutenêuit 
General Brent Scowcroft, who possessed remarkable national
^Historian John Ranelagh, quoted in Herbert S. Parmet, George Buahs 
The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 1997), 195. 
^Parmet, George Bush. 194.
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security experience. Bush also entered his presidency with 
numerous legislative allies eind a commitment to a 
cooperative partnership with the Congress. ^ Scholars cite 
as evidence of Bush's commitment to the integrity of the 
oversight process his own writings in which he has said: 
"Don't look for shortcuts and don't try to circumvent the 
oversight process. Host important of all, follow the 
rules."= Ten years prior to making the above statement Bush 
wrote, "I do believe that oversight of the intelligence 
community is necessary, and I will strongly support the new 
measures set out by the President. I welcome the 
responsible exercise of oversight by the congress as well.
Bush possessed a track record for compliance with rules 
governing oversight that went far beyond mere rhetoric. As 
DCI, he officially appeared before Congress 30 times during 
the first six months of his tenure— a figure tdiich does not 
include more than 30 other meetings with members and their 
staffs.HI Though dismayed at the constant stream of
^Kerry Mullins and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Procedural Presidency of 
George Bush,” Political Science Quarterly 107 (Winter 1992): 49. 
^George Bush, Looking Forward (New York: Doubleday, 1987) in Mullins, 
"The Procedural Presidency, " 50.
®George Bush, 14 March 1976 address, in All the Best: Mv Life in
Letters and Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 1999), 251. 
lOBush, "Memorandum for the President," 3 Aug 1976, in All The Best.
257.
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investigative inquiries made by Capitol Hill staff. Bush 
nevertheless complied fully with his responsibility to 
report to seven different committees in the Congress.n As 
Director, Bush showed a keen appreciation of the apolitical 
nature of his job. 12 As president. Bush would find that 
personality and political circumstances would be the 
dominant factors in his intelligence relationship with the 
Congress.
The Bush presidency occurred during one of the most 
unique international moments of the 20th Century. An entire 
world order collapsed after 1989. The forty year old 
foundation of the American national security state 
disappeared almost overnight. Rather than reducing the role 
of the intelligence community, the end of the Cold War 
focused attention on a host of "new" security concerns such 
as postmodern forms of terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, narcotics traficking, rogue states, and 
economic espionage. Any type of consensus vAich Bush hoped 
to build around these manifold threats was hampered early on 
by the appointment process in the wake of Judge Webster's 
expected retirement.
lllbid., 257; 259.
12pannet, Georae Buah. 188.
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America's first post-Cold War president selected career 
Agency official Robert Gates to succeed Webster. Gates 
experienced a relatively meteoric rise within the Agency 
after arriving in Washington D.C. in 1966 from an Indiana 
University Master's degree program. During his early years 
with the Agency, Gates earned a Ph.D. in Soviet studies from 
Georgetown University and briefly served with the US Air 
Force as a nuclear missile officer. Among his more notable 
career assignments in conjunction with the Agency are staff 
assistant to the US SALT Delegation (1971-1973), Special 
Assistant to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 
(1977-1979), Deputy Director for Intelligence (1982-1986), 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (1986-1989), and 
Deputy for National Security Affairs to the president (1989- 
1991). Gates also authored more than thirty major articles 
and addresses at the time of his nomination to be Director.
The senior management portion of Gates ' career was 
marked by attençts to institute reforms within the Agency 
and the larger intelligence community. As Deputy Director 
for Intelligence in the early 1980 s, he supported the
^^Evidence from Robert M. Gates, “Questionnaire for Completion by 
Presidential Nominees,“ found in Congress, Senate, Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of 
Central Intelligence. 102nd Cong., 1st seas., vol. 1, 19.
122
development of a covert action review system. The purpose 
of the program was to subject all covert action proposals to 
analytic review. This review would evaluate the premises 
upon which covert actions were based and it would outline 
the risks and ramifications of such proposals to ensure that 
the actions were in line with foreign policy goals. Gates 
also helped to establish the Intelligence Producers Council- 
-headed by an Agency outsider— as a forum for the analytic 
shops to share information and minimize duplication within 
the intelligence community. Finally, Gates assisted in 
establishing a budgeting program which was less centralized, 
and one in which actual requirements— as opposed to 
intelligence forecasts— were the primary determinant for 
allocations.
Gates ' nomination to be DCI was controversial. His 
confirmation process was unique for two reasons. First, 
Gates possessed "a lot of political b a g g a g e . H e  was the 
first ceureer officer to be put up for the position of DCI in 
a generation. Out of all those who have served as Director, 
he is one of only three to have been career officers and the 
only one to rise from entry level employee. He was the only
^^Gates interview.
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career analyst to be n o m i n a t e d .  had been nearly twenty
years since the last career officer— William Colby— had been 
appointed Director. Ideological polarization and bitter 
partisan conflict had become pronounced trends in Washington 
D.C. during the intervening two decades.This fact would 
make the Gates ' confirmation hearing unusually contentious. 
Further, over the years. Gates worked directly for some of 
the most powerful and controversial individuals in American 
government— including Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
and William Casey. This fact would ensure that those who 
did not wish to see him confirmed would have plenty of areas 
for inquiry, particularly Gates’ relationship with Casey in 
regards to Central America. In fact, his association with 
the Iran-Contra matter forced him to withdraw his nomination 
to be DCI in 1987, after he was selected to replace the 
terminally ill Casey. Finally, Gates' unusually quick rise 
within the Agency, and many of the innovations he instituted 
within its analytic branches, may also have alienated some 
colleagues %dio claimed during confirmation hearings that
opposed to Operations.
^^Alan K. Ota, 'Partisan Voting on the Rise," Congressional Ouarterlv 
Weekly Report. 9 January 1999, 79-80.
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Gates had slanted intelligence to suit certain policy 
preferences of his superiors.
A second factor which contributed to the duration and 
conflict of the Gates hearings is that, in many respects, 
the hearings took on a life of their own as a post-Cold War 
performance review of the Agency, with emphasis on whether 
or not the Soviet threat had been exaggerated. Early in the 
hearing. Senator Bill Bradley stated:
While [Gates] might be excused for belittling the 
fundamental changes taking place as early as 1986, it 
is hard to excuse his blindly fatalistic view in 1988 
that, in his words, "The dictatorship of the Communist 
Party remains untouched and untouchable" or that, in 
his words, "a long competition and struggle with the 
Soviet Union lie before us. "
There is no question that Mr. Gates got it wrong. The 
question is why.
The committee has to decide whether such mistakes were 
truly impartial errors of judgment or the result of 
systematic biases to support the bloated defense 
budgets of the 1980's.
virtually the entire final week of hearings involved Senator 
Bradley's concern. Rather than an assessment of the 
nominee's qualifications and views, much of the testimony 
during this time involved battles between factions within
^^See John Gentry, Lost Promise:__How CIA Analysis Miaservee the
Nation; An intelliaene» (Lanham, MD: Univeraity Press of
America, 1993).
l^Congreas, of Robert M. Gates. Vol. 1, 424.
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the Agency as well as between the Agency and Congress. Had 
the hearing occurred without the context of the Cold War's 
end, much of its substance would have been different and 
most assuredly its duration.is Of the event itself. Gates 
remarked:
I've never had a problem with the confirmation process. 
I believe that if one is to be entrusted with the kind 
of power that the DCI has that if he hasn't got the 
guts to go through that kind of a doorway, he probably 
doesn't belong as DCI anyway.
In his written confirmation testimony. Gates outlined 
his views concerning the role of the DCI.
At this moment in history perhaps the most important 
challenge for the DCI is to focus on the future.
The world so familiar to us for two generations has 
changed dramatically in a very short time. The next 
DCI must lead a fundamental reappraisal of intelligence 
priorities from a substantive perspective. He must 
also evaluate the structure of the intelligence 
community cuid its broad strategies and then plot a 
course for the future that best and most efficiently 
serves our national interest. Old attitudes also must 
be re-examined. A DCI cannot do this alone, but only 
in close collaboration with the president and senior 
national security officials and in close consultation 
with the congress through the Intelligence Committees. 
But the DCI must initiate and lead the p r o c e s s . 20
In the end. Gates was confirmed but perhaps less because of 
his personal assurances to the Committee than the commitment 
of SSCI Chairman David Boren to see that his nomination was
^^Confidential interview. 
20ibid., 34.
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successful. Gates would not have been confirmed without 
Boren's help.21 Gates "returned the favor by briefing Boren 
with assiduous regularity."22
Long before his politcally volatile confirmation. Gates 
personally recognized that considerable Congressional 
oversight had become a permanent fixture of intelligence 
work. The existence of the Soviet threat was the driving 
force behind the creation and maintenance of the 
intelligence community. The demise of the Soviet Union 
would surely increase Congressional questioning of 
intelligence priorities and operations. Despite allegations 
to the contrary. Gates, Bill Casey, and other long time 
Community officials saw fatal cracks developing inside of 
the soviet system22 and worked to expedite— if not plan for—  
an end to the Cold W a r . 24 unlike Casey— and, perhaps, in 
political response to the Contra affair— Gates increasingly 
accepted oversight as a political reality with which he 
would have to contend. This was perhaps more out of 
pragmatism than it was from a philosophic commitment to
2lconfidential interview.
22Quoted in Carroll J. Doherty, "Despite Flurry of Allegations, Boren 
Still Respects Gates,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 20 July 
1991, 2001.
23Michael A. Ledeen, Perilous Statecraft; An Insider's Account of 
the Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 26. 
24confidential interview.
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democratic accountability. Regarding the oversight
relationship between Congress and the Presidency, Gates 
stated:
I don't think that oversight is at all too intrusive. 
And I think contrary to conventional wisdom, I think 
most intelligence professionals welcome oversight and 
particularly in the covert action arena. Because we've 
all been exposed over the years to some really nutty 
ideas in the White House situation room and for the DCI 
or the DCIs representative to be able to say "well, 
that's all a very interesting idea but, of course. I'll 
have to brief the intelligence committee." It has a 
very healthy effect on the meeting.
Gates contends that there has not been a single 
incident on the order of the Iran-Contra episode in more 
than a decade of recent Congressional oversight of the 
intelligence c o m m u n i t y . 27 with the exception of his own 
rocky confirmation. Gates' claim is essentially accurate.
The primary explanation for this fact lies in an 
understanding of politics as an art rather than a predictive 
science. Senator David Boren, who chaired the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) from 1987 to 1993 made the 
following observation of Executive-Congressional relations 
during the Gates years.
25confidential interview.
2®GateB interview.
27Relatively minor exceptions being possible CIA complicity in the 
1990 murder of an American in Guatemala and a 1996 funding dispute 
with the National Reconnaissance Office.
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You had someone like Gates who came in as Director who 
believed in oversight. I think that we've had 
Directors before who really didn't believe in 
Congressional oversight. It was something of an 
adversarial relation. They didn't think Congress could 
keep secrets. They wanted to keep everything 
con^artmented which meant compartmented also from 
Congress. Gates embraced oversight. I think he was 
smart enough to know it was there to stay. It was only 
going to grow in its influence and its ability to get 
information and that you could either fight it, which 
would be in the long run not winnable, and divisive, 
and would lead to confrontations, destruction of morale 
within the community; or you cêm embrace it and by 
embracing it help in some ways to shape it within %diat 
you thought were reasonable boundaries. And that's 
what he did.28
Gates firmly committed himself and the Agency to 
obtaining a better relationship with the Congress than had 
been achieved under Casey and Webster. He took note of the 
effect that his work in this area had upon the rest of the 
intelligence community.
I think that if the DCI is a strong advocate of 
Congressional oversight inside the community, then that 
has an enormous trickle-down effect. I thi^ part of 
the reason for so many of the problems during the time 
Bill Casey was Director was that Bill was fairly 
contemptuous of Congress and that attitude permeated a 
lot of parts of the community. And so I think the 
attitude of the Director and the messages that that 
sends really is much more influential than vdiatever 
policy distances there may be at the time.28
28oavid Boren, interview with author, 25 Feb 99, University of 
Oklahoma.
28Gatea interview.
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The observations of Boren and Gates offer insights for 
explaining institutional behavior. "Policy distances," or a 
lack of policy consensus, may not be the single most 
important determinant of effective intelligence oversight. 
The degree of DCI commitment to oversight emerges as a 
significant factor. In other words, effective intelligence 
accountability is not exclusively a function of the quality 
or quantity of Congressional activity. For meaningful 
oversight to occur, there must be much more than a committed 
chairman and fully engaged members of Congress. There must 
be constructive Executive Branch actions as well—  
particularly involving the DCI. This is a powerful factor 
in accounting for the state of Executive-Congressional 
relations with respect to intelligence policy throughout the 
1990's and one that surfaced repeatedly throughout the 
course of this research, including field interviews with 
three DCIs, their staffs, as well as by relevant members of 
Congress and their staffs.
Other elements which help to explain the overall 
institutional relationship emerge from the Gates years as 
well— most notably the impact of new types of interpersonal 
relationships on reform efforts. The Gates DCI years were a
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unique moment because each of the three major institutional 
players in the intelligence relationship— the Agency, the 
Presideny, and the Congressional oversight Committees—  
brought together skillful leaders as well as individuals who 
enjoyed close personal relationships. Senator Boren 
described aspects of these relationships this way:
Obviously we were of one mind about foreign policy.
And we were exceedingly bipartisan. And the other 
thing is we had close, very close, bonds of friend­
ship— which human relationships always enter into these 
things.
I had talked with Bob Gates about withdrawing his 
nomination the first time and assured him that if he 
were ever reappointed I would do everything in my power 
to make sure he was treated fairly.
I had a relationship with George Bush in which we 
shared insights on not only some sensitive political 
issues but in which we discussed personal, family 
matters and our feelings as people— not anything to do 
with politics. So, all of that cama together.
In fact, there existed between these individuals a consensus 
about intelligence policy and the emerging international 
issues that would need to be addressed. The triangular 
association involving a president, an agency head, and a
^°Boren interview.
^^For an elucidation of the elements of consensus see Richard M. 
Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus; American Foreign Policy Since 
the Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 3-12. In a 
notable exception to this assertion, Boren voted against authorizing 
President Bush to use force against Sadaam Hussein. However, Boren 
stated that he based his decision upon intelligence data and 
estimates which were quite dissimilar to %Aat the president was using 
to make his own decisions.
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committee chair— served to shape the general tone and 
specific content of efforts to reevaluate the intelligence 
community in the wake of the Cold War.
Gates stated that, with respect to anticipating the 
heightened scrutiny and reform that the community would face 
in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Executive Branch would 
usually read the signs and act accordingly to preempt 
unproductive reshuffling of bureaucratic boxes or complex 
procedural requirements.
I would say that out of the twenty-five or so task 
forces that I appointed in terms of restructuring the 
community after the end of the Cold War, some of the 
biggest were the result of the dialogue between 
[Senator] B o r e n and myself or some of us in the 
Executive Branch and some of the people on the Hill.
And there were several cases where David [Boren] tried 
to put things in legislation and then withdrew them, 
and used that as leverage to help me push the Executive 
Branch...to cooperate with me in change because if 
there weren’t the risks that Congress would pass a 
really ugly piece of legislation, some of the other 
parts of the Executive Branch might not have been 
willing to go as far as they did in going along with 
the reforms that I was proposing.
Gates hereby offers direct and revealing testimony as to how 
aspects of intelligence policy— especially post-Cold War re- 
prioritizing and restructuring— were carried out. Smist^
^^Chair of the Senate Select Canmittee on Intelligence at the time. 
^^Gates interview.
^^Frank Smist, Conoreae Overaees the United State» Intelligence 
Coniminitv. 1947-1994. 2nd ed. (Knoxvill, TNi Univeraity of Tenneaee 
Press, 1994).
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has rightly characterized the Bush-Gates-Boren period of 
oversight as being one in which there remained significant 
Congressional skepticsm over intelligence policy, although 
the interview data reported here suggest that, in reality, 
the tone was for the most part cooperative, with Congress 
being supportive of the Executive Branch, and the Executive 
Branch sensitive to the concerns of Congress. An example of 
this cooperation involves efforts to restructure the 
intelligence community.
Less than four months after the Executive Branch 
successfully appointed Gates DCI, Boren and House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) chairman Dave 
McCurdy introduced similar intelligence reform bills in 
Congress. The sweeping reform measures were cooly received 
by the Bush administration but %#ere viewed by some within 
the admins is trat ion as productive in the sense that they 
expedited, and in some cases expanded, reforms already being 
advanced by G a t e s . I n  this sense, the real intention of 
the Boren-McCurdy proposal was a call for Executive action. 
Bobby R. Inman, a former head of the National Security 
Agency, interpreted events by saying, "The mere fact of
^^Confidential interview.
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introducing the legislation has been helpful. There is an 
enormous amount of resistance within the bureaucracy. The 
legislation has sent 9. very loud and clear signal."36
When Gates unveiled his own reform proposals, shortly 
after introduction of the Boren-McCurdy package, McCurdy 
stated: "If fully implemented, he may accomplish a great
deal of what we desired. "3? A short time later, McCurdy 
again expressed confidence in Gates' measures by stating: 
"Given Mr. Gates' willingness to work with us, I believe it 
is important to give his changes a chance to work. " 3» 
Interview data reveal a constructive, ongoing dialogue 
between committee leadership and the Executive Branch.
Gates acknowledged:
I think that what David [Boren] and I did was probably 
unicpie in the history of the community and certainly 
had never been done before and I doubt will ever happen 
again— that is, in essence, a DCI emd the Chairman of 
the SSCI coming pretty close to conspiring against 
bureaucracy in the Executive Branch.
I felt the need to move very fast to restructure the 
intelligence community at the end of the Cold War and 
to get an number of things in motion that were fairly 
far reaching. And so I think that because I wanted to 
move fast and because the bureaucracy was so reluctant
36guoted in Andrew Taylor, "Hearings Yield No Clear Path On the Road 
to Change," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 7 March 1992, 550. 
37Quoted in Carroll J. Doherty, "Bill to Cut Spending Gets OK; Agency 
Reshuffle Left Out," Congressional Ouarterlv Weekly Report. 16 May 
1992, 1364.
38Quoted in Pamela Fessier, "Leaner Authorization Measure Emerges 
From the House," Congressional Ouarterlv Weekly Report. 27 June 1992, 
1893.
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is one of the reasons why David and I had such a 
productive partnership.
You know, I wasn't playing geunes because I often would 
tell the President in frank what I was doing. But I 
would say 'I can’t move the Pentagon or this, that, or 
the other without first using this [Congressional] 
leverage ' . s*
These efforts preempted formal legislation. In ways 
that elude detection by the formal models of social science, 
personality and interpersonal relationships are at work in 
shaping the contours of intelligence policy. Personality 
and personal relationships and degrees of trust and 
consensus on values between individuals clearly have made an 
impact upon shaping the contours of intelligence policy in 
the post-Cold War period.
with institutional trust running quite high, and "no 
popular outcry for rearranging the boxes within the 
intelligence community, " Congressional will to follow 
through on fundcunental changes was modest.Popular focus 
upon defeating Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf, and a 
postwar recession at home, only served to limit further the 
public preoccupation with— and thus Congressional push for—  
critical evaluation and reform of the intelligence 
community. Personality and personal relationships, the
^^Gates interview.
^°Boren interview.
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degree of policy consensus, and individual events like the 
Gulf War, increasingly shaped intelligence policy in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Elements of the larger 
context continued to play a large role in interbranch 
relations and intelligence policy throughout the course of 
the 1990s.
The Clinton Administration
The impact of personal relations and other identifiable 
elements of context on intelligence policy is underscored by 
events since the advent of the Clinton administration. 
Clinton, in marked contrast to his predecessor, came to the 
Presidency with much less personal interest in, and 
comparatively no experience with, foreign and intelligence 
policy. He relied heavily upon individuals such as Les 
Aspin, Warren Christopher, Madeline Albright, and Anthony 
Lake to formulate and inclement day-to-day foreign and 
security policies.The administration's record in these
^^Aspin was a long-time Washington insider first making a name for 
himself as one of Robert McNamara's Pentagon "wiz kids" and later 
chairing the House Armed Services Committee as a member of Congress. 
Christopher was Deputy Secretary of State under President Carter, trho 
described him as "the best public servant I ever knew. " Albright was 
foreign policy advisor to presidential candidate Michael Dukakis and 
has taught foreign policy at Georgetown. Lake had experience as a 
foreign service officer and was Director for Policy and Planning at 
the State Department from 1977-1961.
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areas has consistently received criticism. Throughout both 
terms of the Clinton presidency, there has generally been no 
consensus about American foreign policy. Many have argued 
that this is due to an absence of vision and a lack of a 
general framework to give it direction.As suggested in 
Chapter 1, there is almost a consensus about the lack of 
such a general framework. Others have concluded that 
Clinton bases foreign policy decisions upon factors which 
significantly deviate from any articulated national 
interest.'*3 The result has been characterized by sloppy and 
inconsistent diplomatic behavior by the world's sole 
superpower. **
In defense of Clinton, some scholars have concluded 
that the transformation of world politics and lack of 
articulated national interests would hinder the diplomatic 
perfomance of any p r e s i d e n t . *5 what is clear in the debate 
over whether or not Clinton has articulated and followed an 
overêirching foreign policy framework, is that the game of
^^See Noises Naim, "Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Victim of
Globalization," Foreign Policy 109 (Winter 1997/1998): 34-37; Richard 
N. Haass, "Fatal Distraction: Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Policy 108 (Fall 1997): 112-123.
^^Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign 
Affairs 75 (January/February 1996): 16-32.
44samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs 78 
(March/^ril 1999) : 35-49.
*^For example, see Jurek Martin, "Clinton Abroad,” The Washington 
Monthly 31 (March 1999): 22-26.
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diplomacy has fundamentally changed in the 1990's. The 
basis for certain types of policy decisions— such as those 
regarding covert actions— is so different that it affects 
Executive-Congressional relations with respect to 
intelligence policy.
Another element which affects intelligence policy is 
that Clinton was elected at the end of a significant 
downturn in the American economy. In fact, many observers 
attribute his defeat of Bush to the country ' s financial 
condition (i.e. recession) and the perception that the 
incumbent administration was out of touch with the average 
voter ' s economic plight. This perception was embodied in 
the Democratic canpaign slogan, "It s the economy, stupid." 
During the election, the incumbent president was actually 
under attack for being a foreign policy president, not 
sufficiently focused on domestic policy.*® American voters 
seemed uninterested in savoring the military victory won in 
the Gulf War. They seemed uninterested in relishing the 
ideological victory won in the Cold Weir. And they were 
growing increasingly frustrated by extremely partisan 
electoral politics which seemed to be played at the expense
*®Fareed Zakaria, "The New American Consensus: Our Hollow Hegemony,
The New York Times Magazine. 1 November 1998, Section 6, 44-47, 74,
80.
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of other concerns. Their concern were with issues like 
wages, child-care, and health-care. Thus, having run 
successfully on a platform that made domestic matters 
dominant, Clinton was predisposed to concentrate his 
presidential efforts in these areas.
A third element affecting intelligence policy was the 
change talking place with respect to membership on the 
Congressional intelligence oversight Committees. Committee 
members serve fixed terms of six and eight years for the 
House and Senate, respectively. The start of the new 
Congress, in January 1993, saw new chairmen and ranking 
members take control of the oversight Committees, ending the 
tenures of Oklahomans McCurdy and Boren. In the House, 
Speaker Tom Foley replaced McCurdy with Democratic member 
Dan Glickman (KN) in order to give the House leaders more 
control over the committee. During public hearings, 
Glickman was strident in calling for more Agency involvement 
in "economic intelligence. " In the Senate, Arizona
^^Pamela Fessier, "Secrecy May Be Highest Hurdle As Agencies Face 
Shifting Hill,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 13 February 
1993, 328.
^^See Pamela Fessier, "Woolsey Gets Senate Approval; Budget Cuts, 
Overhaul Await,' Concresstional QuarterIv Weekly Report. 6 February 
1993, 276. In his confirmation hearing, Woolsey indicated that 
economic intelligence and counterintelligence represented the 
"hottest current topic in intelligence policy issues" but that 
government sharing of economic intelligence is full of "complexities, 
legal difficulties...and the rest. See Congress, Senate, Select
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Democrat Dennis OeConclnl assumed control of the 
Intelligence Committee. He departed from Boren's effort to 
work with Agency personnel to reinvent the intelligence 
community.49 m  addition, his attitude in meeting with 
intelligence officials was described as "almost brusque."so 
The unique and very personal relationship between the 
president, the DCI, and the committee chair conç>letely 
vanished with the presidential election and committee 
changes. These factors would greatly impact both the 
presidential access and general influence of Clinton's first 
choice for DCI.
R. James Woolsey
James Woolsey served as Director of Central 
Intelligence from 5 February 1993 to 10 Janueiry 1995. A 
native of Tulsa, Oklahoma, Woolsey earned an undergraduate 
degree at Stanford University and a law degree from Yale.
He was also a Rhodes Scholar and served briefly as a Captain 
in the US Amy. Prior to serving as DCI, Woolsey occupied a 
variety of security-related positions. These included
Connu.ttee on Intelligence, Nomination of R. James Woolaev to be 
Director of Central intelligence. 103rd Cong., 1st sees., 23 February 
1993, 87-88.
49yes8ler, "Secrecy May Be Highest Hurdle," 329.
soibid.
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analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (1968- 
1970); National Security Council advisor for the US 
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (1969- 
1970); General Counsel to the US Senate Armed Services 
Committee (1970-1973); Under Secretary of the Navy (1977- 
1979); President's Commission on Strategic Forces 
("Scowcroft Commission” 1983-1984); President's Delegate at 
Large to the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and 
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (1983-1986); President's Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (1985-1986); 
Ambassador and US Representative to the Negotiation on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1989-1991).
The Senate confirmation of Woolsey was a dramatic 
departure from that of Gates. Gates was consistently dogged 
both by his association with the Iran-Contra matter and his 
long career within the intelligence community, during which 
he acquired a number of political adversaries. Despite his 
commitment to oversight and improving Congressional- 
Executive relations. Gates could never escape his 
Congressional critics. Woolsey, on the other hand, had 
"earned respect fran both Republicans and Democrats for long 
years of public service" and came to the job of DCI already
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possessing "close ties to Capitol Hill."si unlike Gates, 
Woolsey possessed a wide variety of senior-level government 
experience and virtually no intelligence e x p e r i e n c e . S2 
Woolsey acknowledged at the start of his confirmation that 
virtually all of his exposure to intelligence had been in 
the area of strategic arms and US Naval intelligence. 
However, this did not seem to trouble those on Capitol Hill. 
In fact, Woolsey's status as an intelligence outsider was 
seen by some as an asset. SSCI Chairman Dennis DeConcini 
stated: "If ever there was a time when we needed someone
like Jim Woolsey to judge these [post-Cold War reform] 
situations, it's now. We know he'll act less as a 
cheerleader and more as a judge. DeConcini succeeded 
Senator Boren as Chair of the SSCI and viewed the arrival of 
Woolsey as a positive change, saying that "the benefit of 
this guy is he doesn't have a lot of baggage."
Woolsey's indicated that he believed one of his primary 
responsibilities vras to adhere to the oversight provisions 
of the National Security Act of 1947. This entails keeping
^^Feaaler, "Woolaey Geta Senate Approval," 276, 277.
^^For more background on Woolaey aee John Pradoa, "Woolaey and the 
CIA," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientiata. <http://www.bullatomaci. 
org/iaauea/1993/ja93/ja93Pradoa.htn>, 1-7, Downloaded 11 Auguat 1999. 
^^ J. Bennett Johnaton, D-La., quoted in Feaaler, "Woolaey Geta Senate 
Approval," 276.
^^Feaaler, "Secrecy May Be Higheat Hurdle," 326.
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the established Congressional oversight Committees "fully 
and currently informed"ss about the intelligence activity of 
the United States. Woolsey stated that "the 
responsibilities of both Executive Branch officials and 
Congress go beyond the specific provisions of the law. In 
his view, a partnership between administration officials and 
the legislature had great potential to increase the 
effectiveness of intelligence collection and utilization. 
Woolsey indicated that his experience as a Congressional 
staffer, as well as his personal convictions concerning 
oversight, led him to believe that Congress should be 
treated as a full partner in the post-Cold War era of 
intelligence activity. He emphasized the need for "frequent 
consultation, tolerance for one another's different 
viewpoints emd orgemizational needs, and a respect for the 
importance of the different, but complementary, roles of 
governmental branches. " s?
^^Woolaey quoted from "Questionnaire for Completion By Presidential 
Nominees,” found in Congress, Senate, Select Comnittee on 
Intelligence, Mcminat-ion of R. Jamw woolsev to be Director of 
Central Intelligence. 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 23 February 1993, 36. 
ssibid.
57ibid., 36-37.
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This sentence suggests that Woolsey would attempt to 
uphold the pledges he made before Congress.s* His approach 
to the goal of making Congress an Intelligence policy 
partner was unprecedented In terms of the level of personal 
effort Woolsey put forth. In 1993, during his first year as 
DCI, Woolsey averaged one Congressional briefing per day. 
This was In the starkest of contrasts to all of his DCI 
predecessors.^^ The nature, substance, and duration of 
Woolsey's briefings varied. Some of the briefings Involved 
formal testimony In front of the Intelligence oversight 
Committees. Many of the formal briefings during Woolsey's 
first year were even less contentious than his short 
confirmation hearing had been. His confirmation hearing was 
characterized by lines of questioning that were mainly 
benign points of clarification. The major exceptions to 
this fact were unsurprising. Democratic Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum of Ohio— a long-time Intelligence community 
critic— asked the only questions which could be classified 
as abrasive. John Warner (R-VA), ranking minority member on
^^The following discussion is based upon an interview with James 
Woolsey conducted by the author on 1 September 1999 in Washington 
D.C. .
^^DCI Bush, for instance, had sent a memo to President Ford 
complaining of this activity. Bush dealt with Congress about one 
fifth as much as Woolsey— and Bush’s tenure was in the immédiate 
aftermath of the CIA scandals of the early 1970's. See Bush, All The 
Best. 257-259.
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the SSCI, pressed the nominee on some Issues as well. 
Warner's intensity likely stemmed from the position of being 
leader of the loyal opposition to the new Democrat in the 
White House. In the end, the concerns of these two 
legislators were not serious enough to keep them from 
joining their committee colleagues in unanimously 
recommending woolsey's nomination to the full Senate. He 
was confirmed by a rather low key voice vote.
Woolsey attempted to stay ahead of Congressional 
demands. He departed from his DCI predecessors by making 
frequent, and often unrequested, visits to Capitol Hill.
His purpose on most of these visits was to conduct what he 
describes as "tutorial sessions" for members to assist them 
in gaining a fuller perspective on intelligence matters—  
both in terms of substantive analysis of world affairs as 
well as developments within the intelligence community 
itself.®® The visits were also part of his effort to lobby 
on behalf of the intelligence community— often for funding 
that was specifically marked for reduction in President
®®Woolsey interview. See also, Gregory T. Bowens, "House Votes To 
Freeze Funding But Keep Amount Secret," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report. 7 August 1993, 2168.
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Clinton's budget requests.After a time, the sessions 
began to annoy key members of Congress. For example:
One time he called right while I was sitting there 
talking to a senator.
I don't know what Jim's problem is. This [proposal] 
causes no rifts. I didn't touch any of his people. I 
already gave him authorization for $25,000 bonuses for 
early retirements, and they're already maxed out.
Again we see personality and personal relationships as 
a central tool for conducting intelligence policy. Woolsey 
attempted to educate members, in part, for the purpose of 
giving them an Executive Branch perspective on the roles, 
capabilities, and future needs of the intelligence 
community. Though his personalized style differed from that 
of Gates, the goal was the same: stay ahead of
Congressional concerns about reform and budgetary matters; 
act rather than react. Woolsey contends that member 
attentiveness to these sessions was dictated, in large part, 
by the wilingness of committee chairman to set an 
appropriate tone for substantive Congressional o v e r s i g h t .
^iSee Gregory J. Bowens, "Chairman Leaves His Mark on Bill That 
Freezes Spending," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 17 July 
1993, 1895.
62Ibid.
63woolsey interview.
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This fact is a notable point of congruence with the research 
findings reported on the DCI tenure of Robert Gates.
Woolsey argued that the integrity and effectiveness of 
Congressional oversight is a direct product of the behavior 
of committee chairmen. In short, the chairman takes on most 
of the responsibility of oversight.®^ Overall, Woolsey 
(particularly during his second year as DCI) did not build a 
positive relationship with Senate Committee chairman 
DeConcini during the time they interacted. The relationship 
between Congress and the intelligence community suffered. 
Woolsey indicated that, during the period of his second 
year, he spent much of his time "fighting fires" on Capitol 
Hill rather than conducting substantive intelligence-related 
activities for the purpose of helping members of Congress 
make more informed policy decisions.
The most significant of these so-called "fires" was the 
political fallout after the arrest of Aldrich Ames in 
February of 1994. Ames was a thirty year veteran of the 
Agency. Despite flagrant problems with alcohol and 
extremely poor job performance reports, he was repeatedly 
promoted and eventually secured a sensitive position in the
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Soviet-East European Division of the Agency’s Directorate of 
Operations. From his position in the DO, Ames possessed 
access to information on the entire network of agents the 
Agency utilized within the Soviet Union. Later, citing 
reasons of financial gain, Ames identified these agents to 
the Russians shortly after walking into the Soviet Embassy 
in the spring of 1985 and volunteering to spy. In its 
investigative report of the matter, the SSCI stated that 
Ames' betrayal of these men involved "the largest amount of 
sensitive documents and critical information...that has ever 
been passed to the KGB... The men betrayed by Ames 
vanished, yet the Agency was, in retrospect, judged to have 
originally reported these disappearances rather matter-of- 
factly to the oversight Committees. Further, Ames' 
activities continued until 1994, despite tips from Ames' 
colleagues dating back to 1989 that there were financial 
irregularities with respect to his lifestyle that should 
have raised suspicions.
Despite the fact that Ames' activities had occurred 
under the watch of his three immediate DCI predecessors.
^^The Directorate of Operations, hereafter "DO”, is the Agency's 
subcomponent responsible for handling human espionage. 
s^Quoted in Donna Cassata, "Senate Panel Broadly Indicts CIA Culture 
of 'Negligence'," Congressional Ouarterlv Weekly Report. 5 November 
1994, 3138.
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Woolsey would be the one forced to deal with the matter. He 
was faced with the choice of either firing high-level 
officials in the Agency, which would lead to charges within 
its ranks that he was "scapegoating," or he could issue 
strong reprimands and attempt to ride out the storm of 
Congressional p r o t e s t . woolsey chose to do the latter and 
was faced with unanticipated levels of Congressional 
criticism. Protests came from Republicans, smelling blood 
as the 1994 mid-term elections quickly approached, as well 
as Democrats who were desperately trying to maintain 
majorities in Congress. HPSCI Chairman Glickman described 
Woolsey's handling of the affair as "slow and spotty"®® and 
forbodingly stated that "the question is whether the CIA has 
become no different than any other bureaucracy, if it has 
lost the vibrancy of its unique mission."®* SSCI Chairman 
DeConcini responded to Woolsey's actions by saying:
It's a very inadequate response to negligence in the 
biggest espionage case in the CIA's history. There's a 
problem here that you're not going to get at by leaving 
some of these people in place. It'll take dramatic 
reorganization to change the culture, the good old
®^Choices cited from Tim Iteiner, David Johnston, and Neil A. Letris,
Bgtrayal; The Storv of Aldrich Ames, an American Spy (New York:
Random House, 1995), 285.
®®Bob Benenson, "Woolsey Acts To Quell Concern Over Handling of Spy 
Case," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 19 March 1994, 681.
®*Ibid.
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boys’ club that protected this guy, promoted him, and 
gave him sensitive positions.
The interbranch trust and confidence which had been 
cultivated in the aftermath of Iran-Contra began to suffer 
during Woolsey’s second year. However, the reasons were 
wholly different then those surrounding the affair in 
Central America. In the Ames case, there was no outright 
effort to mislead the oversight bodies as there had been 
with the issues in Central America. Woolsey s September 
1994 reprimands occurred during a pivotal electoral mood of 
dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration. The 
political climate, rather than Executive misdeeds, led 
Congress to proceed with oversight of an advesarial nature.
Woolsey was already experiencing other difficulties by 
the time of Ames' arrest. Perhaps the most significant was 
his lack of access to President Clinton. To a great extent 
this was due to the lack of a personal relationship between 
Woolsey and the President. Woolsey perceived that Clinton 
far was more concerned with dcxnestic politics than he was 
with matters involving intelligence. woolsey recalled one
meeting of senior foreign policy officials in Wiich the
^°Ibid. Others, such as Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), called for 
the DCls resignation.
^^Woolsey interview.
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President's press secretary and political advisor, George 
Stephanopoulos, completely controlled the discussion with a 
heated exchange over how best to "spin" a foreign policy 
event in order to protect their boss' public approval 
rating. In the midst of their argument, Woolsey— who was 
sitting silently along side the president and other cabinet- 
rank officials— raised his hand in an effort to be 
recognized. When he attended to draw the discussion back 
to dealing with the crisis at hand, the DCI received blank 
stares from the two combatants. After a moment of awkward 
silence in the room, their argument seamlessly resumed.
By October 1993, after less than nine months on the 
job, Woolsey confronted increasing inattention by the 
administration on intelligence issues. One account reports 
that:
[President] Clinton, preoccupied with the economy, 
would often ceuicel his daily CIA briefing. Woolsey 
complained of having little access. Even National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake began skipping his agency 
briefing.
Additionally, the Agency issued a top secret warning to the 
White House, entitled "Looming Disaster," %diich predicted
72ibid.
^^Douglas Waller, "Master of the Game: The Formidable John Oeutch is
Becoming the Most Po%#erful CIA Chief Ever," lima, 6 May 1996, 42-43.
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that Somalian Warlord Muhammad Feurrah Aidld would attempt to 
ambush US troops. The report was ignored.DCI access to 
the President, never in abundance, seemed to dry up even 
further during 1994. Commenting at the end of Woolsey's 
tenure as OCX, HPSCI member Larry Combest observed that 
"there is just a big impression on the Hill that this 
[intelligence policy] is not an area of tremendous 
importance to the White House."
These remarks might be construed as being 
impressionistic and anecdotal evidence. However, they come 
from senior career individuals who were in the best position 
to know the nature of certain intelligence policy decisions. 
Comparing Gates and Woolsey, we see that several elements of 
the larger context matter in intelligence policy; among 
these are personality and the nature of personal 
relationships among the DCI, the president, and Intelligence 
Committee leadership.
Another element is the conception of the job of DCI 
held by its occupants; both Gates and Woolsey differed from 
earlier DCis in their pro-active acceptence of Congressional 
oversight. Gates enjoyed a more successful tenure of
74Ibid., 43.
75@uoted in Donna Cassata, "Intelligence Panel Belatedly Filled, 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 4 February 1995, 374.
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building interbranch consensus and comity and, not 
surprisingly, he left government service with the change of 
administrations. Woolsey, by contrast, came with "no 
baggage" but resigned midway through Clinton's first term.
He suffered from a lack of the sort of relationshiop needed 
to weather incidents like the Ames case and revelations 
about community mismanagement. The shift in personality and 
personal relationships combined with trigger events, like 
the Ames case and the anti-administration mid-term elections 
of 1994, helped to produce thj_s outcome.
John M. Deutch
The abrupt departure of Woolsey only added to the 
intelligence policy discontent experienced by each branch of 
the government. Woolsey was unable to institute fundamental 
changes within the intelligence community due to factors 
largely beyond his control. The political situation, and 
his reaction to it, infringed upon management continuity by 
shortening his tenure as DCI. For its part. Congress 
responded to public outrage after the Ames case broke by 
commencing its own intelligence reform effort. In March 
1994, the Senate voted 99-0 to establish a presidential 
commission which would reevaluate the intelligence
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community. Convening their newly elected majorities in 
January 1995, Republicans commissioned their ovm study for 
reforming the intelligence community.Initially sparked by 
controversies involving the Ames matter and secret National 
Reconnaissance Office funds, these Congressional efforts 
possessed an investigative quality. However, the momentum 
for reform dissipated rather quickly."^ ® As demonstrated 
below, this was due mainly to the efforts of the new DCI and 
new elements of the larger political context \diich shifted 
the often inconsistent attention of the Congress.
Contemplating Woolsey's replacement and the atmosphere 
in which the new DCI would be required to work, Robert Gates 
stated:
The Director of Central Intelligence has to develop his 
own strategic plan in terms of restructuring the 
culture, if only to channel and complement the %#ork of 
these other groups [in the community].
If he's going to have a prayer of being successful, he 
must be part of the [White House] inner circle.
^^See Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Congress Creates Commission To Study 
CIA's Performance," Congressional Ouarterlv Weekly Report. I October 
1994, 2824.
^^"Intelligence Conmunity in the 21st Century" was a House commission 
created in large measure by Republican Larry Combest of Texas idio 
succeeded Glickiman as HPSCI chair.
^®Contextually-driven calls for reform would return to haunt Oeutch 
as well.
^^Quoted in Donna Cassata, "Congress Jumps to CIA's Aid In Its Quest 
for Identity," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 7 January 1995, 
43.
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President Clinton considered a number of individuals to 
replace Woolsey and was forced to withdraw his first 
candidate amid accusations that the nominee had been 
involved in some legal improprieties. John Deutch was the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time he was nominated by 
President Clinton to be DCI. Deutch had received bipartisan 
praise for his work in the Defense Department and had 
already received Senate confirmation for two previous 
positions.®® Deutch resisted the nomination until he 
received assurances from the administration that his post 
would be granted Cabinet rank status. Deutch ' s move made 
many in Congress— including the new SSCI Chairman Arlen 
Specter— fearful of a return to the days of William Casey 
(who, as DCI, had received Cabinet rank) and a dangerous 
blurring of the line between the reporting of analysis and 
making policy.
Like his immediate predecessor, Deutch was a known 
quantity and reasonably well liked by most members of 
Congress. Deutch had a long history of important government 
appointments. He obtained a Ph.D. in chemistry from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1965 and
®®See Donna Cassata, "Choice of Oeutch To Bead CIA Wins Qualified 
Praise," Congressional Ouarterlv Weekly Report. 18 March 1995, 825.
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immediately began work for the Defense Department that same 
year. Intermittently, from 1970 to the present day, he has 
served in various positions at MIT, including professor, 
dean, and provost. His more notable government appointments 
include Under Secretary for Energy (1977-1980), Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology (1993- 
1994), and Deputy Secretary of Defense (1994-1995). 
Additionally, Deutch was appointed in 1991, by President 
Bush, to serve as a member of the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board. These positions not only 
provided Deutch with significant exposure to the 
intelligence community but also aided him in building a 
network of Congressional acquaintances. Furthermore, this 
experience gained him the administrative savvy useful for 
avoiding the bureaucratic and Congressional pitfalls 
prevalent in national security policy.
Personal factors, such as bureaucratic-legislative 
expertise, would affect Deutch's tenure as significantly as 
trigger-events and inter-personal relationships had affected 
Gates and Woolsey. Deutch had impressed the Clinton 
administration by organizing the 1995 round of military base
®^Confidential interview.
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closures so that politically important states such as New 
Hampshiref Florida, and California were protected. One 
senior aide commented that Deutch's actions "positioned him 
as a player” and that Deutch "moves around the White House 
effortlessly."** His skills and stature were evident in 
conditionally accepting the nomination in exchange for the 
Clinton's guarantee of Cabinet rank status— a move designed 
to preempt the lack of presidential access Wiich contributed 
to Woolsey's resignation.The issue of Cabinet status 
addressed the concerns of those in Congress %dio believed 
that President Clinton was granting insufficient attention 
to intelligence policy, witness this exchange between SSCI 
member (and former vice Chairmam) William Cohen and nominee 
Deutch:
Senator COHEM. But I believe that by virtue of your 
predecessor's lack of access and the level of morale 
which [one] could say is perhaps at ocean bottom levels 
out at the Agency, you were prompted to request the 
[C«d)inet rank] access and the President agreed to that 
level of access because he felt that the Agency was in 
such a state of either low morale, disarray or in need 
of that kind of leadership that he granted the request. 
Is that correct?
Mr. DEUTCH. Senator, you say it extremely well.
Senator COHEN. You need only say yes.
Turqu* and John Barry, "Th# Troubla %rith tha CZA, " Sawawaak. 
20 March 1995, 27.
83ibid.
84confidantial Intarviaw.
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Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.
Deutch also attended to stay eüiead of other Congressional 
concerns. Senators Connie Mack and Arlen Specter both 
raised the issue of reports that sexual harassment was 
prevalent throughout the Agency. Deutch responded that he 
was "not privy to the facts of this case" but noted that he 
intended to safeguard equal opportunity and proper conduct 
if confirmed.*^ Within the first week of his tenure as DCI, 
Deutch filled the Agency’s third most powerful position—  
that of Executive Director— with a female colleague from the 
Pentagon.Deutch remarked of this decision that his goal 
was "to make the glass ceiling into a glass floor.
Perhaps the most significant, unprecedented, amd 
lasting action Deutch took as DCI was his appointment of 
several former Congressional staff members to key
^^One female plaintiff, a former CZA Chief of Station, waa awarded 
$400,000 after the court found evidence of auch behavior. Thia caae 
waa mentioned aeveral times to Deutch during his confirmation 
hearings.
^^See John Deutch written response to additional questions submitted 
to him by the SSCI. Found in Congress, Senate, Select Committee on 
Intelligence, w«min»tion of John M. Deutch to be Diretor of Central 
Intelligence. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 26 ^ril 1995 and 3 May 1995, 
94.
^^Responsible for all of the Agency's day to day operations as well 
as the National Reconnaissance Office. See Donna Cassata, "New CZA 
Staff Chosen To Ease Strained Relations With Hill, ” Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report. 20 Nay 1995, 1441.
®®Ibid.
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administrative posts inside the Agency. Less than a week 
after he was sworn into office, Deutch officially announced 
several major personnel changes at the senior levels of the 
Agency.®® He appointed five former Congressional staff 
members to fill posts such as director of the community 
management staff, general counsel, and chief of staff. 
Further, Deutch successfully encouraged President Clinton to 
appoint George Tenet to the position of Deputy Director of 
Central intelligence— the number two position in the 
intelligence community.
Tenet was a lifelong Congressional staffer who was 
picked from relative obscurity— and without regard to 
seniority— by Senator Boren to be the SSCI Staff Director in 
the wake of Iran-contra. With these appointments, we see a 
striking and very new trend emerging which has continued to 
the time of this writing— namely, staffing of top-level 
posts traditionally held by career Agency people with 
individuals who have spent virtually their entire career on 
Capitol Hill. Deutch explained the rationale for this 
staffing practice by stating, "This agency...has not had a 
stunning success in relating to Congress, not because they
®®Following personnel changes based upon Ibid., 1441.
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don't try, but because there hasn't been enough.. .knowledge 
about the best way to hook into the system."®®
The Agency's Inspector General, Frederick Hitz, 
submitted a report to Deutch in which he found an 
"institutional predisposition at CIA against sharing 
information with Congress.Deutch appeared before the 
SSCI six weeks into his tenure for the purpose of addressing 
a number of specific issues on which the committee required 
follow-up. Deutch outlined major personnel changes which 
had taken place, and he spoke of further changes in regard 
to replacing the Deputy Directors for Operations and 
intelligence. ®z
These appointments represented an even greater 
extension of the new "DCI culture" that began with Gates and 
woolsey: the notion that the DCI should be fully committed
to Congressioal oversight (\diether for pragmatic or 
philosophical reasons) and pro-active in being both 
sensitive and responsive to Congressional concerns.
®°Ibid.
®^Sta££ Reporting; Section Notes, "CIA Says None of Its People Had 
Role in Slayings," Congressional Ouarterlv Weekly Report. 29 July 
1995, 2296.
®^Two core positions, as Operations involves managing human spying 
and covert operations and Intelligence oversees the Agency's 
analysis. See John Deutch, "Open Testimony Before the SSCI," Written 
statement for the record, <http://wmr.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_hr 
/s950621d.htr>. Downloaded 10 August 1999,
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Deutch’s appointment of former Congressional staffers 
clearly went a step further in the evolution of this "DCI 
culture; of concern for Congressional good will.
Both of Deutch ' s post-Cold War predecessors were 
dubious of these staffing practices. Woolsey pointed out 
that, during his tenure as DCI, no personnel moved directly 
from a Congressional position to senior management within 
the Agency.®^ Gates indicated that current Executive Branch 
officials have cause to be alarmed. When asked about the 
institutional impact of moving personnel from Capitol Hill 
to Langley, Gates responded:
I would tell you if I were the president. I'd be 
concerned because who [at the Agency] has an Executive 
Branch perspective in terms of protecting the 
president's prerogatives and authorities? I'd be 
concerned with all those [Congressional] folks out 
there [at CIA] that on any issue that involved the 
president's prerogatives...that would be 
secondary....
Despite his reservations about how presidents and their 
inner circle might view the trend. Gates stated: "I don't
think the career [Agency] folks have a problem with it."®* 
While it is plausible to assume that Gates' impression is an 
accurate reflection of Agency culture, it remains unclear to
®^Woolaey Interview.
®*Gates interview.
®*Ibid.
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what extent the attitude of the DCI affects rank and file 
members of the Agency.9® It should also be noted that 
Deutch's attempts to-quell Congressional concerns and 
preempt, quoting Gates again, "ugly" reform efforts were 
successful only in as much as the seas of the larger 
political context remained calm. Like Woolsey, Deutch 
eventually found himself struggling to stay ahead of events.
In September 1995, a story in the Washington Post 
reported that the National Reconnaissance Office had amassed 
nearly one billion dollars in unspent funds. It was later 
determined that the amount was $3.8 billion.This 
discovery was made a year after several members of Congress 
asserted that the NRG had concealed huge cost overruns in 
the construction of a new, $302 million, headquarters 
(nicknamed "the Taj Mahal") in Virginia.*® Members were 
angry when forced to confront the lack of forthcoming they 
often encounter when attempting to conduct intelligence 
oversight. Republican Senator John Waumer, in whose state 
the NRO's headquarters is located, expressed this
*®Such interview research is in^rtant for developing the fullest 
possible view from the Executive Branch. However, issues of access 
precluded such a survey being done here.
*7Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Comminitv (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1999), 40.
*®See Donna Cassata, "Members Fear Fiscal Crackdown May Sap Spy 
Agency," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 25 November 1995,
3604-3605.
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displeasure by saying: "If you didn't ask the precise
question, if you asked a near-miss question, they wouldn't 
volunteer anything."®® Unspent NRO funds had been discovered 
in 1992, but the agency assured Congressional overseers that 
they eliminated the accounts in a timely fashion. When this 
did not occur. Congress imposed new legal measures which 
would tighten the NRO's financial management p r a c t i c e s .  
Additionally, Congress eliminated one billion dollars from 
the NRO's budget. The DCI has joint responsibility with the 
Secretary of Defense for managing the NRO and Deutch, in an 
effort to reassure lawmakers, ordered an audit of the NRO as 
well as changes to the agency's financial management 
staff. 101
Soon after this event, Deutch encountered additional 
fallout from the Ames case. In September 1995, Deutch had 
asserted that "espionage is the core of the CIA, " and that 
although the Directorate of Operations was still in need of 
some reform, covert operations were to be strengthened.
This assertion haunted Deutch less than two months later
®®Quoted in Casaata, 'Members Fear Fiscal Crackdown,” 3604. 
I0°lbid., 3605.
lOiQonna Cassata, "Spy Agency's $I Billion Cache Dra%rs Members' 
Wrath,” Congressional QuarterIv Weekly Report. 30 September 1995, 
3019.
l^^Quoted in Donna Cassata, ”CIA: More Covert Actions,”
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 16 September 1995, 2825.
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when the Agency's Inspector General released a report which 
detailed the intact that the treachery of Ames had made upon 
the intelligence community. One member of Congress said of 
Ames' intact: "It's a lot worse than expected. It's like a
bad dream. Ames is Walker, Howard, and all our other double 
agents put together. " The chairman of the SSCI stated : 
"It's just mind-boggling, the scope of what went on here. "lo* 
Annoyed members of Congress informed Deutch that the IG 
report indicated that substantive change in the culture of 
the CIA had yet to take place, despite confirmation hearing 
assurances from two DCI nominees that dramatic differences 
would be forthcoming.
Additionally, more details surfaced of other alleged 
Agency wrongdoings. Questions were raised, during Deutch's 
tenure, about Agency con^licity in humem rights abuses and 
murder in Guatemala. One of the Agency's paid informants. 
Col. Julio Alpirez, was linked to the torture and murder of 
dissidents in Guatemala— including one American.Further,
^'^^Representative and HPSCI member Bill Richardson (D-NM) quoted in 
Donna Cassata, "Drive To Reform CIA Intensifies As Ames Case Fallout 
Worsens," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 4 November 1995,
3392.
Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) quoted in Cassata, "Drive to Reform 
CIA," 3392.
°^^ For good background on the Guatemalan case and the murder of 
Michael DeVine, see Pat Towell, "Senators Accuse CIA of Deception," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 8 April 1995, 1033.
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the media reported in late 1995 that one of the Agency's 
officers assigned to penetrate terrorist organizations had 
sold the terrorists visas to the United States in exchange 
for prostitutes and money. Deutch's response to these
matters was significant when conqpared to the manner in which 
his predecessors dealt with Agency crises. For exan^le, 
unlike woolsey's response to the Ames disclosures, Deutch 
fired top personnel for their involvement in the Guatemalan 
matter. During the tenure of Gates, Agency crises and 
damage control were typically discussed and handled in 
concert by the president, DCI, and Congressional 
intelligence leadership. By contrast, Deutch found himself 
more alone in responding to escalating Congressional 
criticism as each allegation emerged. Deutch did not have 
as active presidential ally as was the case for Robert 
Gates. 107 This is attributable to the fact that Deutch was 
not as personally close to key institutional actors as Gates 
had been.
Other personal factors— most notably Deutch's 
management style— worked against his attempts to solidify
io®Evan Thomas and Gregory Viatica, "Spooking the Director," 
Newsweek. 6 November 1995, 42.
lO^oircujnstantially, Clinton could not have been as po«ier£ul a voice 
due to the newly elected Republican Congressional majorities he was 
facing during the time of these revelations.
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control over his bureaucratic power base inside the 
intelligence community. Deutch's management style was 
abrasive long before he arrived at the Agency. 10= Likewise, 
his management performance, while at the Pentagon, has been 
described as "decisive" but "sometimes abrasive. In an
interview granted one month after being sworn in, Deutch 
stated that he "never felt any problem asserting control. 
Colleagues at the Agency noted his willingness to "push his 
own tray in the cafeteria" and stroll around the halls 
talking informally with co-workers but to "erupt" whenever 
crossed by subordinates. The following description of 
Deutch is worth citing at length.
Gregarious and backslapping, Deutch can also be a 
ruthlessly tough manager and highly status conscious. 
He recently angered seven Senators planning a fact­
finding trip to Bosnia by refusing to let them use a 
plane he had reserved from the Pentagon for a later 
trip, even though the Pentagon was ed>le to find him an 
identical substitute. When one of Washington's hot 
restaurants. The Palm, was slow to put up Deutch's 
caricature among more them a thousand portraits of the 
city's political elite, Deutch had aides and relatives 
pester the manager with phone calls until the picture
was hung. 112
^^^Constance Bolden, "Deutch Bows Out," Science. 2 February 1990,
530. Deutch was opposed for this reason by MIT students and faculty 
as he sought the MIT presidency.
lO^Staff Reporting, "Second Time, Yes: The CIA," The Keongmiati 334
(7906): A29-30.
^l°Evan Thomas, "Cleaning Op The Congiany'," Newsweek. 12 June 1995,
34-35.
illlbid.
^^^OQugias Waller, "For Your Disinformation," ZjjD£# 13 November 1995,
82.
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Deutch's attempts to discipline and reshape the Agency—  
through significant tasking and personnel changes— met with 
mixed success and, initially, very poor morale. At one 
point, an audience of Agency employees committed a 
significant breach of protocol by failing to rise as Deutch 
entered the auditorium to present an address.Deutch*s 
instructions to fire agents, drop informants, and closely 
vet potential human intelligence sources drew an unusual 
response from rank and file case officers— some of whom wore 
black arm bands in protest of the DCis actions. m
Deutch made a significant, and lasting, impact as DCI. 
He is credited for improving the public image of the Agency- 
-so much so that a major publication proposed having its 
cover photo consist of Deutch riding a \diite h o r s e .
However, his reforms were cited by the Center for 
International Policy as being more cosmetic than 
substantive.il* He succeeded in helping to establish the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency to reduce redundancy in 
the use of photographic intelligence— another example of
iiiThomas and Viatica, "Spooking the Director," 42.
114 Ibid.
11*The Agency turned the request down. Arthur Jones, "Same Old CIA 
Out to Fix Image," National Catholic Reporter. 26 ^ril 1996, 4-5. 
llSlbid.
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staying ahead of Congressional inclinations. Elements 
within the Congress had been seeking a way in which the 
perceived redundency of tasks might be addressed. NIMA 
combined the efforts of several previously separate 
intelligence entities. Deutch was a supporter of the NIMA 
plan. His personnel selections— particularly those with 
Congressional experiences— were well received by 
intelligence overseers. However, these successes were 
offset by other notable developments such as Congressional 
insistence that he create new offices for the purpose of in- 
house oversightand the manner in which his management 
style was received at the Agency. Deutch resigned his 
position shortly before President Clinton began his second 
term. With his departure and the eventual ascendancy of his 
deputy, George Tenet, a new era of intelligence policy 
making began to emerge.
George J. Tenet
The process to replace John Deutch was not an easy one 
for the Clinton administration. Clinton had won reelection 
in 1996, but the Republicans retained control of the 
Congress and were disappointed by the defeat of their
measure Deutch was completely against.
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presidential candidate. The desire of Republicans to exact 
political retribution on the administration possibly 
explains, to some extent, the failed nomination of 
Clinton's first choice to replace Deutch, Anthony Lake.
Given the administration's history of appointment setbacks, 
the person who immediately emerged as the front-runner, was 
unsurprising.
George Tenet is one of the most unique DCI appointments 
in the history of the Agency. He is the first career 
staffer from Congress to be appointed as DCI. A 1976 
graduate of Georgetown, Tenet worked in Washington D.C. his 
entire life. In the early to mid-1980 s, he was a 
Legislative Assistant (and eventually Legislative Director) 
for the late Senator John Heinz (R-PA). He served as a 
staffer on the SSCI (1985-1988) and was picked by then SSCI 
chairman Senator David Boren to be the Committee Staff 
Director in the wake of Iran-Contra. Tenet moved to the 
White House in 1993 to serve as National Security Advisor 
Lake's deputy for intelligence matters. In 1995 he returned 
to the Agency to be Deutch*s Deputy Director, a post for 
which he easily obtained Senate confirmation.
Juliana Gruenwald, "Tenet Given Warm Reception By Intelligence 
Panel," Conoreaaional Quarterly Weekly Report. 10 May 1997, 1086.
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At this time, the Agency was reeling from legislative 
reform efforts. Congressional fallout from revelations 
concerning Ames, the NRO funding matter, Guatemala, and the 
relatively short tenures of its two most recent OCIs. The 
Clinton administration— still bruised from the Lake 
nomination affair— needed an overwhelmingly confinoable 
nominee. That Tenet’s DCI confirmation hearing stood in 
marked contrast to that of Gates and Lake is something of an 
understatement. A careful reading of the testimony and 
confirmation proceedings indicate that, of the four 
individuals vdio have served as DCI in the post-Cold War era. 
Tenet experienced the least difficulty during his Senate 
confirmation hearing. In fact, even Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, one the more vocal critics of the intelligence 
community, pledged his trust and confidence in Tenet.
It is an honor and pleasure, as you [Chairman Shelby, 
R-Ala. ] and Senator Kerrey have indicated, to introduce 
to the committee a distinguished son of Queens and of a 
vibrant Greek community that has added so much to our 
city, emd now to our Nation in the person of Mr.
Tenet.
I commend him to you, sir 120
36.
120Ibid., 37.
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Former SSCI chairman Boren's confirmation hearing testimony 
in support of Tenet's appointment reflects the former's 
thoughts concerning Tenet's government service and rapid 
rise in stature.
I had not met George Tenet when I first became a member 
of the Intelligence Committee. Very quickly, after 
watching him and working with him, I became 
tremendously in^ressed. Very early on in my 
chairmanship with about 5 years left to go, the staff 
directorship became vacant. I consulted with then 
Vice-Chair Senator Cohen, and together we reached the 
conclusion that George Tenet would make an outstanding 
staff director for this c o m m i t t e e .
In many of their opening statements. Committee members 
from both parties expressed warm familiarity with Tenet and 
his uniquely nonpartisan, professional disposition.Those 
on the committee vdio were the most contentious about 
Clinton's first pick. Lake, were uniformly increased by 
Tenet's SSCI staff leadership experience euid personal 
attributes. 123 Tenet simply did not possess the political 
baggage that previous nominees had involuntarily towed into
l2lDavid L. Boren in Congress, Senate, Select Comnittee on 
Intelligence, Nomination of Georae J. Tenet to be Director of Central
Intelligence. 105th Cong., 1st sess., 6 Nay 1997, 40-41.
Senator Boren stated in confirmation testimony and in an interview 
with the author that Tenet worked quite hard to keep the minority 
members of the Committee fully informed. To this day, Boren is 
unsure of Tenet's political affiliation.
^^^Juliana Gruenwald, "Tenet Brings Strong Credentials To Prospective 
CIA Post, " Congressional QuarterIv Weeklv Report. 12 J^ril 1997, 857.
See also Eric Pooley, "Why the Senate Loves an Understudy, " Time. 31
March 1997, 38.
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their confirmation hearings. Further, Tenet had occasion to 
speak prior to the hearing with Committee members who were 
the most contentious .during the Lake appointment, including 
Republican Senator James Inhofe who stated publicly to 
Tenet:
We have talked previously— and we had a long discussion 
in my office— and I appreciate the opportunity to go 
into a lot of things with you privately. I think 
that ' s an in^)ortant part of this process. And I know 
that the time you afforded me, you also gave to others, 
too. ^ 4
Aside from a sense of mutual professional respect. 
Tenet's confirmation testimony reveals an individual with a 
unique grasp of the intelligence policy relationship between 
Congress and the president. SSCI Vice Chairman Robert 
Kerrey pressed Tenet on his feelings about prompt 
notification of Congress in regard to intelligence matters, 
including failures like the Ames case. Tenet's response 
illustrates his longtime commitment to improving 
intelligence through making positive advancements with 
respect to institutional relations.
Acting Director TENET. Senator, ny gut instinct is 
that I don't [feel the need for more notification 
requirements] because we provide these notifications 
not on the basis of a statutory requirement but on the 
basis of comity between us. And t^t's—
i24genator James Inhofe (R-OK) in Nomination of Georae J. Tenet. 72.
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vice Chairman KERREY. Did you say comedy?
Acting Director TENET. Comity, c-o-m-i-t-y, between 
us. And we function as partners in many ways. So my 
sense of it is— of course, you may say it may change in 
the next regime and the next guy in, but i don't 
believe that the system of Congressional notification 
or oversight is moving backward in any way. I mean, I 
think we've set the standard. So long as we trust each 
other, I would resist statutory changes.
This exchange highlights the key to good intelligence policy 
relations between Congress and the Executive Branch. The 
key is institutional trust, built and maintained through 
forthright communication. The point would be clearly 
accentuated by Tenet's tenure as DCI.
Though he testified that he did not seek it,^26 Tenet 
retained Deutch's cabinet rank status, a fact that curiously 
seemed to trouble far fewer Committee members in Tenet's 
case than it had in the instance of Deutch. 127 This may be 
explained by the fact that Deutch had not been perceived as 
having utilized his Cetbinet status inappropriately. The 
fact that Tenet was an overwhelmingly familiar figure in the 
Senate may also have been a factor.
125 Ibid., 91.
126Ibid. , 110.
i22only one Conniitee member raised the issue.
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Access did not present problems for Tenet, as it had 
for Woolsey. The issue was raised during Tenet's 
conf irmation.
Senator DEWINE. It seems to me that all of the 
successful Directors of the CIA have had a couple of 
things in common. One is they have been strong leaders 
internally within the CIA itself, and in the 
intelligence community; but, second, they've all had 
access— good access— to the President of the United 
States. I would like you to discuss that a little 
bit...
Acting Director TENET. ...My relationship with the 
national security advisor and the national security 
team is very, very good. I don't have any doubt about 
my ability to see the President when I need to see the 
President... I think he is quite keen to hear from me, 
and quite attentive to our issues, and quite an avid 
consumer of intelligence. And every time I have 
engaged him with the previous Director, he has been 
right on top of our issues...So we don't play golf 
together, but I will be seeing him often...
Tenet seemed to take lessons from his predecessors ' record 
in explaining the management style he would utilize.
well. Senator, my view on how you would lead an agency 
is to get your hands dirty, get to see people where 
they work, let them know that you have warm blood in 
your veins and care about v^at they write and what they 
say, and be very, very much of an activist in the day- 
to-day operations of what they do. I find that's been 
ny style ny entire life, and I find when you practice 
that style you get a r e s p o n s e . . .129
l28genator Mike DeWine (R-OH) of Ohio in Nomination of Georae J. 
Tenet. 97.
I29ibid. 99.
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Finally, in terms of the oversight relationship between 
Congress and the intelligence portion of the Executive 
Branch, Tenet's unqualified responses during his 
confirmation hearing lend insights which explain the current 
state of intelligence relations. For example:
Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Tenet, is there any circumstances 
under which you would intentionally deceive or mislead 
one of the oversight Committees, or direct an official 
under your control to do so in pursuit of a policy 
objective or to protect the national security?
Acting Director TENET. No, sir.
Of his former deputy, Deutch commented "I think he will be
an excellent leader. I have found him to be a man of
incredible loyalty and judgment, By a floor voice vote
after receiving a unanimous endorsement from the SSCI 
earlier in the day, George Tenet was confirmed by the Senate 
and became the youngest DCI in the Agency's history in July
1997.131
As of this writing. Tenet has served as DCI for necirly 
three years, making him the longest serving post-Cold War 
DCI by nearly a year's length. As Deputy DCI for two years 
prior to becoming DCI himself. Tenet oversaw the
i30Gruenwald, "Tenet Brings Strong Credentials," 857.
I3ijuiiana Gruenwald, "Senate Confirms Tenet As Intelligence Chief, 
Congressional Quarterly Weeklv Report. 12 July 1997, 1644.
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implementation of the intelligence reforms instituted during 
the Deutch era. As DCI, Tenet has kept most of these 
continuing reform efforts in-house, closely consulting with 
the Congressional Committees. Not since the Carter 
administration has a DCI experienced such success in keeping 
his Agency off of the front page and on good terms with the 
Congress.
There are several factors which explain the current 
state of institutional comity and trust with respect to 
intelligence policy. The foremost factor is George Tenet 
himself. His personality and professional example have 
shaped the course of institutional relations. The point is 
articulated by those who know him personally:
He's been a major factor [in the good relations with 
Congress] because he just truly is a very candid 
person. He comes from the oversight process. Gates 
came at it as the insider who pragmatically understood 
that for the agency to survive in the modem world, it 
had to see oversight as a fact of life. Tenet came at 
it [the job of DCI] from the outside as an overseer—  
like a prosecutor can't overnight become a defense 
attorney without some transition— and I think he still 
has that [prosecutor] mentality. But that ideally 
works. That helps build a lot of consensus or trust 
from the overseers [in Congress] because they have the 
feeling "he's one of us, not one of t h e m . "^ 2^
l^^Boren interview.
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Boren adds that. Tenet has achieved— again, through force of 
personality— loyalty and trust from rank and file Agency 
members :
On the other hand, he has enough affinity of just 
really respecting %diat these guys do at the Agency.
They feel the emotional affinity he has. I mean, you 
need that natural "I'll fight for you," which projects 
to them like "I'm proud of you— you are a good 
patriotic American. " And George is that to the core.":
Consistent with his confirmation hearings and 
Congressional briefings. Tenet has a commanding presence in 
interview s i t u a t i o n s . 1^4 ge is extraordinarily "no-nonsense" 
in responding to questions concerning Congressional 
oversight and community management. His DCI oversight 
philosophy for nearly three years has been a simple one with 
regard to giving intelligence briefings and acknowledging 
intelligence failures: tell the truth and tell it as early
as possible.
During Tenet's tenure as DCI, the number of 
intelligence flaps resulting in damage to institutional 
relations, or to the continuity and low-key approach that he 
has worked to build within the ccsmnunity, have been
Interview with DCI, George J. Tenet, in hie Agency office, 
Langley, VA, 1 Septandser 1999.
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extraordinarily low. This is the case despite several 
incidents in which the intelligence community has been 
accused of an intelligence breakdown. One journalist 
outlines some of these instances.
In May 1998, the agency failed to predict that India 
would test a nuclear weapon. In August, it was caught 
unawares by North Korea's test flight of a three-stage 
missile over Japan. Earlier that month, it failed to 
detect plans for the bombings of the US Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania— even though it had been involved in 
tracking the bombing's alleged sponsor, Osama Bin 
Ladin, for several years. And...questions have been 
raised over the agency's contention that a Sudanese 
pharmaceutical factory that the United States bombed in 
retaliation was producing VX nerve gas for use by Bin 
Ladin.
The question is: Why have these so-called failures not
contributed significantly to institutional discord and a DCI 
vacancy? A more recent incident, and the manner in which it 
was addressed by Tenet, provides an explanation.
The incident involved the Agency's role in the 
mistaken US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on 7 
May 1999. Tenet testified before the HPSCI two months after 
the incident. He indicated that outdated maps, and a 
failure to consult both the Agency operative on location and 
the appropriate military attaché, were to blame for the 
erroneous targeting data that the Agency supplied to the US
^^^Nurith C. Aizenman, "Intelligence Test: Can George Tenet Save the
CIA?," The New Republic. 22 March 1999, 22.
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military. Tenet stated: "it was a major error. The
ultimate responsibility for the role of the intelligence in 
this tragedy is mine. " Tenet acted quickly to contain 
Congressional fallout and, from the standpoint of protecting 
the intelligence relationship between institutions, it 
worked. One source said "George immediately came down [to 
the Capitol] and it was brilliant. [His] pre-emptive 
criticism helped mute Congressional outrage. He didn't try 
to sugarcoat it.”^^ ® These actions are consistent with the 
behavior that Tenet and vowed he would observe during his 
confirmation hearings. Tenet did not allow elements of the 
larger context, like revelations, to destroy interbranch 
trust and cooperation with respect to intelligence policy. 
Rather, he forthrightly faced each situation head-on.
The relationship only suffered when trust, once again, 
became an issue. An event for which Tenet received direct 
Congressional criticism involves the Agency's failure to 
ensure that former DCI John Deutch was properly scrutinized 
after it was discovered, in 1998, that he had stored dozens
i36Quoted in Wire Report, "CIA Muddled Op in China Bnibaaay Bombing in 
Belgrade," ITAR/TASS New Aoencv. 23 July 1999, (Infotrac).
^^ A^s of this writing. Tenet has dismissed one officer and 
reprimanded several others. See Wire Report, "CIA Fires Officer Over 
Chinese Embassy Bombing," United Press International. 10 i^ril 2000,
(Infotrac).
l38Quoted in HcCutcheon, "Tenet Gives CIA Credibility,” 139.
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of classified files on an internet-linked, personal 
c o m p u t e r . 139 controversy arose less over the case that 
Deutch may have broken Agency rules and federal laws than 
over the fact that the Agency did not report the matter to 
the Justice Department for more than one year, still 
worse. Tenet admitted to the SSCI that Congress had not 
been informed in a timely fashion.
That should have been done promptly, certainly by the 
spring of 1997 when internal reviews had been 
con^leted. But my view is that when you have a case 
involving a director, the notification should have been 
prompt. And there's no excuse for that.
This admission did not blunt Congressional criticism that 
followed less than three weeks later when the Agency 
released a report of its internal investigation of the 
matter. The report stipulated that Agency officials "hid" 
the facts surrounding the Deutch matter and, in doing so, 
jeopardized the nation's s e c u r i t y .  1*2 in response to the
unsecured computer such as Deutch ’ s could have been ccmprcmised 
by international 'hackers'. For more background on this incident, 
see Daniel Klaidxnan and Gregory L. Vistica, "Was the Spymaster Too 
Sloppy?,” Newsweek. 19 April 1999, 42; Wire Report, "Ex-CIA Chief's 
Computer Scrutinized," United Press International. 8 February 2000, 
(Infotrac); Warren P. Strobel, "A Former Spy Chief's Errant Ways," US 
News and World Report. 14 February 2000, 27.
i^Owire Report, "Tenet 'Could Have Done Better,'" United Press 
International. 8 February 2000, (Infotrac). Upon being notified by 
the Agency's Inspector General, the Justice Department reportedly 
took an additional year to pursue the matter.
I4iibid.
2Wire Report, "CIA Placed National Security At Risk," United Press 
International. 23 February 2000, (Infotrac).
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report, and seemingly without regard to Tenet's preeo^rtlve 
efforts, SSCI Chairman Richard Shelby stated: "This, I do
not believe, was Mr. Tenet's finest hour. All of this 
[Agency cover up] happened under his watch."^ *3 Despite all 
of the other perceived failures relating to Intelligence In 
the past several years, this particular Incident stands out 
as the only one which jeopardized Intelligence policy 
relations between Institutions. It Is no coincidence that 
it Is also the only significant Incident In which Congress 
felt the Executive Branch had not been appropriately candid.
George Tenet has no plans to leave the Agency 
voluntarily. 1^4 Nevertheless, It remains an open question as 
to whether or not his strategy for managing the Agency, Its 
and relations with Congress will prove to be successful. He 
faces another unique situation In possibly being asked to 
remain DCI regardless of the outcome of the 2000 
presidential election. ^45 He has been criticized for being 
lopsldedly attentive to Congress at the expense of 
articulating a vision for the Intelligence community, i**
343 Ibid.
344-1 love it here. It's the perfect job. They're going to have to 
blow me out of here.” Tenet quoted in Aizenman, ”Intelligence Test,”
22.
345confidential interview.
34(Former Agency operations officer Robert D. Steele offers this 
criticism in McCutcheon, ”Tenet Gives CIA Credibility,” 141.
181
However, Tenet has been less concerned with rearranging 
organizational ch2u:ts and vast reform efforts than with 
concentrating on a few important priorities such as 
rebuilding the Agency's collection assets, monitoring 
weapons proliferation, and working well with law enforcement 
agencies to address issues such as narcotics traficking, 
terrorism, and counterintelligence.
Tenet's personality— his aggressive leadership on the 
Agency's successful basketball team, his penchant for 
cigars, and his long history of support for the sometimes 
risky work of his subordinates— has helped him completely 
reconstruct the Agency ' s morale. He has greatly improved 
the intelligence policy relationship between political 
actors, without suspicion from either Congress or the 
president that he has somehow been institutionally co-opted. 
These events have come to pass despite no significant change 
in the DCIs statutory authority— budgetary or otherwise.
Managing Intelligence vs. Managing the Context of Intelligence
This chapter has assessed post-Cold Watr institutional 
relations over intelligence policy. The level of
^^^Namely human agents and satellite platforms. 
^^®Confidential interview.
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institutional comity is inqportant for it results in patterns 
of institutional policy behavior which require explanations. 
These include Congressional attitudes towards intelligence 
oversight (manifesting themselves in such events as muted 
efforts of Congressional reform), the level of continuity in 
intelligence community management (five DCis in four years 
during the 1990 s), and governmental behavior with respect 
to public account 2d)il it y (such as responses to the Ames case 
and the Guatemala affair), in an effort to offer 
explanations for these events, this chapter outlined 
research involving DCis and the relationships they developed 
with other institutional actors. It has also outlined 
research involving institutional responses to political 
events, like intelligence revelations.
Several factors explain intelligence policy relations 
during the Bush administration. First, there existed 
between key individuals (if not the nation as a whole) 
significant degrees of value, procedural, and policy 
consensus. These levels of agreement eumong major political 
actors were as unique as those between President Truman, 
George Maucshall, and Senator Arthur Vandenburg in the era 
immediately following World war II. The personal
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relationship between President Bush, Robert Gates, and SSCI 
Chairman B o r e n 4^9 certainly influenced behaviors like the 
efforts to reform the intelligence community as well as the 
tone of Congressional oversight. Second, potential areas of 
disagreement, such as covert action, dried up rather quickly 
after 1989 and were replaced by concerns for which there was 
a high degree of political agreement (e.g. terrorism, 
narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction). Third, for much of the Bush 
administration, the country and its leadership were focused 
almost exclusively upon defeating Iraq's aggression in the 
Middle East. American consensus during this period, 
although nonexistent in terms of an overarching foreign 
poliy framwork, was strong with respect to aspects of the 
structure and mechanics of the country's national security 
apparatus. In short, the prospect of significant numbers of 
American military personnel in action overseas drew 
attention away from intelligence reform movements, 
oversight, and reductions in appropriations. Much greater 
concern was displayed for intelligence requirements vdiich 
would help to minimize US losses during the war with Iraq.
149^ 8 well as having members of the same party and state delegation 
chair both Intelligence Coomittees— i.e. HPSCI Chairman Dave McCurdy.
184
In addition to personality and personal relationships, the 
political context of the times affected interbranch 
relations with respect to intelligence policy.
The significance of these factors increased during the 
Clinton administration. The absence of personal 
relationships and presidential access undermined James 
Woolsey's attempt to fulfill his role as intermediary 
bewteen the administration and the Congress. Despite a 
flurry of personal briefing activity on Capitol Hill and 
attempts to introduce a series of in-house reforms, Woolsey 
was unable to obtain a positive working relationship with 
SSCI Chairman DeConcini. Additionally, Woolsey never 
penetrated Clinton’s inner-most circle of advisors. Clinton 
was too engrossed in the American economy, and too 
suspicious of the country's national security structures, to 
afford much clout to his DCI. With no allies in Congress or 
in the White House, Woolsey was alone in his attempts to 
deal with crises such as the Ames case and post-Cold War 
intelligence budget cuts. Yeaurs after leaving the Agency, 
Woolsey reflected on his intelligence policy experience, 
saying that interbranch trust and successful community
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management "all depends on individuals. DeConcini and I 
didn't agree on a single thing in two years.
John Deutch sought to strengthen the power and 
influence of his position in hopes of avoiding his 
predecessor's pitfalls. One account provides a marked 
contrast to Woolsey's predicament.
By sheer force of personality, Deutch has become the 
most we11-connected spymaster since Allen Dulles....
Deutch is well on his way to becoming more powerful 
than Ronald Reagan's notoriously influential spy chief. 
Bill Casey....
The President relishes Deutch's company, his intensity, 
yes, even his advice.
Despite his wealth of bureaucratic experience emd cabinet- 
rank presidential access, Deutch was unable to weather 
political fallout from reported intelligence failures and 
excesses. Deutch's tenure as DCI was as volatile as 
Woolsey's and no more successful in terms of improving 
community management and morale. He was not successful in 
cultivating his bureaucratic po%#er base as manager of the 
Agency and, therefore, his reform efforts were diluted by 
bureaucratic politics, s imilar to Gates, Deutch relied on 
personal connections. However, in the case of Gates, they
i*®McCutcheon, "Tenet Gives CIA Credibility," 142. 
iSlwaller, "Master of the Game," 41.
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were built upon personal relationships that Deutch did not 
fully develop with key Congressional figures. Whatever 
skills and access Deutch possessed, they were no match for 
the damaging political realities he faced. He "scarcely 
concealed his distaste for the job" and left the Agency 
after a remarkably short term, Deutch did set a course 
for improved institutional relations with his personnel 
changes, particularly those involving the placement of 
longtime Congressional staff in key Agency positions.
This trend was epitomized by the appointment of George 
Tenet to be Deputy DCI and later DCI. under Tenet, 
intelligence policy relations between Congress and the 
Executive Branch have clearly been harmonious, relative to 
the past twenty years. This is due to mainly to Tenet ' s 
approach to community management and relations with the 
Congress. Thus far. Tenet has been successful in terms of 
maintaining a cooperative intelligence policy relationship 
with the Congress. At the same time, he has maintained his 
access to, and influence with, the President, particularly 
in light of President Clinton's increased attention to
^Aizenman, "Intelligence Teat," 22.
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foreign policy— a typical trend during the course of a
presidential administration.
Intelligence policy— ranging from reform proposals and 
Congressional inquiries to the tenure of senior 
intelligence officials— can be more fully explained by case 
study analysis of political behavior. Much of the 
intelligence rapport that has been constructed between the 
Executive Branch lies in the fact that recent OCXs, though 
at variance in their personal relations with the Congress, 
have all been in word and in deed committed to the 
oversight process.
If there is to be a more complete explanation for the 
current state of relations between institutional actors, 
then qualitative elements of the larger political context 
must be assessed to discover the reletive weight of 
in^rtant policy variables like consensus, democratic 
legitimacy, and public accountability. Much of the 
explanation for the current state of affairs lies within the 
Executive Branch. However, post-Cold War intelligence 
policy has also been affected by tendencies which reside
^^^Confidential interview.
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within the Congress. The nature and the extent of these 
tendencies is the focus of the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Post-Cold War Intelligence and the Congress
Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a 
powerless parlieunent— at least in so fetr as ignorance somehow 
agrees with the bureaucracy's interests -
-Max Weber^
The legislative department is everywhere extending its sphere of 
activity, and drawing all po%rer into its impetuous vortex.
-James Madison^
Context and Congressional Involves»nt in Intelligence Policy
This chapter assesses Congressional activity with 
respect to post-Cold War intelligence policy. Congress 
involves itself in intelligence policy mainly through the 
oversight function. Since the stctrt of the Cold War, both 
the amount and character of Congressional oversight has 
changed dramatically. Substantive intelligence oversight 
was absent until the mid-1970s. Congressional oversight of 
the intelligence community since that time has been 
extensive; however, the tone of this oversight has varied. 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, Congressional oversight, 
from 1975 on, was more adversarial in character. Since the 
end of the Cold War, the intelligence oversight relationship 
between Congress and the Executive Bremch has been generally
^From Max Weber, Eaaaya in Sociology, trana. and ed. B. B. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mllla (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 233-234. 
T^he Federalist No. 48.
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cooperative. The preceding chapters have examined the 
intact of certain contextual factors in shaping Executive 
Branch attitudes and actions with respect to intelligence 
policy. This chapter will extend previous scholarly 
research in order to elucidate the intact of these factors 
upon the extent and character of Congressional oversight.
The more conventional wisdom which concludes, "If Congress 
simply knew what the community was doing, there would be 
more adversarial oversight," can be substantially discounted 
based upon the findings presented here.
Congress and Intelligence Policy
Intelligence policy is not like other types of policy. 
It is public policy in the sense that the public helps to 
staff agencies of the intelligence community and public tax 
revenues are utilized to keep the community functioning. 
However, intelligence policy is public policy that is, in 
large part, crafted, authorized, implemented, and monitored 
behind closed doors. This fact raises guestions regarding 
democratic procedures and accountability. The technical 
collection systems purchased and the subterfuge conducted 
abroad represent some of the most expensive and dangerous
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undertakings of the federal government. However, due to 
paramount concerns of national security, these bureaucratic 
activities are special with respect to the type of attention 
they are given by the Congress.
There exists in the National Security Act of 1947, the 
legal obligation for the president to keep the Congress 
"fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities 
of the United States."^ This entails for Congress a 
responsibility to monitor every aspect of intelligence 
policy. For nearly a generation. Congress has possessed the 
structural mechanisms and procedures to conduct intelligence 
oversight. Members of the SSCI and HPSCI have virtually 
unfettered access to the community's products, personnel, 
and budgetary resources. However, the Committee 
chairpersons are typically alone in delving into the deepest 
details. Further, all non-Committee members of Congress are 
authorized, subject to relatively minor restrictions, to 
review classified intelligence reports on wide ranging 
aspects of the community and its activities. Few members 
exercise this right. Finally, the entire intelligence 
community was created, maintained, emd remains subject to
3as amended by PL 102-88, Intelligence Authorization Act. Fiscal Year 
1991.
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the legislative Inclinations of the Congress. In other 
words, reform efforts, budget adjustments, and other major 
changes that the Intelligence community faces are a major 
purview of the Congress. However, Congressional effort with 
regard to these types of activities has been sporadic and, 
at times, weak.
Why would the Intelligence watchdog— a dog that Is more 
Informed than It has ever been and of a party In opposition 
to president's throughout much of the period examined here—  
conduct rather benign forms of program monitoring? At a 
time that has been repeatedly characterized as devoid of 
consensus on a comprehensive foreign policy, why would 
Interbranch Intelligence relations be described as 
"excellent'?* To more fully explain the current state of 
Intelligence policy and Inter-branch comity. It Is necessary 
to analyze the post-Cold War Intelligence behavior of the 
Congress. The analysis Is facilitated by focusing on an 
activity which concis Interaction between the two branches : 
oversight.
Robert M. Gates, interview %rith author, Texas A & M University, 6 
December 1999. See also Robert M. Gates, "Remarks Before the 
American Bar Association Standing Committee Breakfast,” delivered on 
18 February 1993, Reprinted in National Securitv Law Report. 15 
(February 1993): 3. Gates stated that "in recent years the 
relationship between American intelligence and the Congress has 
improved steadily to reach what I believe is a current excellent 
state."
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Congressional Oversight
Oversight is an activity which, among other functions, 
serves to keep the Congress involved in the policy process 
beyond the legislative stage.* The Joint Committee report 
which led to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
states that "without effective legislative oversight of the 
activities of the vast Executive Branch, the line of 
democracy wears thin."® Thus, oversight has long been 
recognized as an avenue for Congress to continually bring 
democratic review to bear upon federal programs, agencies, 
and personnel.
There are several variations to the activities tdiich 
constitute oversight. Formal oversight actions have 
oversight as their prinary purpose. An example of formal 
oversight with respect to intelligence matters would be 
Committee hearings convened for the express purpose of 
conducting a particular covert action review. Informal 
oversight occurs incidental to other official functions. An
®An excellent general work on Congresaional oversight is Joel D. 
Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eve; The Politics of Congressional 
Oversight (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1990).
®Quoted in Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenburg, Th*» American Political 
Dietionarv (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1997), 10th 
ed., 175.
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example of informal oversight: would be Congressional 
inquiries made t:o intelligence officials incident to routine 
events like intelligence budgets and world threat assessment 
hearings.^
Additionally, not all oversight activities are readily 
perceived. This fact tends to impact judgments as to the 
overall effectiveness of oversight. Morris Ogul states that 
an
[A]ssessment of oversight is conditioned also by one's 
perceptions of what oversight is. If oversight is 
defined only in terms of formal powers, different 
conclusions emerge about its adequacy than if informal 
relationships are taken into account. Those Wio view 
oversight as simply an attend to influence the 
in^lementation of legislation through post-statutory 
investigations will reach different conclusions than 
will those who are sensitive to oversight performed 
latently.®
In Ogul's sense of the term. Congress displays both manifest 
and latent types of oversight in dealing with matters of 
intelligence. Visible oversight comes in many forms.
Readily apparent are the impacts that the Intelligence 
Committees have with respect to confirming Executive 
appointments, proposing reform legislation, and conducting
^Definitions found in Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 
"Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire
Alarms, American Journal of Political Science 28 (February 1984) 166. 
®Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy; Studies in 
Legislative Supervision (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg 
Press, 1976), 6.
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covert action reviews. This type of oversight helps shape 
the contours of intelligence policy at several levels. 
However, the Committees have an invisible impact as well. 
Intelligence community officials have been forced to 
determine a priori whether or not their actions can stand 
the test of Committee, and ultimately public, scrutiny.
"The most important form of oversight goes unseen. The CIA 
worries that Congress is looking over its shoulder; 
therefore, it is less reckless. It makes them think before 
they act."® From a social scientific standpoint, such 
latent forms of oversight are virtually impossible to 
measure and predict
The HPSCI and the SSCI are unique oversight entities 
within the Congress in that they were created, and continue 
to exist, for the sole purpose of overseeing the activities 
of the intelligence community. This is at vairiance with 
other committees of the Congress, many of which have been 
researched previously.^ Scholars have asserted that, due to 
the nature of Congress, these other committees often tend to
®Anonymous senior SSCI staffer quoted in Loch K. Johnson, Secret
Agenciea; a.s. intelligence In a Hostile W o r l d  (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1996), 117.
^^However, every interview participant in this research indicated 
that such considerations are prevalent.
l^See, for example, Richard F. Fenno, C o n g r e s s m e n  in Cowiiitteew 
(Boston, MA: Little, Broim, & Co., 1972).
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conduct "fire alarm" as opposed to "police patrol" 
o v e r s i g h t .  12 That is, in order to reduce the time consuming 
and electorally worthless task of constantly policing an 
agency, members of Congress will construct rules and 
policies which will automatically alert them to bureaucratic 
problems and a b u s e s .12 The House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees are unique in this respect, given that members 
form long lines to join them despite a large amount of the 
Committees ' time being devoted to oversight of the more 
mundane, police patrol variety. Finally, there is scholarly 
literature Wiich suggests that members of Congress pursue 
oversight strategies that are not nearly as collegial as 
they used to b e . 4^ The main reasons for this phenomenon are 
a declining interest in public policy and an increased 
concern with sel f-promotion on the part of many members. 
Given that the %#ork of the Intelligence Committees is of 
such vital importance to the nation, and given that much of 
their work is conducted behind closed doors, it follows that 
membership behavior is potentially quite different than that
22McCubbins and Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked, 
"ibid., 166, 168, 171-2.
24James L. Payne, "The Rise of Lone Wolf Questioning in House 
Committee Hearings," Polity 14 (Summer 1982): 626-640.
"ibid., 626.
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of other committees. These factors impact institutional 
relations and intelligence policy.
Cold War Intelligence Oversight
For nearly the first two decades of its existence, the 
intelligence community experienced extremely modest levels 
of Congressional oversight. As cunended, the National 
Security Act of 1947 provides a statutory role for Congress 
to conduct thorough oversight and evaluation. Nevertheless, 
the Congress was initially quite reluctant to stray beyond 
its minimum responsibilities with regard to intelligence 
appropriations reviews and confirmations of Executive 
appointments.
Clearly, theories of institutional deference provide 
explanations for intelligence policy behavior during this 
"Era of Trust."17 The overriding perception of the need to 
roll back and destroy communist infiltration created a 
belief that the activities of the community— even if they 
involved the disruption of legitimate governments and abuses 
of the rights of citizens— were necessary for maintaining 
American national security. Unbridled intelligence activity
i^Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies. 4, 
17Ibid., 4.
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was commenced shortly after President Eisenhower received a 
review prepared by General Jimmie Doolittle which outlined 
the intelligence needs of the nation.
It is now clear that we are facing an in^lacable eneny 
whose avowed objective is world domination...There are 
no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of 
human conduct do not apply...We must...learn to 
subvert, seüx^ tage, and destroy our enemies by more 
clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods 
than those used against us.^ ^
Spectacular, US-assisted regime displacements in Iran (1953) 
and Guatemala (1954) thwarted ostensible communist 
encroachment and were considered to be model Cold War 
successes for the intelligence community.^® The deference of 
attitude displayed by Congress during this period is best 
captured by the famous comment of Senator Leverett 
Saltonstall vdio said: "It's not a question of reluctance on 
the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a 
question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information 
and knowledge on subjects which I personally would rather 
not have. "20 Similarly, Democratic Senator Frank Church 
stated: "We don't watch the dog. We don't know what's
lOguoted in Stephen E. Ambroee, Eisenhower; Soldier and President 
(New York.: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1990), 377.
Ibid., 475. This is not to say failure did not occur during this 
time period— as with Hungary's revolt in 1956.
20@uoted in Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 169.
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going on, and furthermore, we don't want to know. "Zi 
Finally, Senator Carl Hayden stated during this same period 
that legislative interference with intelligence "would tend 
to impinge upon the constitutional authority and 
responsibility of the president in the conduct of foreign 
affairs. "22 Scholar Gary Schmitt has described the 
relationship during the period this way:
Substantively.. .oversight was de minimi*. There were 
never more than a few members of either house of 
Congress actually involved in intelligence oversight.
Limited membership on tbe intelligence subcommittees 
was matched by an even more limited number of Committee 
staff members to assist them in their deliberations. 
Often no more than a clerk or an assistant had access 
to the subcommittee material. As one might expect, the 
number of subcommittee bearings held were also limited. 
Indeed, there were several years when the "joint” 
Committee of the Senate met only once or twice. 
According to the CIA, from 1967 to 1972 it averaged 
twenty-three annual appearances before Congressional 
committees.
By the early 1970 s, perceived successes turned to 
suspected excesses as the Cold War consensus broke down. 
Sensational stories emerged in the media about illegal 
domestic spying activities, assassination atten^ts made 
against foreign leaders, and overseas intelligence failures
2^Cited in Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry î Congress And 
Intelligence (Chicago: Dorsey Presa Inc., 1988), 6.
22@uoted in Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment. 166.
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of the c o m m u n i t y . 23 a  younger Congress— newly invigorated by 
large classes of liberally-minded freshman— was eager to 
engage in substantive, foreign policy issues and 
investigative oversight. Widely publicized accounts of 
presidential deception with respect to the cost and tactics 
of the Vietnam war, coupled with the ire over Watergate, 
caused pubic and Congressional trust to evaporate.
As a result of this new cuid unprecedented era of 
distrust, both the tone and consistency of Congressional 
efforts to scrutinize Executive activities were dramatically 
altered. Consequently, several Congressional inquiries of 
the intelligence community were undertaken in the mid- 
1970's, the most notcd>le of which are the Senate's Church 
Committee and the Pike Committee of the House. The Church- 
Pike Committees illustrated Congress' growing demand for a 
role in the conduct of intelligence policy. The 
establishment in 1976-1977 of permanent Intelligence 
Committees in both Congressional chambers has 
institutionalized this sentiment.
The oversight record of the Intelligence Committees 
between their inception and the end of the Cold war is the
23Domestic abuses aure illuminated in David Levy, The Debate Over 
Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 
154-155.
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subject of existing scholarship. Frank Smist offers perhaps 
the most extensive historical account of the oversight 
relationship between Congress and the intelligence community 
during this time.^* He argues that there exists two 
perspectives from which we can view intelligence relations 
between Congress and the Executive Branch. He labels the 
perspectives Institutional Oversight and Investigative 
Oversight. Institutional Oversight is characterized by 
Congress being deferential to the Executive Branch on 
matters of intelligence policy. Investigative Oversight was 
dominant during the era of Congressional reform in the mid- 
1970's and has reappeared briefly during both times of 
perceived Executive deception (e.g. Iran-Contra) as well as 
political battles (e.g. the Gates nomination). Despite 
these periodic episodes, Smist clearly believes that there 
has been a significant improvement in the intelligence 
relationship between the two branches.
During the first part (1991-1993) of the post-Cold War 
period, the Congress— especially the Senate— functioned at 
its highest level of effectiveness in terms of interbranch 
relations. This was due in large part to the effectiveness
Z^Frank Smist, Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence 
Comnunitv 1947-1994 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 
1994).
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of Senator David Boren, who chaired the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence during this time p e r i o d . Boren 
successfully conducted covert action reviews, established a 
Committee audit unit, and helped establish an independent 
Inspector General at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Boren's unusually long tenure as chair, his personal 
relationships with President Bush and Director Robert Gates, 
and his commitment to %*ork in a truly bipartisan fashion all 
contributed to an effective interbranch intelligence 
relationship. A more current analysis is appropriate for 
determining the extent to which these relationships have 
changed.
Post Cold War Intelligence Oversight
Before turning to an analysis of recent Intelligence 
Committee behavior, it is useful to outline the structural 
and membership characteristics of the post Cold War HPSCI 
and SSCI. The primary purpose of the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees is oversight. The Committees were 
formed for the expressed purpose of monitoring the 
intelligence community. This is in significant contrast to 
other committees of the Congress— most of which were created
^^Gates Interview.
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for the purpose of facilitating the legislative function.
The Intelligence Committees possess significant legislative 
duties as well, including authority for the annual budget of 
the community. Typically the Committees utilize the annual 
authorization bill as their "primary legislative vehicle" 
for enacting intelligence related statutes.
The HPSCI is comprised of sixteen members divided by a 
relatively large margin between the majority and minority 
parties. The House Speaker appoints both majority and 
minority members to the Committee, virtually always 
selecting minority members on the basis of consultations 
with the House Minority Leader. The political atmosphere of 
the HPSCI, as with the House of Representatives generally, 
is more partisan than its Senate counterpart— although 
ideological polarization has been quite thorough in the 
SSCI, a trend that has increased dramatically with a wave of 
retirements by Senate moderates.
The size of the SSCI has ranged from thirteen to 
nineteen members and was fashioned from its inception to be 
more bipartisan. The ranking minority member serves as the
^®Congre8s, Senate, Select Ccmnlttee on Intelligence, Report on 
Leaialative Overaiaht of Intelligence Activitiee: The American
Experience. 103rd Cong., 2nd aeaa., October 1994, 17. Exan^lea 
include the CIA Inspector General Act of 1990, the Intelligence 
Oversight Act of 1991, and the Intelligence Organization Act of 1992.
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Committee Vice-Chairman and is empowered to fully control 
the Committee in the absence of the Chairman. Further, 
Senate Resolution 400, the SSCI's charter, grants the 
majority party a mere one vote margin over the minority.
Due to this provision, major intelligence overhauls along 
budgetary, operational, or organizational lines require that 
support be enlisted from both parties. Selection for 
assignment to the SSCI is handled by both the majority and 
minority leaders independently in order to further remove 
partisan considerations and replace them with those 
concerning merit and qualification.
Both Intelligence Committees are constructed to ensure 
that membership includes individuals who sit on other 
committees that "have a legitimate interest in intelligence 
matters "2'^. Members of both the HPSCI and SSCI serve fixed 
terms of six and eight years, respectively. This provision 
was imbedded in the Committees ' charter legislation to 
ensure that members would not be co-opted into being 
intelligence community advocates through long periods of 
contact with the Executive Branch.
27ibid., 7.
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Throughout the 1990's, the HPSCI and SSCI did not enjoy 
a great deal of leadership «md membership continuity.
Senator David Boren chaired the SSCI for the longest period, 
1987-1993. However, since his retirement from the Senate in 
1994, the SSCI has been chaired by three individuals. 
Further, the membership turnover has been equally high—  
exemplified by the fact that, in 1993, nine of the SSCI's 
(then) seventeen members were new.^^  During this same time 
year, eleven of the HPSCI 's nineteen members were new. 
Leadership continuity has been even less existent on the 
HPSCI, as there have been five chairmen since the end of the 
Cold War.
The phenomenon of Committee turnover has implications. 
One has been noted by those possessing an insider's 
perspective. At the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, HPSCI staff member Paula 
Scaglini described the relationships between members of the 
HPSCI, the HPSCI's relations with other committees and with 
the SSCI, staff agendas, and relations between majority and 
minority staff. She found that "the proclivities of the
David Ray, "Intelligence Accountability After the Cold War: 
Continuity and Change in Congresaional Oversight, 1991-1997," paper 
prepared for presentation at the Southwestern Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, Chorpus Christi, TX, March 18-21, 1998,
9.
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chairman" are the most important factor in determining the 
focus and effectiveness of the Committees
Another implication of frequent Committee member 
turnover is that, while turnover may ease fears of co­
optation, it reduces the level of Committee experience and 
intelligence policy expertise. Committee members may be 
less committed to serious engagement of intelligence policy 
issues.^® In fact, in 1993, House Speaker Tom Foley told the 
HPSCI chairman at the time to "emphasize to Committee 
members the inertance of attending meetings and that their 
attendance would be a factor in %diether they would be 
reappointed... " .
Aside from traits of participation, other Committee 
characteristics are important. In an effort to update 
existing research, membership rosters of the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees, along with ideological 
ratings for each member are provided on Tables 1 - 10 in 
Appendix B. Ideological ratings in this case are calculated 
by votes on selected Congressional roll calls. The 
Americans for Democratic Action is a liberal interest group
^^Cited in Ray, "Intelligence Accountability," 8.
3°lbid., 9
^^Pamela Fessier, "Secrecy May Be Highest Hurdle As Agencies Face 
Shifting Hill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 13 February 
1993, 327.
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and its scores are listed from 0 (member is most 
conservative) to 100 (member is most liberal). The American 
Conservative union scores are listed as 0 (member is most 
liberal) to 100 (member is most conservative). Each rating 
is based upon roll call votes which occurred in the year 
previous to the date of the rating's publication.
There are two is^xsrtant observations which can be 
observed in the information compiled here. First, there 
occurred a dramatic majority shift on both Committees as a 
result of the 1994 midterm elections. The president has 
since been faced with Intelligence Committee majorities 
con^rised of the Republican opposition. Logic says that 
adversarial oversight should increase, in peurt due to 
partisan politics, as those generally opposed to the 
president's policies seek to undermine his agenda and 
closely monitor his b u r e a u c r a c y .^ 2 second, based upon the 
interest group ratings provided here, the Committees have 
become remarkably more ideologically polarized. In the 
first period of this study, 1991-1992, half of the Democrats 
on the SSCI were moderates or conservatives. By the final
^^The Republican majorities in the House, riding into power on the 
"Contract With America" and a popular wave of anti-Clinton sentiment, 
should have spurred a great deal of adversarial oversight and reform 
in both chambers of the Congress.
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year, 1999-2000, there were no conservative or moderate 
Democrats on the SSCI. The loss of moderate and 
conservative Democrats should affect intelligence oversight, 
and thus policy, as it has other areas. A more aggressive 
atmosphere of oversight and reform should manifest itself 
during encounters between Congress and the Executive Branch. 
More effective analysis and explanation of the most recent 
Congressional behavior is possible with these Committee 
characteristics and history in mind.
Research Design and Data
The following determinations as to the nature of post- 
Cold War intelligence oversight are based upon a content 
analysis of Congressional hearings. Assumptions regarding 
the intact partisanship and ideology have upon the degree of 
manifest oversight have been tested in the past. Loch 
Johnson has studied the effects of such factors and noted 
that ideological indexes are "an especially significant 
predictor" of aggressive oversight a c t i v i t i e s . ^3 m  an 
effort to build upon this resea&rch, a sangle of recent 
oversight hearings is subjected to some of the techniques 
pioneered by Johnson.
^^ I>och K. Johnson, Secret Agencies. 104.
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since the end of the Cold weœ, the Intelligence 
Connnlttees of the Congress have held hundreds of hearings 
which Involved them In Interaction with the Executive 
Branch. These hearings "provide a significant window Into 
the content and quality of oversight by the committees 
All but a relatively select few of these hearings were 
conducted In a closed format called executive session. 
Executive sessions are secret hearings. Unlike the open 
hearings of other committees, SSCI and HPSCI executive 
sessions are entirely closed to the public and to the press 
The Government Printing Office Is not provided with a 
hearing transcript for public distribution. The room In 
which these sessions are held Is of special design and 
typically "swept" to ensure that It Is free of listening 
devices or other compromises In security. Even the hand­
written briefing notes which Committee members make and 
utilize to ask questions during these meetings are 
considered classified and cannot be removed from the secure 
area.
^^Loch K. Johnson, 'Flaying Hardball with the CIA,' in The President. 
the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy, ed. Paul E. Peterson 
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 65.
^^For example, during the two most recently completed sessions of 
Congresses— the 2nd session of the 105th and the first session of the 
106th, there were a total of 78 SSCI hearings. Of these, 15 were 
open hearings.
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All of this is to say that academic analysis of these 
proceedings— although in^rtant to assessing notions of 
institutional mechanics and democratic accountability— is 
extraordinarily limited. Aside from interviewing members. 
Congressional staff, and Executive Branch officials about 
the general atmosphere of the closed proceedings, there is 
little the average researcher can do to report 
systematically insights into the nature and impact of these 
meetings. However, as a potential flaw in the research 
design, the inaccessibility of closed hearings is of less 
concern. Loch Johnson finds no notable difference between 
open and closed sessions.
As a former staff aide on the Senate and House 
intelligence committees, I have listened to hundreds of 
hours of closed-door testimony by CIA officials and 
questioning by legislators. The behavior of committee 
members showed little variation from the private to the 
public forum. Those who attended the public hearings 
were likely to attend the closed hearings ; those who 
were energetic in public hearings were energetic in 
closed hearings; those who were deferential [to the 
intelligence community] in public were deferential in 
private. Moreover, an examination of the four closed 
SSCI hearings that have been declassified reveals 
questioning patterns quite similar to those seen in 
open hearings.
A decade ago, Johnson asked the SSCI Staff Director at the 
time, George Tenet, %diat he felt were the most valuable
^^Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies. 95.
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forms of Congressional supervision. Tenet pointed to the 
Committee's hearing room and said "Down there, with the 
m embers.These insights compel researchers to focus upon 
available hearings in order to more fully explain political 
behavior. From them, frequencies of hearings, individual 
patterns of attendance, frequencies of individual questions 
and responses, and question assertiveness can be evaluated 
in order to assess both the nature of intelligence oversight 
and institutional relations with respect to intelligence 
policy.
Intelligence Committee hearings may be divided into 
several main types. First, there are confirmation hearings- 
-the only type unique to the SSCI. The SSCI is charged with 
the responsibility for reviewing major presidential 
appointments within the intelligence community, including 
the DCI, the Deputy DCI, the CIA Inspector General, and the 
top official of the National Reconnaissance Office. The 
second type of hearings are those of the factual type.
These hearings include an extremely wide range of topics 
including threats to US national security interests, nation- 
specific briefings (intelligence on Iraq, China, etc.), and
37Ibid., 109.
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issue-specific briefings (economic intelligence, 
intelligence hiring/pension practices, etc.). Third, there 
are hearings which address a particular revelation. These 
hearings tend to be investigations into an alleged 
wrongdoing or abuses of power on the part of the 
intelligence community. Examples of these include hearings 
on suspected CIA complicity in Third World human rights 
violations, secret caches of appropriations by a particular 
intelligence agency, and intelligence failures such as the 
Ames case. Fourth, there are hearings which are convened to 
discuss legislative reforms of the intelligence community. 
Examples of this type would include sessions which discuss 
reorganizing community elements, passing "whistle-blower” 
legislation to limit fraud, waste, and cd)use, and the 
disclosure of classified information to the Congress and to 
the public. The final type of hearing are those convened 
for the purpose of approving the annual intelligence 
authorization bill. Often, provisions that result from the 
other types of hearings are tacked onto the authorization 
bill in an effort to have legislative concerns addressed.
The following analysis focuses exclusively upon the 
SSCI. There are differences between the HPSCI and SSCI— the
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most notable of which is a proclivity for House members on 
average to be more attentive to their committee assignment 
on the HPSCI.Nonetheless, SSCI hearings have been 
selected for study for two reasons: (1) studying the SSCI 
allows the research to include confirmation hearings which 
have been recognized by members as a vital aspect of 
oversight,39 (2) for the period under study, the most 
conçlete sample of open hearings is offered by the SSCI.*® 
The entire SSCI hearing listing was utilized in an 
analysis of both the frequency of SSCI hearings and the 
attendance patterns of individual members. The frequency, 
type, and tone of the questions and remarks of individual 
SSCI members is evaluated on the basis of a sanqole of the 
entire listing. The 102nd Congress represents the unique 
Boren-Gates-Bush era of cooperation in intelligence policy. 
The 106th Congress is currently still in session and, thus, 
is not entirely appropriate for use in this analysis. 
Therefore, a sample of one hearing per type was selected
3®Interviews of staff, members, and relevant Executive Branch 
personnel indicated this across the board.
3^ At the outset of the most recent DCI confirmation. Senator John 
Glenn stated that "the lengthy Gates confirmation process is one of 
the most significant oversight events in the Committee's history.”
See Congress, Senate, Select Conmittee on Intelligence, Nomination of 
George J. Tenet to be Director of Central Intelligence. 105th Cong., 
1st sess., 6 May 1997, 49.
*®Open HPSCI hearings in the Congresses of the 1990's did not always 
include those from every type— factual, revelations, and reforms.
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from the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses. There were no 
open hearings of the revelation variety in the 105th 
Congress. The findings are thus based upon an examination 
of eleven open oversight hearings highlighted in Appendix B.
The methodology of content analysis was utilized for 
this research.41 Steven Del Sesto and Loch Johnson offer a 
solid rationale for credibly conducting this type of 
research. 42 The data analyzed in this chapter are the 
questions and remarks of SSCI members in the aforementioned 
set of open hearings. Similar to Del Sesto, the recording 
unit was the "intent or posture" of %diat each member said.43 
The dependent variable in this analysis was the degree of 
aggressiveness displayed by the individual members in the 
questions and remarks they directed towards hearing 
witnesses. Similar to Johnson, this analysis places member 
questions and remarks into one of four categories: 
deferential, factual, probing, adversarial.44
41a  discuBBion of the methcdologleB employed in thie disBertation may 
be found in J^pendix A.
42gee Steven L. Del Seeto, "Nuclear Reactor Safety and the Role of 
the CongreBsman: A Content Analysis of Congressional Bearings," The
Journal of Politics 42 (February 1980): 227-241; Johnson, Secret 
Agencies: Johnson, "Playing Hardball."
43oel Sesto, "Nuclear Reactor Safety," 231.
44johnson, "Playing Hardball," 51-53.
215
Deferential utterances typically take the form of 
rapport building with the witness, support for the Executive 
Branch and its actions, or even criticism of the Congress 
for being overzealous in its oversight efforts. For 
example, from the research conducted for this dissertation:
Never once has one of my constituents come up to me and 
said, "Congressman or Senator, we have got a real 
problem in this country, we're not disclosing the 
bottom line.. .number on what we're spending on 
intelligence. We've really got to do something about 
that." The American public doesn't want to know that 
number, in fact, if there is a problem in this 
country, in terms of the American public's perception 
of our Intelligence Community, it's that we are giving 
out too much information, that we can't control our 
national secrets...^ 5
... I hope that the number of open hearings this 
Committee holds is very limited. I think this threat 
assessment hearing and the confirmation of DCIs are 
about the limit of what we ought to discuss in an open 
hearing.
Factual questions and remarks include the "marshaling of 
basic information about the agency's activities. " For this 
research, it also includes chronological clarifications and 
basic questions about intelligence policies and topics. 
Examples of factual utterances in this research include:
Senator John Kyi (R-AZ) in Congress, Senate, Select Comnitte on
Intelligence, Renewal and Reform; OS Intelligence in a Changing
World. 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 April 1996, 240.
‘^^Senator Charles Robb (D-VA) in Congress, Senate, Select Conmittee 
on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to 
the United States. 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 28 January 1998, 96.
Johnson, "Playing Hardball,” 52.
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If you find a US company is the victim of economic 
espionage, do you pass that information on to the 
company?*®
...both during the audit staff’s exit briefing to the 
Director and Deputy Director of the NRO and during the 
project manager's recent briefings to the Committee 
Chairman, it has been stated consistently that from the 
beginning of this project, the NRO planned on 
constructing office space of approximately one million 
square feet. Is that true?*®
The probing category is characterized by questions which 
"take a more prickly line of inquiry into past performance, 
anticipated operations, and even charges of malfeasance. 
Examples of probing questions and remarks found in the 
hearing sample of this dissertation include :
As we get further into the Ames case, and presumably in 
the debriefing learn more about his modus operandi, 
perhaps we should revisit this provision. Because my 
inclination is to believe that he did violate a lot of 
the existing procedures established by the Agency in 
collecting information %diich otherwise would not have 
been given to him in his position. Would that not be 
right, Mr. Director?®^
.. .on page 11 of your testimony you indicated that the 
CIA made some management procedural mistakes: "First,
*®Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) in Congress, Senate, Select Conmittee 
on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to 
the United States and its Interests Abroad. 104th Cong., 2nd sess.,
22 February 1996, 42.
*®Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) in Congress, Senate, Select Conmittee on 
Intelligence, NRO Headquarters Project. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 10 
August 1994, 28.
50Johnson, "Playing Hardball,” 52.
5^ Senator John Warner (R-VA) in Congress, Senate, Select Conmittee on 
Intelligence, Counterintelligence. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 3 May 
1994, 53.
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as already noted, we did not brief the Oversight 
Committees on important 1991 information related to 
Devine in the same way we had briefed the Department of 
Justice. We regret we did not do so. " Question: Who
made the decision not to brief this Committee and why 
was that decision made?5Z
Lastly, the adversarial category consists of those questions 
and remarks which exhibit "more explicit skepticism, 
sometimes even hostility, toward the Agency's programs or 
witnesses. The following is an example of an adversarial 
utterance derived from this research.
I read Mr. Faga's statement, you know, where he says, 
oh, we told congress. That's bunk. That's distortion; 
we were told the least possible. It certainly lacked 
candor. Even his statement as reported in the media 
would have you think they came up here and said, this 
is the cost, this is what we 're doing, et cetera, et 
cetera. This %fas a sneak, a little scam; a little 
sneak here, a little bite there. It leads me to say I 
just believe that we're going to have to look at this 
agency in far greater detail. We cannot take at face 
value those statements that are put forth to this 
Committee. I think that ' s a shame... ^^
Another example of the adversarial type is the following 
exchange.
Acting Director TENET. I see no evidence to this point. 
Senator, and I would be astounded if someone was trying 
to conceal information on an issue like this.
^^Senator John Glenn (D-OB) in Congress, Senate, Select Comnittee on 
Intelligence, Bearing on Guatemala. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 5 j^ril 
1995, 46.
^^Johnson, "Playing Bardball," 53.
^^Senator Alfonse O'Amato (R-MY) in Congress, Senate, Select 
Committee on Intelligence, NRO Beadouartera Project. 103rd Cong., 2nd 
seas., 10 August 1994, 32.
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Senator LEVIN, well, there have been a number of 
astounding things in this saga.
Acting Director TENET. Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. So the fact that we would be astounded 
by learning some information, it seems to me should not 
astound us. And so I just want to be sure on this 
point that you have not concluded your investigation in 
this respect as to whether or not there was any sloppy 
or improper staff work relative to the issues...
In assessing the overall character of intelligence 
oversight, Johnson collapses the first two categories—  
deference and fact-finding— into a single category which he 
labels "softball" and the last two categories— probing and 
adversarial— into a category he calls "hardball. " In brief, 
Johnson found that during the period between 1975 and 1990—  
with the exceptions being high profile committee meetings 
such as Church-Pike and Iran-Contra— member attendance was 
low, with only one third of the heetrings witnessing a 
majority of members present.** The frequency of public 
hearings was also low. *7
Johnson also found that the CIA faced an average of 23 
questions annually from each member of the HPSCI and SSCI—
**Senator Carl Levin (0-MI) in DCI nominee George Tenet in Congress, 
Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of George J. 
Tenet to be Director of Central intelligence. 105th Congress, 1st 
sess., 6 May 1997, 82.
**Johnson, "Playing Hardball," 55.
57ibid., 54.
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"not exactly a withering barrage. The tone of 
questioning— softball or hardball— was driven by one 
particular contextual element— namely, by individual events 
involving intelligence scandals.when context served to 
convene an investigative heeuring, Johnson's research 
indicates that member ideology was a significant independent 
variable for explaining the tone of member question and 
remarks. Johnson concluded that Congress is clearly an 
"actor in the conduct of strategic intelligence policy"®® and 
that "most participants in both branches now acknowledge the 
value of participation by legislators."®^ What can be said 
about the post Cold War Congresses?
Research Findings
Frequency of Hearings
One basic measure of intelligence accountability and 
Congressional will is the number of hearings convened. The 
frequency of public intelligence oversight hearings in the 
103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses is displayed in Table 
5.1.
5®Ibid-, 56. 
5@Ibid., 57-58. 
®®Ibid., 69. 
®llbid., 70-71.
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Table 5.1 Huaber of Open Hearings Convened
103rd Congress
1993 - 1994
104th Congress
1995 - 1996
105th Congress
1997 - 1998
House Senate House Senate House Senate
15 9 4 22 0 9
Source: Figures have been con^iled from hearings reported
in CIS Abstracts.
In examining the hearings listed in the Congressional 
Information Service for the six years of 1993 through 1998, 
the HPSCI averaged 3.2 hearings per y e a r . ® ^  interestingly, 
the Congress with the highest number of public intelligence 
oversight hearings is the 103rd and not the Republican- 
controlled 104th or 105th. In fact, the CIS lists only four 
hearings for the 104th and no House hearings for the 105th 
Congress. Of the 15 hearings held in the 103rd Congress, 
only one hearing is of the revelation variety. The others 
are split bet%<een post Cold War intelligence reform- 
legislation efforts and simple fact-finding sessions.
This same time period saw the SSCI average 6.5 public 
intelligence oversight hearings per year. The overwhelming 
majority of these were conducted in the 104th Congress—  
which one would expect in the aftermath of the so-called
®^Johnson examined public hearings as well and found that the House 
and Senate combined to average only 1.6 per year for the period 
between 1975 and 1990. See Johnson, "Playing Hardball," 54.
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Republican Revolution which occurred when the Democrats lost 
both chambers of Congress in the 1994 midterm elections.
The hearing category dominant in the 104th SSCI' activities 
was fact-finding. Hearings purely devoted to investigating 
revelations were limited to three out of a total of 23 
sessions.
Hearing Attendance
Another measure of attention to intelligence policy is 
the rates at which Committee members attend hearings. It is 
necessary to view member turnout percentages with several 
facts in mind. First, service on the Intelligence 
Committees results in comparatively little dividends for 
reelection. Second, as staffers like Johnson emphatically 
state, there is little difference between public hearings 
with cameras and microphones and those hearings conducted in 
executive s e s s i o n . Finally, the majority of the hearings 
are of the factual type and not the more visible types of 
confirmations and revelations. Given these facts, the basic 
patterns of participation are a credible indicator of a more 
serious commitment to intelligence policy.
assertion also indicated by HPSCI and SSCI staff intervie%ied 
confidentially for this study.
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Political affiliation made a modest difference in 
attendance rates. Table 5.2 displays overall attendance 
rates by party. Data derived from individual hearings do 
not support the assertion that Republicans tend to be less 
attentive to intelligence oversight than Democrats. For
Table 5.2 Hearing Attendance Percentage By Party*
103rd Congress
1993 - 1994
104th Congress
1995 - 1996
105th Congress
1997 - 1998
House Senate House Senate House Senate
R = 48 R = 31 R = 48 R = 39 R = 45 R = 43
D = 50 D = 52 D = 47 D = 40 D = 79 D = 40
*R = Repub]Lican; D = Democrat
Source: Figures have been compiled from individual hearing
transcripts.
example, a series of reform-legislation SSCI hearings held 
during the 104th Congress reveals that Republicans achieved 
an attendance performance that was, for the most part, equal 
to their Democratic opponents. Of the six days of hearings 
which comprise Senate Bearing 104-781, Renewal and Reform: 
us Intelligence in a Changing World, Republican attendance 
was an average of 12% higher than that of the Democrats 
during three of the six days. On the three days when 
Democratic attendance was greater, it exceeded Republican 
attendance only by approximately the same amount— 11%.
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A similar example exists in the House. During 104th 
Congress, the HPSCI conducted six days of hearings which 
comprise the House's intelligence Coamunity in the 21st 
Century inquiry. Republicans again averaged a 17% greater 
attendance rate than the Democrats in three of the six days, 
although, for the three days on which Democratic attendance 
was greater, the average was someWiat higher— 21%.
It is also worth noting that for the Republican 
controlled 105th Congress— the most recently completed 
Congress and the one during which the most damaging personal 
charges were leveled against President Clinton— the CIS 
reports no public hearings being held in the House.^
Table 5.3 displays attendance rate percentages by 
hearing type. Revelation hearings did not produce greater 
attendance by one party over another— regardless of which 
party held the majority during the Clinton administration. 
For example, during the Democratically controlled 103rd 
Congress, Republicans in the Senate achieved only a 25% 
turnout for Senate Hearing 103-997, NRO Headquarters 
Project, a revelation hearing over the accounting practices
transcript of one hearing. The Record of Proceedings on H.R.
3829. The Tntelliaanc# Community Whistlehlower Protection Act. May 20 
and June 10. 1998. was finally published by the GPO in 1999, during 
the 106th Congress.
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Table 5.3 Attendance Percentages By Hearing Type
— .... , Confirmation
Reforma and 
Legislation Factual Revelation
103rd
Congress 100 46 31 52
House — 51 37 74
Republican — 43 36 86
Democrat — 53 38 67
Senate 100 29 28 41
Republican 100 13 17 25
Democrat 100 44 37 56
104th
Congress 74 42 41 35
House — 43 47 NA*
Republican — 46 56 —
Democrat — 50 36 —
Senate 74 36 40 35
Republican 83 34 40 27
Democrat 63 38 39 39
^01
105th
Congress 55 45 32 NA*
House — 62 NA* —
Republican — 45 —
Democrat — —
Senate 55 16 32 —
Republican 57 15 33 —
Democrat 52 16 30 -
*NA = No open hearings available for this type
Source: Figures have been con^iled from individual hearing
transcripts.
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of the National Reconnaissance Office. This is compared to 
a Democratic turnout rate of 67%. However, House 
Republicans surpassed their Democratic opponents at a 
hearing on the same topic by achieving a turnout rate of 86% 
compared to 67% for the Democrats. Save for the 
consistently higher turnouts for confirmation hearings, 
there is relatively little consistency in hearing 
attendance. This is true for both chambers, for any type of 
hearing, and for each of the three Congresses examined. It 
should be noted that, in the case of every hearing under 
scrutiny, save for one in each chamber, the Chairman (and 
vice Chairman in the SSCI) had perfect attendance records. 
General member attendance to meetings which shape 
thecontours and mechanics of post-Cold War US intelligence 
policy is relatively low.
Consistent with Johnson's findings, the hearings in 
which DCI nominees were being confirmed tended to produce 
the highest attendamce. James Woolsey entertained 100% of 
the SSCI ' s members with John Deutch and George Tenet close 
behind at 88% and 90%, respectively. The lowest attendance 
tended to be that afforded to factual types of hearings, 
with the 104th Congress reaching a peak of 44% attendance to
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-this type for both chambers combined and the 103rd and 105th 
achieving factual attendance rates of 35% and 32%, 
respectively. Exceptions to this pattern are worth noting. 
For instance, for the SSCI fact-finding hearing on the 
intelligence activities and findings with regard to Iraq,
65% of the Committee's members showed up.^  ^ The tabled data 
illustrate several other exceptions to the general 
attendance trends.
Hearing Participation
Showing up to an hearing is one thing but being 
energetically involved in substantive oversight— or singly 
being minimally engaged— is altogether different. Table 5.4 
displays data concerning member participation for the 
subset of SSCI hearings examined. The totals represent 
thecumulative number of complete oversight utterances made 
by every Senator who participated during the Congresses 
e x a m i n e d . The only comments which were coded were those
^^The CIS Abstracts lists no HPSCI factual types of public hearings 
held during the 105th Congress, 1997-1998.
®^See Congress, Senate, Select Conmittee on Intelligence, Iraq. 104th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 19 September 1996.
^^These numbers do not include the follo%ring types of remarks: 
Procedural remarks such as "I thank the Chairman and yield back the 
balance of my time." or "We will be follotring this session with an 
executive session." Remarks other than those %*ich build rapport 
with «ritnesses such as "Good morning. " or "Move the microphone so we 
can hear you. " Remarks that are incomplete and not able to by 
analyzed for content such as %rtien a member is interrupted.
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which were complete questions or remarks {Q & R ’ s ). Long 
introductory statements and editorials were generally coded 
singularly as opposed to sentence by sentence.The
Table 5.4 Humber of Questions and Remarks per Member69
Republicans Total rats Total
1. Warner* 324 1. Kerrey^ 395
2. Specter* 302 2. DeConcini* 351
3. Shelby* 211 3. Robb 47
Cohen 77 4. Kerry (MA) 45
5. DeWme 62 Baucus 42
6 . Kyi 41 6. Metzenbaum 42
7. Hutchison 40 7. Bryan 39
8 Inhofe 31 8. Graham (FT. I 26
9. Allard 25 9. Levin 25
10. Hatch 15 10. Glenn 24
11. Roberts 14 11. Johnston
12. Lugar 12.Lautenbera
13. Hack
14. D'Amato
15. Chafee
16. Coats
17. Danforth
18. Gorton
19. Stevens
20. Wallop
*Served as Chair or Vice Chair
Source: Figures have been compiled individual hearing
transcripts.
GGin some instances such passages contained more than one intent. A 
member may in one instance be deferentially building rapport by 
welcoming a witness and then in the next moment be criticizing the 
agency that the witness works for. These ideas were coded 
separately.
^^Sample from which data are compiled may be found emboldened in 
Appendix C . Some members ' 8-year Conmittee terms ended or began 
during the period of this study. Naturally their total will be lower 
due to the fact that a great deal of their activity may not be 
accounted for here.
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frequencies of individual utterances are completely 
congruent with the findings on attendance in one respect: 
the individuals running the Committees were unambiguously at 
the forefront of interaction with Executive Branch.
Table 5.5 displays, in more detail, the specific 
workload of the Chairmen and Vice Chairmen for the sample 
scutinized. The data here indicate that the Committee 
leadership undertake a staggering load of work, no doubt 
involving considerable amounts of time devoted to 
preparation eind post-hearing reports. This finding confirms 
the aforementioned assertion by staffer Paula Scaglini that 
the Committee chairs have the biggest intact upon oversight.
Table 5.5 Ccsmittee Leadership Workload
Total Wumber 
of Q ft R's
Total posed 
by Chair and 
Vice Chair
Percentage
103rd
Congress 853 675 79
104th
Congress 950 566 60
105th
Congress 417 220 53
Source: Figures have been compiled from individual hearing
transcripts.
No SSCI members in this sample came even remotely close to 
the efforts of the Committee leadership. This was the case
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regardless of their degree of partisanship or ideology. In 
fact, the attendance rates and levels of participation of 
the other members are comparatively so sporadic and low as 
to virtually warrant no comment.
Hearing type is in one respect a significant 
determinant of the total numbers of questions and remarks 
posed. Table 5.6 displays the total question and remark 
activity, per Congress, per hearing type. Not surprisingly, 
revelation hearings generated significant member 
involvement— accounting for 38% (683/1803) of the total 
number of questions and remarks posed during the 103rd and 
104th Congresses.^® Confirmation hecurings achieved a distant 
second place of 26% (574/2220) of all questions and remarks. 
Reform-legislation and factual hearings achieved 
participation rates of 24% (521/2220) and 20% (442/2220), 
respectively. These data are consistent with Johnson's 
findings concerning the relative levels of member 
participation per hearing type. They also support the 
assertion that the contextual factor of individual events 
like high profile confirmations and revelations generate
7®The 105th Congress did not publish a revelation hearing, as 
indicated by the Congressional Infozmation Service. Thus, the 
divisor is adjusted accordingly for this category.
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greater intelligence policy interaction with the Executive 
Branch.
Table 5.6 Activity fer Hearing Type
CoofiiMt I Mil Reform Factual Revelation Total
103rd 137 92 193 431 853
Congress (16.1) (10.8) (22.6) (50.5) (100)
104th 191 366 141 252 950
Congress (20.11) (38.53) (14.84) (26.52) (100)
105th 246 63 108 NA* 417
Congress (59) (15.11) (25.89) (100)
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages
*NA = There were no open hearings available for this type.
Source: Figures have been compiled from individual hearing
transcripts.
Political affiliation was an interesting indicator of 
member participation. Table 5.7 expands the previous 
table's breakdo%m in order to display the effects of party 
affiliation on the number of questions and remarks for each 
type of hearing. During the single party government of the 
103rd Congress, Republicans offered only 40% of the total 
number of questions and remarks put to witnesses (343/853). 
However, the percentages jumped to 61 (575/950) and 63 
(264/417), respectively for the Republican controlled 104th 
and 105th Congresses. Party also displayed a notable 
pattern Wien examined with regard to category of hearing. 
Republicans posed an average of 20% more questions and
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Table 5.7 Humber of Questions and Resurks for Each
Hearing Type Based Upon Party
...... Confirm. Reform Factuel Revelation TUtal
103rd 137 92 193 431 853
Repub licari 67 28 101 147 343
Democrat 70 64 92 284 510
' ' ~ •» *
104th 191 366 141 252 950
Republican 143 230 82 120 575
Democrat 48 136 59 132 375
105th 246 63 108 NA* 4Ï7
Republican 133 46 85 — 264
Democrat 113 17 23 • 153
''' . ' '
Total 574 521 442 683 2220
Republican 343 304 268 267 1182
Democrat 231 217 174 416 1038
*NA = No open hearings found available for this type.
Source: Figures have been compiled from individual hearing
transcripts
remarks than their Democratic counterparts for reform (58% 
or 304/521), confirmation (60% or 343/574), and factual (61% 
or 268/442) hearings. However, Democrats reversed this 
trend during revelation hearings, out-speaking the 
Republicans by slightly over 20% (416/683). Thus, it does 
not appeêo: to be the case that one party will be 
stereotypically more or less inclined to be highly 
participatory in intelligence oversight. Attendance and 
participation are, as is often the case for the convening of 
a hearing in the first place, driven by contextual factors—
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be they relating to a member's schedule, level of outrage, 
or personal policy interests. When an oversight hearing is 
convened, and members attend, what is the character of the 
interaction? To examine Congressional oversight to an even 
greater extent, it is useful to assess the types of 
questions and remarks they offer when interacting with the 
intelligence community.
Tone of Member Questions and Remarks
Not only were the oral comments and questions coded to 
reveal institutional, party, and individual levels of 
oversight activity, they were also coded according to their 
tone and posture. This is the qualitative aspect of the 
research which allows for conclusions to be drawn in regard 
to the nature of recent intelligence oversight. Utilizing 
the aforementioned categorical research design of Johnson, 
individual member questions and remarks were coded as being 
deferential, factual, probing, or adversarial.
Tables 5.8 - 5.10 display by Congress the question and 
remark totals and percentages listed by degree of 
aggressiveness for each category of hearings. The results 
are consistent with %diat Johnson found prior to the end of 
the Cold War. For the post Cold War sample analyzed, the
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Table 5.8 Total Questions and Resuurks Listed By
Tone and Hearing Type - 103rd Congress
103rd
Congress Tone of Questions and Remarks
Softball Hardball Total
Deference 1 Fact-fiadiag Probing 1 âdgeraarial
Hearina Type
11 42 38 1 92
Reforma & Lama (12) (45.7) (41.3) (1) (100)
53 f57.7) 39 (42.3)
19 12 101 5 137
Confirmation (13.9) (8.8) (73.7) (3.6) (100)
31 (22.7) 106 (77.3)
29 64 97 3 193
Factual (15) (33.2) (50.3) (1.5) (100)
93 (48.2) 100 (51.8)
17 267 75 72 431
Revelation (3.9) (62) (17.4) (16.7) (100)
' ' ' 284 (65.9) 147 (34.1)
76 385 311 1 81 853
Total (8.9) (45.1) (36.5) 1 (9.5) (100)
461 (54) 392 (46)
Note: Figures in parentheses are
Source: Compiled from individual
percentages. 
hearing transcripts
234
Table 5.9 Total Questions and Remarks Listed By 
Tone and Hearing Type - 104th Congress
104th
Congress Tone of Questions and Remarks
' ... ' Softball Hardball Total
Deference 1 pact-finding Probing I Mvemarial
Hearing Type
52 179 116 19 366
Reform» ft Laws (14.2) (48.9) (31.7) (5.2) (100)
" 231 {63.1) 135 (36.9)
24 143 20 4 191
Confirmation (12.6) (74.9) (10.5) (2) (100)
167 (87.5) 24 (12.5)
9 71 47 14 141
Factual (6.4) (50.3) (33.3) (10) (100)
80 (56.1) 61 (43.3)
16 142 65 29 252
Revelation (6.3) (56.4) (25.8) (11.5) (100)
158 (62.7) 94 (37.3)
101 535 248 66 950
Total (10.6) (56.3) (26.1) (7) (100)
636 (66.9) 314 (33.1)
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.
Source: Figures have been compiled from individual hearing 
transcripts.
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Table 5.10 Total Questions and Remarks Listed By
Tone and Hearing Type - 105th Congress
105th
Congress Tone of Questions and Remarks
Softball Hardball Total
. _ ...... ..... S3ÎKSÎS Deference Fect-fiadieg Probing RttvreeLiel
Hearina Type
Reform» & Laws 6 22 18 17 63
(9.5) (34.9) (28.6) (27) (1001
* 28 (44.4) 35 (55.6)
Confirmation 25 211 3 7 246
(10.2) (85.8) (1.2) (2.8) (100)
236 (96) 10 (4)
Factual 13 93 1 1 108
(12.03) (86.11) (.93) (.93) (100)
________. 106 (98.14) 2 (1 .86)
Revelation NA* - - . . - —
..... - r ™ —
Total 44 326 22 25 417
(10.5) (78.2) (5.3) (6) (100)
370 (88.7) 47 (11.3)
*NA = No open hearings found available for this type. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.
Source: Compiled from individual hearing treuiscripts
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overall tendency of SSCI Committee members was to ask 
softball questions— deferential and factual— with factual 
being the most prevalent of the two. In fact, this sample 
revealed that, during the most recently completed Congress, 
almost 9 out of every 10 questions and remaurks were of the 
softball variety.Confirmations produced high levels (77% 
or 106/137) of hardball questions and remarks— i.e. probing 
and adversarial— during James Woolsey's 103rd Congress 
confirmation but dropped off to a mere 13% (24/191) for John 
Deutch in the 104th Congress and a remarkably low 4%
(10/246) for George Tenet during the 105th.
Another notable trend was the tendency for Committee 
members to ask consistently high percentages of hardball 
questions during lower profile, factual hearings 
during the 103rd (52% or 100/193) and 104th (43% or 61/141) 
Congresses. The 105th Congress saw this trend dramatically 
drop-off, but the overall percentage of hardball questions 
was greater for factual hearings than it was for 
confirmation hearings. Aggressive oversight in the form of 
probing and adversarial types of questions and remarks
^^The caveat to this being the fact that no open revelation hearings 
were held during this time period.
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naturally occurred during hearings that scrutinized 
intelligence failures.
Table 5.11 displays, by participating Committee member, 
the question and remark totals and listed by degree of 
comment tone. The data support the observation that 
Committee leadership share a heavy, bipartisan workload.
They also display the relatively low levels of participation 
and aggressiveness of rank and file members. While it is 
true that not all of the members listed here served on the 
SSCI in each of the three Congresses examined, none in that 
category seemed on track to either establish, or leave the 
Committee with, a reputation for aggressive intelligence 
oversight.
Political party and ideology had only a modest impact 
on the degree of aggressive oversight. Party in particular 
was a rather weak explanatory variable for determining who 
might be most committed to engaging the Executive Branch on 
these matters. For example. Democrat Dennis DeConcini and 
Republican John Warner made nearly identical amounts of 
questions and remarks in each category. Democrat Bob Kerrey 
and Republican Arlen Specter have fairly congruent numbers 
as well, with Kerrey only significantly outpacing Specter in
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Table 5.11 Question and Remark Totals By Tone
Republicans ADA/ACU* Beferent Factual Probinc Adveraary Ibtal
1. Warner** 20/74 27 153 123 21 324
2. Specter** 55/46 40 149 86 27 302
3. Shelby** 18/73 15 142 26 28 211
4. Cohen 40/45 7 40 22 8 77
5. DeWine 16/84 2 48 12 0 62
6. Kyi 5/95 3 32 3 3 41
7. Hutchison 10/96 3 15 22 0 40
8. Inhofe 0/100 4 27 0 0 31
9. Allard 10/100 1 24 0 0 25
10. Hatch 5/100 2 12 0 1 15
11. Roberts 5/95 3 11 0 0 14
12. liUqar 8/95 3 5 4 0 12
13. Mack 10/96 1 11 0 0 12
14. D'Amato 30/52 2 0 3 2 7
15. Chafee 40/52 2 0 2 0 4
16. Coats 10/100 0 1 0 0 1
17. Danforth 25/74 1 0 0 0 1
18. Gorton 25/72 0 1 0 0 1
19. Stevens 20/74 1 0 0 0 1
20. Wallop 10/100 1 0 0 0 1
Itepablieaa Votai 104 563 288 1 83 1038
Deaocrats ADA/ACU* Deferent Factual Probing Adversary Vatal
1. Kerrey** 85/10 40 242 101 12 395
2. DeConcini** 75/20 25 179 122 25 351
3. Robb 70/16 7 26 14 0 47
4. Kerry (MA) 97/2 9 14 14 8 45
5. Baucus 88/8 3 31 6 3 42
6. Metzenbaum 90/0 4 3 16 19 42
7. Bryan 80/13 6 9 14 10 39
8. Graham (FL) 78/9 3 23 0 0 26
9. Levin 85/5 1 19 0 5 25
10. Glenn 85/8 5 17 1 1 24
11. Johnston 63/23 1 0 0 0 1
12. Lautanbarg 95/10 0 0 0 0 0
Democrat Total 118 671 303 90 1182
222 I 1234 I 591 I 173 I 2220 |I Overall Total
*For members serving during more than one Congress, an 
average ADA/ACU^^ rating for the period was utilized. 
**Served as Chair or vice Chair during study time period.
Source: Figures have been compiled from individual hearing
transcripts.
^^Source of ADA/ACD scores: Congressional Quarterly's Politics in 
America volumes for the years 1994-1998 (Washington B.C.: CQ Press)
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the factual category. This can be explained for the most 
part by the fact that, for the Congresses examined 
in this study, Kerrey remained on the SSCI longer than did 
Specter.
The total number of questions and remarks for the 
sample examined was 2220. Of this amount, 47% (1038) were 
offered by Republicans, with the remaining 53% (1182) coming 
from Democrats. The amount of each type of question and 
remark were comparable between the parties. Democrats only 
outpaced Republicans by an average of 12 questions and 
remarks for the categories of deferential, probing, and 
adversarial. Democrats offered 108 more factual questions 
and remarks than Republicans but these remain in the 
softball category.
Conclusions
The SSCI activities examined here offer a glimpse into 
the nature of post-Cold War intelligence oversight.
Important contextual factors vdiich determine the tone of 
interbranch interaction and policy efforts are illuminated. 
Congress does more than singly monitor policy, although this 
research shows that, for the most part, the more serious 
efforts are undertaken by the Committee leadership, with the
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participation of other members sporadically driven by the 
contextual element of high profile political events.
A thorough reading of even the most mundane, factual 
types of hearings shows a committed level of policy 
engagement on the part of several members throughout the 
post-Cold War time period. This level of activity is not 
confined to one political party. The realtively weak role 
of ideology in determining the tone of a member's engagement 
is a departure from the findings of Johnson, \^o found that 
ideology was a significant factor.
The SSCI displayed extraordinary cohesion in one 
institutional respect: none of its members take kindly to
the prospect of Executive Branch dishonesty. Revelations 
such as the NRO funding matter and secret Agency activities 
in Guatemala tend to elicit bipartisan ire because of human 
context and the tendency to become cohesive in dealing with 
a common problem— in this case defending the Congress 
against the perceived excesses of the Executive Branch.
Members on both sides of the aisle complained bitterly 
in public about the frustration they often face. SSCI Vice 
Chairman John Warner stated it this way:
We simply do not have, nor should we have, the 
institutional infrastructure in the Congress to go over
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every single item in the detail that is necessary. 
That detail must be forthcoming from the Executive 
Branch. It is incumbent upon the Executive Branch to 
be forthcoming in providing these budget details.
Members who wanted to make an impact upon policy, and thus 
achieve some degree of democratic accountability, felt 
hamstrung by secrecy and a lack of candor. Agency critic 
Howard Metzenbaum said that "we still have to ask the right 
questions in order to get the right answers or the full 
answers, but that ' s the way it is. " Senator Richard Bryan
similarly complained that "if you don't frame the question 
with absolute precision, there seems to be kind of a game 
going on. It's extremely difficult for our Committee staff 
to get answers that we're entitled to under the category of 
being forthright."^* John Warner stated that when his staff 
asked a specific narrow question they "got back a specific 
narrow answer" but "were never given the broad confines of 
the picture."^» In many cases, members indicated that they 
would have been more supportive of the Executive Branch had 
the intelligence community been more forthcoming at an
^^Congreas, Senate, Select Comnittee on Intelligence, HBQ 
Headquarters Project. 103rd Cong., 2nd eeaa., 10 August 1994, 7. 
74 Ibid., 11.
75Ibid., 26.
76ibid., 38.
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earlier time. The comments made by Senator Max Baucus* 
during one hearing exemplifies this attitude.
I know you know this already, Mr. Director, but I want 
to follow up on the point that both the Chairman and 
the Vice Chairman have made. You know, it's a paradox 
of human nature. The more you inform this Committee in 
advance, probably the more support you're going to get. 
The less you inform this Committee in advance, the more 
contentious, the more difficult, and the more 
suspicious this Committee is going to be. And I'd just 
urge you to remember that aspect of humeui nature, that 
you can generally do better by going the extra mile and 
taking the first step in informing this Committee too 
much— you know, too much in advance, too far in 
advance, too specifically.. .you'd probably do a lot 
better.
For their part. Executive Branch officials express 
difficulties in attempting to comply with mandated 
Congressional oversight. To further utilize the NRO funding 
revelation, one intelligence official responded to Committee 
member criticisms by noting that the NRO had scheduled an 
oversight visit for the SSCI Staff Director on eight 
separate occasions, only to have that individual cancel on 
them each time.^® The rarity and inconsistency of serious 
intelligence oversight was also evidenced in the last speech 
Robert Gates presented as DCI.
My first and foremost concern is that very few Members 
of the Intelligence Oversight Committees appear to 
devote much effort or time to their intelligence
77Ibid., 30.
7®ibid., 72.
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oversight responsibilities. Only a handful of Members 
in both Houses have take the time to visit the 
intelligence agencies and to make the effort required 
to gain some knowledge and understanding of vdiat is a 
very complicated and sophisticated undertaking. This 
places an enormous burden on the Chairmen and Ranking 
Minority Members. Individual Members from time to time 
will develop an interest in one or another aspect of 
our work and acquire some knowledge of that, but the 
number of those with broad understanding and real 
knowledge in my judgment can be counted on the fingers 
of one hand— and that is after 15 years of continuous 
oversight.
It is less surprising that non-Committee members of Congress 
fail to spend the time required to inform themselves on 
intelligence matters. They take their cues on matters of 
intelligence from colleagues serving on the Committees and, 
thus, are able to devote more attention to their own 
assignments and electoral concerns. However, it is more 
alarming to consider Gates' remarks.
Gates ' assertions concerning the low levels of 
attention to intelligence policy displayed by members of 
Congress are clearly evident in the data compiled in this 
chapter. Many members who showed up to hearings asked no 
questions or merely welcomed a nominee and then left the 
hearing in rather short order. One example of this lack of 
Congressional perseverance is the Woolsey confirmation— a
^^obert M. Gates, "Remarks before The World Affairs Council of 
Boston," address delivered 15 January 1993, Boston, MA. 
^^Confidential interview.
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hearing that began with 100% member attendance. Upon return 
from a lunch recess. Chairman DeConcini and Senator 
Metzenbaum were the only two members present out of a total 
of 17.®i Gates noted a similar trend while he was DCI.
We had a single budget hearing for FY 1993 in the 
Senate Intelligence Committee last spring, almost a 
year ago. The heads of all the intelligence agencies 
were present. Of the fifteen members of the Committee, 
the Chairman and a handful of members, perhaps three or 
four, showed up. A half hour or so into the hearing it 
was recessed for a vote, and when the hearing resumed, 
the Chairman and only two or three members returned.
All but the Chairman were gone within twenty minutes. 
The result is that for the single most important 
hearing of the year, on the budget of the entire 
intelligence community at a time of great change, only 
Chairman Boren was present t h r o u g h o u t .
Committee members are astonishingly busy people and this 
fact of Congressional life certainly goes far to explain 
some of the patterns outlined in this chapter.
Nevertheless, they seem to involve themselves to a much 
larger extent vdien the context is ripe.
Confirmation hearing attendance was certainly a clear 
indicator of this fact as attendance to these hearings 
averaged 92%. Often this type of hearing was utilized as a 
forum for member to air personal political views on the
®^Congresa, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of 
R. James Woolaev to be Director of Central Intelligence. 103rd Cong., 
1st seas., 23 February 1993, 98. Other members floated in and out of 
the afternoon session.
®^Gates, "Remarks Before the American Bar Association," 3.
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subject of intelligence and President Clinton's foreign 
policy performance. Revie%#ed, but not coded for content 
here, the aborted DCI nomination of Anthony Lake is perhaps 
the most extreme manifestation of this tendency. The 
commentary of Gates again lends insights:
The irony is, if you want to have a non-controversial 
confirmation process, go out and get somebody whose 
never had anything to do with intelligence or has not 
been associated with the Executive Branch. And, of 
course you know, Wien anybody wants a safe confirmation 
process they go get somebody from the Hill as the 
nominee.
Gates' comments certainly help explain recent political 
behavior with respect to aspects of interbranch comity in 
intelligence policy. In the wake of his own extremely rocky 
confirmation process, all of his DCI successors to date fit 
the above characterization. This fact is less surprising in 
light of President Clinton's consistent trouble with the 
appointment process, but more significant in terms of how 
intelligence policy euid the community is affected by the 
appointment of an outsider. James woolsey and John Deutch 
both came to the position of DCI with close ties to Capitol 
Hill relatively no inside intelligence experience.®^ George
®^Gates interview.
®^See Pamela Fessier, "Woolsey Gets Senate Approval; Budget Cuts, 
Overhaul Await," Congressional QuarterIv Weeklv Report. 6 February 
1993, 277; Donna Cassata, "Choice of Deutch To Head CIA Wins
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Tenet has spent virtually his entire career working for 
Congress. Other national security appointments of the 
Clinton administration, such as Senator Bill Cohen as 
Secretary of Defense, likewise involved individuals who were 
known, trusted quantities to the Senate. No modeling is 
necessary to explain this phenomenon. Context matters in 
this aspect of intelligence policy interaction between 
institutions.
Overall, Congressional attention to intelligence policy 
seems low. One survey of lawmakers completed on the eve of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union found lawmakers 
"overwhelmingly disinterested" in intelligence.®* More 
recently a former Congressional staffer said, "It's really 
irrelevant \diat kind of published intelligence is sent to 
the Hill. Nobody has time to read it anyway."®® This 
anecdotal evidence exists during, and is possibly a product 
of, a time when the intelligence community has been the most 
sensitive to Congressional demands. Electoral factors, a 
lack of revelations, former Hill personnel working in key
Qualified Praise," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 18 March 
1995, 825.
®*CIA History Staff, unpublished draft, quoted in L. Britt Snider,
"Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of
intelligence, " Monograph published by The Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, February 1997, 54.
®®Ibid., 26.
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Agency positions®^, and the personal efforts of the most 
recent DCIs are all factors which assist in explaining the 
current situation.®®
This brief survey confirms much of what Loch Johnson 
observed taking place with respect to oversight between 1975 
and 1990. Contextual iii^ >act upon the human behavior of 
groups and individuals, and the level of trust and comity 
between governmental institutions, are revealed to be of 
rather significant import. These factors, \diile less easily 
measured, do help to explain institutional behavior and 
policy outputs. Explaining institutional relations and the 
intact they make upon policy requires a clear recognition of 
these con^lex factors.
®^ Current.ly, the DCI, his Chief of Staff, the Agency's Inspector 
General, and the Agency's Congressional Liaison are among the 
positions held by those «rith significant staff experience on Capitol 
Hill.
®®For another recent assessment see Pat M. Bolt, "Who's Hatching the 
Store? Executive-Branch and Congressional Surveillance," in National
Inasc^rity; p .s. intelligence After the Cold War, ed. Craig
Eisendrath (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000) 190-211.
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Chapter 6 
Findings and Conclusions
Context ia everything.
-Former SSCI Chairman David L. Boren^
General Findings
This study has found that Congressional-Executive 
Branch relationships concerning the intelligence community 
have teücen on strikingly new forms in the post-Cold War era. 
There are two major aspects to this change: (1) 
Congressional influence over the community has increased 
even beyond the level manifested in the period of intense 
interbranch conflict from 1975 through 1990. As we have 
seen, the increase in Congressional influence has been 
brought about by many factors, not simply by increased 
Congressional assertiveness. Congressional influence has 
increased in part because of the pro-active and purposeful * 
decisions of the post-Cold War DCIs, and in part because of 
the cooperation (Bush) and acquiescence (Clinton) of the 
post-Cold War presidents; (2) The post-Cold War era has seen 
an unprecedented type of Congressional oversight of 
intelligence policy. Oversight of the intelligence
^Interview with the author, 25 February, 2000 Ohiversity of Oklahoma.
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community has been extensive and thorough, probably more so 
than in any earlier period, but the character of this 
oversight has been primarily cooperative. While "trigger- 
events " like the Ames case and the NRO budget episode 
brought Congressional scrutiny and criticism, and even 
contributed to the early departure of DCI James Woolsey and 
the withdrawn nomination of DCI-designate Anthony Lake, the 
more striking point is that these events did not "poison the 
well" or reduce the primarily harmonious tone of extensive 
Congressional oversight.
Context and the Study of Intelligence Policy: Conclusions
This study has examined various types of contextual 
factors which help to explain the two major ways in which 
the post-Cold War era has been different. Intelligence 
policy involves lawmakers and administrators in a special 
set of circumstances. In virtually no other realm of public 
policy is there so comparatively little direct 
accountability to the electorate. However, intelligence 
policy is similar to other types of policy in that it is 
driven to a significant extent by contextual factors. To 
say that contexts are propelling forces Wiich help to 
explain why a particular event has occurred is to perhaps
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say that human beings breathe because of the oxygen around 
them. It is something of a given that context possesses 
explanatory weight. However, this project has identified 
contextual elements that significantly shaped interbranch 
relations and policy outputs in specifiable ways with 
respect to matters of intelligence. This research has 
elucidated the impact of these contextual factors, and shown 
how they contribute to interbranch relationships on 
intelligence, especially as these have taken on new forms in 
the post-Cold War era.
First, there is the contextual element of institutional 
dispositions. The origins of this element were outlined in 
Chapter 2. In the course of its history, the United States 
has possessed an Executive dominance with respect to matters 
of national security. To be sure, the Congress has asserted 
itself periodically, but a general degree of latitude was 
incorporated by the Freumers into the Executive Branch. 
Certainly in times of crisis or emergency, dominance with 
respect to these powers clearly remains in the hands of 
presidents. Periodic Executive abuses aside, this fact 
seldom offends the Congress as it has been generally more 
disposed to take on the president with respect to matters of
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domestic import. Institutionally, Congress can still be 
characterized as relatively deferential on national security 
matters.2 m  the contençxsrary era of politics, it is 
easier— and more electorally advantageous— for individual 
members and the collective body to support a president on 
defense-related and foreign policy issues initially— when in 
many cases there exists a rally effect— and then to gain 
public approval later by criticizing presidential policies 
gone-wrong.^  The roots of these modern day dispositions are 
thus in the institutional structures that were constructed 
by the Framers and subsequently developed by crisis, 
precedent, and evolving political conditions^.
Second, there are the contextual elements of 
personality and personal relationships. Chapter 3 explored 
the relationships %Aiich existed between DCIs and presidents 
during the Cold war. For much of this period, intelligence 
policy could be explained simply by excunining Executive
^Stephen R. Weisaman, A_Culture of Deference; Conareea'a Failure of 
Leadership in Foreign Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1995).
^For further examination of this point see Phillip R Trimble, "The 
President's Foreign Affairs Power," American Journal of International 
Law 83 (October 1989): 752-754; Nicholas Katzenbach, "Foreign Policy, 
Public Opinion, and Secrecy," Foreign Affairs 52 (October 1973):1-19; 
Arthur Schleaigner Jr., "Congress and the Making of American Foreign 
Policy," Foreign Affairs 51 (October 1972): 78-113.
*For example, the feverish pursuit of reelections and the 
independence members of Congress have achieved by raising their own 
can^aign money.
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prerogative and preferences. Some presidents such as 
Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson placed a higher premium upon 
the latest intelligence and consistent personal contact with 
their intelligence leadership than other presidents such as 
Nixon and Carter. It generally depended upon the personal 
dispositions of the presidents and their DCIs.
Understanding intelligence policy during the first half of 
the Cold War requires attention to these relationships.
Clearly, personal relationships became even more 
important to the intelligence community with the advent of 
serious oversight. Chapter 4 of this project indicates the 
growing importance of these personal factors in the post- 
Cold War era. The intelligence community leadership has 
increasingly been in contact with and sensitive to the 
Congress. The DCI view of Congressional oversight, and of 
the desirability of pro-active sensitivity to Congressional 
concerns completely shifted during the 1990's. The shift 
has been so complete that it is reasonable to speak of a new 
"DCI culture." Robert Gates noted the permanence of 
Congressional oversight and pragmatically embraced a 
relationship with the Congress which reflected this fact.
The extraordinarily good personal relations he enjoyed with
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SSCI Chairman David Boren and President George Bush Sr. were 
paramount in explaining policies, reforms, and interbranch 
relations during his DCI tenure. Indeed, it is this unique 
three-way relationship of friendship and mutual trust which 
initiated the new direction of interbranch relationships 
concerning intelligence policy.
The absence of these good personal relations among 
subsequent DCIs, presidents, and Intelligence Committee 
chairmen had parallel degrees of impact upon policy and 
interbranch relations. For instance, commenting on the ill- 
fated nomination of Anthony Lake to be DCI, one individual 
with a long association with the SSCI said
Lake never bonded with Congress at all. He didn't 
spend very much time with members of Congress. He 
didn't form any friendships with members of Congress. 
He's a very nice person. A very decent person and 
smart. But in any political environment, you have to 
build personal relationships. Personal relationships 
are more in^rtant than anything for getting things 
done. Or in surviving when you come under attack.^
The DCI tenure of George Tenet also lends support to the 
assertion that these factors matter. When asked eibout his 
style of %*orking with Congress on intelligence policy he 
stated, "There's no secret to this— you just have to be 
straight. There's no Kabuki dance. You get on the phone.
^Confidential interview.
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and you establish a relationship. That works; nothing else 
does."® Such relationships assist in explaining the recent 
absence of high profile open oversight hearings of the 
revelation variety— despite intelligence flaps involving the 
us bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo and the 
information flap involving Deutch's secret clearances. 
Clearly in an age of substantive oversight, personality and 
personal relationships are a permanent contextual factor 
that impacts inter branch relations and, consequently, 
policy.
Third, there is the contextual factor of consensus or 
its absence. The degree of consensus directly influences 
interbranch relations and policy outputs. ^ From 1947 to the 
early 1970's, there existed a value consensus among the 
electorate and bet%«een the branches of government that the 
overriding threat to the United States was the existence and 
influence of communism. The Executive Branch was dominant 
during the first generation of the Cold War with the 
Congress clearly playing a subordinate role in issuing blank 
checks to presidents. The abuses of power revealed in the
®Chuck McCutcheon, "Tenet Gives CIA Credibility on the Bill," 
Congressional Quarterly Weeklv Report. 22 January 2000, 141.
^See David J. Vogler and Sidney R. Waldmen, Congress and Democracy 
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), Chapter 7, "Foreign Policy and the 
Seetrch for Consensus," 123-144.
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early 1970’s compelled the Congress to cancel its checks and 
to attempt to assert its own authority in matters of 
national security. This resulted in contested control over, 
among other things, intelligence policy.® The contest for 
control did not end with the passing of the Cold War; 
however, its character has changed from one of suspicion and 
conflict between branches to one of cooperation.
Fourth, there are the contextual elements of 
idiosyncratic political events. Chapter 5 examined one 
aspect of interaction between the intelligence community and 
the Congress--oversight— and confirmed previous scholarly 
research that this contextual factor determines the posture 
and tone of interaction between the two branches. This, in 
turn, affects intelligence policy. The in^ >act of this 
factor is exemplified by the remarks of one SSCI member:
If this Committee were holding a hearing on some 
scandal within the CIA, this room would be filled, 
there would be active press coverage. Now we are 
talking about the future of the Intelligence community 
for the next quarter century, that's not a very 
exciting subject, but it is exactly the kind of subject 
that we ought to be devoting the thrust of our 
attention to.
®Examples of the inatitutional behaviors that were products of this 
contest may be found in Kenneth E. Sharpe, "The Post-Vietnam Formula 
under Siege: The in^rial Presidency and Central America,” Political
Science Quarterly 102 (Winter 1987-1988): 549-569.
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Political events such as intelligence revelations do help 
determine, for exan^le, the type of inquiry convened, the 
types of questions posed, and the extent of any corrective 
efforts undertaken. Individual political views and ideology 
also help to forecast the nature of these events— with the 
most extreme ideologues making the most pointed challenges 
to existing policy and personnel. Election years, the 
existence of rogue-state threats or aggression, and, no 
doubt, other political circumstances not systematically 
examined here may also be inqx>rtant. Clearly, the 
contextual element of external political events is an 
in^rtant factor for helping to explain specific 
relationships and behaviors.
Finally, this study has clarified the intact of certain 
medium-term trends in organizational behavior and the 
political environment. Host importantly it documents the 
emergence of a new conception of the role of DCI vis-a-vis 
the Congress. This new "DCI culture" fully accepted 
Congressional oversight, perhaps initially for pragmatic 
reasons, but presently for philosophical ones as well. This 
culture is characterized by ever-greater sensitivity to 
Congressional concerns, as both presidential access and
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presidential support for funding evaporated, it is 
evidenced in Woolsey ' s unprecedented personal effort of 
nearly one Hill briefing per day— and in the personnel 
changes made by Deutch, who perhaps more than any other DCI, 
changed the Agency's leadership culture and personal 
relations with Congress by placing former intelligence 
Committee staffers in key Agency positions. DCI George 
Tenet, with his philosophical— as opposed to politically 
pragmatic— embrace of legislative oversight, represents the 
culmination of this shift in DCI culture.
As presidential priorities changed, the behavior and 
policies of the intelligence community responded 
accordingly. Thus, medium term trends— in this case shifts 
in presidential attentiveness to intelligence matters and 
the response of DCIs— helps to explain the state of 
interbranch relations today and their resulting policy 
outputs.
The five contextual factors studied in the course of 
this project— institutional dispositions, personality and 
personal relationships, the degree of consensus, 
idiosyncratic political events, and medium-term trends— all 
help to assess the dependent variables of this study: post-
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Cold War interbremch relations and policy with respect to 
intelligence.
This is not to assert that human beings are merely 
reactive in the sense that they have no control over their 
contextual environment. It is an environment that is in 
large part created, sustained, and altered by people. In 
fact, a wide constellation of forces— very often not acting 
in concert with one another— works to create and affect the 
context in which individuals, organizations, and governments 
operate. A systematic account of all of these forces is 
elusive. The goal here has been to identify the most 
inçortant of those forces in order to better explain 
specific aspects of human behavior. The explanation 
necessarily involves paying more scholéurly attention to the 
role played by a wide range of important contextual factors 
in influencing events. This study has attended to provide 
attention to these factors
The Quest for nsmorratic Hational Security
There exists no formulaic solution to the more 
fundamental governmental problems illuminated by this 
research. The American political psyche includes an 
inherently schizophrenic view of centralized, national
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authority. On the one hand, the Framers of the Constitution 
were mindful of potential abuses of power and yet clearly 
they drew from Locke and their own political experience 
under the Articles of Confederation to create an Executive 
which would utilize secrecy and dispatch to preserve and 
protect the nation.
Despite a well-ingrained foundation of Executive 
dominance in national security affairs, there remains a 
pervasive desire in America for such power and the actions 
which manifest it to be fully accountable to amd 
fundamentally controlled by the people. Thus, Congressional 
checks such as the purse strings were built into the 
original system and Congressional authorities such as 
oversight have been developed along the way.
As ingenious as the product of the Framers has been, it 
cannot provide for one of democracy's most important 
ingredients— political will. As the research in Chapter 5 
suggests, solutions to the problems of Executive Branch 
excesses and low levels of Congressional fortitude do not 
appear to be self-starting in the sense that an institution 
suddenly begins to change its level of activity because of 
an innate desire to be more Constitutionally responsible.
260
Solutions originate with the general citizenry and exhibit 
themselves in the overwhelming electoral will displayed 
during times of grave national crisis, outrage, or 
international moralism.
To what extent can aspects of national security policy 
such as intelligence policy be democratic? In the latest 
era of national security affairs, the intelligence community 
has been faced with the task of justifying its operations, 
and even its very existence. ^ Intelligence budgets remain 
classified, as do most of activities of the intelligence 
community and yet the community has been responsive— and in 
the post-Cold War era even deferential— to the Congress.
Past revelations and the experience of legislative ire has 
clearly conditioned the behavior of the community. Yet it 
still must serve the president, both as a source of 
information and, at times, a primeury policy tool. This set 
of circumstances makes the relationship between the American 
intelligence ccmmunity and the other institutions of 
government the most unique oversight relationship in the
^See critical aaseaaements provided by Roger Hilsman, "After the Cold 
War: The Need for Intelligence," in National Inaecuritv: O.S.
Intelligence After the Cold War, ed. Craig Eisendrath (Philadelphia, 
PA: Ten^le University Press, 2000), 8-22; Robert E. White, "Too Many 
Spies, Too Littel Intelligence," in National Insecurity; U.S. 
Intelligence After the Cold War, ed. Craig Eisendrath (Philadelphia, 
PA: Temple University Press, 2000), 45-60.
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world. Gates is indeed correct when he asserts the 
community finds itself "involuntarily poised nearly 
equidistant between the Executive and Legislative 
Branches." The context surrounding interaction between 
these political actors assists in explaining resulting 
behaviors. Context may not be only set of forces at work—  
human volition and divine guidance are certainly 
possibilities— but it is clearly an important one that 
requires further attention and elucidation.
The Study of Context in Political Science
There are a modest number of social scientists vdio 
approach the study of politics with an appreciation of—  
indeed a scholarly interest in— the effects of a broadly 
defined, multi-dimensional context. In an article which 
appeared in a 1986 issue of the American Political Science 
Review. Richard Fenno asserted the rationale for resecirch of 
this kind.
Observation is at the heart of political analysis...
All students of politics are, perforce, students of 
politicians.. .The relevance of context becomes 
increasingly evident as you move from the observation 
of one politician to another.. .You face an individual 
who is pursuing certain goals, holding certain personal
^°Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy," Foreign 
Affairs 66 (Winter 1987-1988) 225.
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attitudes and values, carrying a residue of personal 
experience. But you also face an individual who is 
perceiving, interpreting, and acting in a complex set 
of circumstances. And you cannot know what you want to 
know about that individual until you have knowledge of 
these circumstances, or this situation, or, this 
context.
Why are so many in the social sciences who seek to explain 
behavior gun-shy about researching the effects of a broadly 
defined, multi-dimensional context on political outcomes? 
Could a regression model which examined party 
identification, ideology, and district location be 
considered a complete explanation of why members of Congress 
or their constituents vote the way they do? Would, to 
paraphrase Edward Banfield, anyone maintain that the Framers 
of the Constitution would have reached a better result with 
the help of a staff of formal model-builders ?
The study of context is complex, it does not possesses 
the virtues of finiteness or parsimony that are exalted by 
those who are inclined to more positivist approaches. Nor 
does it readily offer the generalizable conclusions that are 
feverishly sought by social science. The products of 
contextual research are certainly complex, elusively 
con^rehensive, and seldom the last word on the subject.
^^Richard F. Fenno, "Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study 
of Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (March 1986): 3-
15.
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This study is certainly proof enough of that. However, the 
study of context provides at least as much insight and 
explanatory power as does research which utilizes empirical 
means to focus on a limited number of factors. These 
factors are often selected, at least in part, because they 
are "measurable." Understanding and accounting for the 
impact of contextual factors provides more realistic and 
complete explanations of human behavior— and that should be 
the true goal of social science.
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Appendix A 
Methodology
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Description of Methodology
Three primary methodologies were employed for the 
research: a secondary source review, interviews of elite
intelligence policy officials, and a formal content 
analysis.
First, a thorough review of a massive secondary 
literature was conducted, intelligence studies is a 
relatively new area of scholarly interest. There are 
relatively few works of research which offer comprehensive 
case studies on interbranch relations with respect to 
intelligence policy. Only a fraction of these present 
serious attention to elements of the larger context in which 
political phenomena unfold.
One of the more thorough, yet time consuming, ways in 
which secondary literature may be used to flesh out 
explanatory factors is to review the published historical 
and personal accounts of those %dio have been involved with 
intelligence policy.
Chapter 2 utilizes this type of review extensively in 
order to m£üce determinations about the intended roles and 
evolving dispositions of the Presidency and Congress.
Source documents, including the Federalist Papers and
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Locke's Second Treatise were instrumental in this work. The 
excellent work of Constitutional historians was also 
helpful.
Chapter 3 assesses the role of contextual factors, like 
personal relationships and personality on intelligence 
policy during the Cold War. The use of biographical works 
and the professional memoirs of senior intelligence 
officials and presidents helped to assess the extent of 
presidential interaction with DCIs.
Interviewing was another method used to gather data for 
this research. Two rather formidable obstacles present 
themselves %dien one attempts to conduct interview research 
of the type utilized in this dissertation. First, there is 
the task of achieving access to the subjects one wishes 
interview. The intelligence community, due to the nature of 
its work, is not easy for researchers to penetrate.
However, it can be just as difficult to interview members of 
Congress. Included in this Appendix is a list of 
individuals %dio were interviewed for this project.
The second formidable obstacle to this type of research 
is availability of resources. The sample is limited by the 
resources at hand, as virtually all traveling and
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acconBooda-tlon expenses were paid for by the author. As with 
the case of Richaurd Fenno' s research, "each person added to 
this list represented a heavy commitment of my time, energy, 
and money, so no decision was made lightly. " ^
Interviews were conducted with twenty individuals. A 
list of the research intervie%fs is included in this 
Appendix. One observation which may be made is the relative 
absence of Congressional Intelligence Committee members.
This was not due to a lack of effort, as each member was 
contacted a minimum of three times. A sangle contact letter 
has been included in this i^pendix.
The sample of those individual actually interviewed 
includes Congressional intelligence Committee staff and 
Executive Breuich officials. Three of the four individuals 
who have served as DCI since the end of the Cold War were 
interviewed, in person, for this study. John Deutch 
personally declined to be interviewed. Questions involving 
research interview seunpling typically arise in social 
science work. The philosophy for choosing the sample for 
this project was single: interview any willing, relevant
^Richard ? Fanno, Houaa Hmwhtri In Thair Diatricf
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, t Co., 1978), 254.
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individual, provided there existed the necessary resources 
to do so.
Most of the interviews took place in Washington D.C. 
between September 1, 1999 and November 1, 1999. The twenty 
interviews conducted for this research averaged nearly am 
hour in length. The shortest lasted about 25 minutes and 
the longest nearly two hours. Interviews, for the most 
part, were open-ended. Respondents were not limited in the 
length of time they could spend addressing a question or an 
issue and, for purposes of building rapport with the 
subject, interviews were left unstructured and 
conversational.
Few of the interviews were taped. Restrictions on 
recording devices in and around CIA Headquarters are not 
negotiable. As taping almost inevitably inhibits camdor, 
the main method for gathering interview data was note- 
taking. Notes were expanded immediately upon conclusion of 
the interview due to the per is had)il ity of such conversations 
if simply left to memory.
The original set of questions are provided in this 
Appendix. The impact of certain contextual elements on 
institutional amd individuaü. behavior surfaced as the
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research progressed. As Fenno states, research of a more 
qualitative design:
is likely to have an exploratory emphasis. Someone 
doing this kind of research is quite likely to have no 
crystallized idea of what he or she is looking for or 
what questions to ask when he or she starts. 
Researchers typically become interested in some 
observable set of activities and decide to go have a 
firsthand look at them.
Only after a prolong, unstructured soaking is the 
problem formulated. Indeed, the reformulation of a 
problem or a question may be the end product of the 
research.%
Clearly the "emergent" nature of such a qualitative 
approach manifests itself in this dissertation. Still, 
scholarly access to individuals such as those interviewed 
for this project is rare and offers a "street-level" view to 
social scientist vdio, more often than not, study politics 
and governance from a more removed vantage point.
The final methodology enqployed for this study was a 
formal content analysis of Congressional hearings. The 
sample of hearings was derived from the "universe" of 
hearings presented in Appendix C (note italics). These were 
formally convened, public intelligence oversight hearings 
which took place during the 103rd, 104th, and 105th 
Congresses (1993 - 1998).
2Ibid., 250.
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The questions and remarks made by SSCI members were the 
units of analysis. These questions and remarks were coded 
in a manner consistent with the methodology and 
classification schemes first constructed by Loch Johnson. 
Long editorial comments, salutations, and procedural 
comments such as "I yield back." were not coded. Individual 
Committee members comments were tallied by degree of 
aggressiveness. The coding consisted of the time consuming 
task of carefully reading hundreds of hours of testimony and 
coding more than 2200 utterances. The results were 
consistent with earlier studies, in most respects.
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Interview Questions
1. In your experience, to what extent has the end of the 
Cold War changed the role(s) of the CIA, and how have 
changes affected intelligence oversight?
2. How much time per week did you personally spend 
preparing for and presenting Congressional oversight 
testimony? What did this typically entail?
3. In your experience, to what extent is there informal 
contact with Congressional members?
4. Rep. Lee Hamilton said that the job of intelligence 
officials is to come before Congress and persuade that 
body that it should grant approval to an operation. 
Describe your feelings towards this assertion.
5. To what extent do political concerns explain 
Congressional actions with respect to oversight?
6. What do you feel is the in^ct that political ideology 
has on the oversight conducted by Congressional 
members?
7. From your perspective, what characteristics do you see 
the SSCI and the HPSCI displaying?
8. Are there patterns of behavior on the SSCI and HPSCI
despite turnover of members?
9. Selection for service on the SSCI and HPSCI has been 
described as con^titive. in your view, why might this 
be the case?
10. In your experience, are members of the committee’s 
truly engaged by intelligence matters? Do they think 
strategically, "over the horizon"?
11. What is the specific impact you have noticed 
concerning Congressional oversight of the intelligence 
budget?
12. Which forms of Congressional supervision do you 
consider to be the most valuable?
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13. There seems to be a notable and to a large extent post 
Cold War, trend of Congressional staff earning 
appointment to key CIA positions. To what degree do 
you estimate this to be taking place in the 
intelligence community at large?
14. How would you explain this trend? An attend to take 
oversight to Langley?
15. What is your estimation of the impact of this trend?
16. In your estimation, to what extent has this trend 
affected the behavior of Congress?
17. In you view, how has this trend been viewed by those 
inside the CIA?
18. What intact do you think Hill staff has on oversight?
19. There has been much discussion of intelligence reform 
since the end of the Cold War. There have been many 
reform studies and intelligence reform proposals. To 
what extent have these efforts made an impact on the 
CIA and the intelligence community at leirge?
20. Describe those reform suggestions (and laws) which you 
feel have made the most significant inpact on the 
intelligence community.
21. Does the end of the Cold Wair require additional 
reforms vdiich deal with the manner in which oversight 
is conducted?
22. In a written statement submitted to the SSCI 
during your confirmation process, you indicated that 
your experience as a Congressional staff member 
contributes to your believe that "Congress should be 
treated as a partner" in intelligence matters. To 
what extent has this been the case?
23. What reform measures were carried through during your 
time as DCI? (were they self-imposed? )
24. To vAiat extent do you feel bureaucratic inertia has 
affected efforts to reform the community?
25. Describe what you feel to be the most effective 
of reform, (executive orders, la%fs, etc.)
26. To what extent does the source of the reform effort 
affect its degree of success?
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27. To what extent has the IG made an impact on 
intelligence reform?
28. To what extent is there a tendency for the Agency to 
anticipate reform and move to self-impose something to 
preempt an outside mandate?
29. What are your views on specific reform proposals such 
as combining the Congressional oversight committee's 
of the House and Senate, creation of an intelligence 
"czar,” strengthening the hand of the DCI, wider 
latitudes to conduct surveillance of potential 
domestic threats, etc.?
30. Scholars note the debate over whether or not 
intelligence objectivity and integrity should be 
preserved at the cost of losing influence in the 
policy process. Describe your views on this matter.
31. What improvements can be made to oversight process?
32. We hear about leaks, co-optation, and other potential 
oversight dangers but what other things should concern 
us?
33. What is your view of the role of CIA eind the DCI? To 
what extent did you find yourself being a defender of 
Agency interests?
34. In an interview dated 29 May 1997 entitled "The 
Changing Game of Cloak and Dagger: An interview with
James Woolsey," it was stated that, in regards to 
(Congressional) accountéüt>ility, there is 
"accountability in spades." Please discuss this 
statement.
35. Describe to what extent it became your sense that 
Congress %»ants the president to have a covert action 
capability.
36. How much contact did you have with the President and 
how much prep time does this entail?
37. In your experience, to what extent has the original 
purpose of the CIA and the DCI been achieved?
38. Aspects of oversight that this study needs to examine 
further.
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39. In a February 1993 breakfast address to the ABA, Robert 
Gates stated that the relationship between the 
intelligence community and Congress has improved 
steadily to reach a state of "excellence." To what 
extent can this be explained? Is there a policy 
consensus or has the trust been built back up in the 
years since Iran-Contra?
40. In this same address it was clearly indicated that 
staff have enormous intacts on oversight. Please 
describe these effects as you see them.
41. The Congressional Record indicates that yearly 
authorizations are approved in a strongly bipartisan 
vote. To what extent can this be explained? What 
about your confirmation in 1987 emd 1991 as well as 
the abortive Lake nomination in 1997— what maüces these 
forms of oversight seem so much more partisan than the 
yearly approval and funding of intelligence 
activities?
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Interview Request Letter (Congress)
Dear Senator/Representative
David Boren is co-chair of ny Ph.D. dissertation 
committee and has suggested that my research include 
discussion with you on the subject of intelligence 
oversight,
I would like to speak with you on this matter so I that 
I may gain the perspective of Capitol Hill. Time, place, 
and format of the research interview are at your discretion. 
Please contact me at your earliest convenience with a 
response to this request (please see FAX below).
To date, I have interviewed Director Tenet, members of 
his staff, and James woolsey. Robert Gates has agreed to 
speak with me as well. A view from Capitol Hill is 
indispensaible.
I will very much be grateful for your help.
Sincerely,
Charles M. Korb
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Interview Request Letter (Executive Branch)
Dear _____________ ,
David Boren co-chair’s my Ph.D. dissertation committee 
and has encouraged me to interview individuals who have 
served as DCI since the end of the Cold War. I eim writing 
you to see if you would be willing to grant me a reseaurch 
interview.
The dissertation deals mainly with Congressional- 
Executive relations. Specifically, I am interested in 
outlining the impact of DCI-Congressional relations on the 
intelligence policy.
Oversight is an area in which Congress has shaped 
intelligence policy. Reform measures, operation reviews, 
and confirmation of executive appointments make up three 
chapters of the project. You offer a unique perspective as 
the first truly post-Cold War DCI. To help me construct a 
broad picture. President Boren indicated in correspondence 
to me that he has contacted Director Tenet and several 
former SSCI staff who are now at Langley.
My preference is for an in-person interview. Time, 
place, and format are totally at your discretion and I 
certainly would be willing to provide you a list of 
questions. My upccxning Air Force service has provided me 
with an initial cleeiremce of Secret. Please contact me at 
your earliest convenience with a response to this request 
( FAX and email below). We can then proceed with the 
details.
I will very much be grateful for your help.
Sincerely,
Charles M. Korb
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Liât of Key Interviewa
Kl g art
Robert M. Gates 
Anthony Lake
George Tenet 
R. Jamea Woolsey 
Congres»
David L. Boren 
Norm Dicks (D-WA)
James Inhofe (R-OK) 
Dave McCurdy 
Warren Rudman
Kxecutive Branch Staff
John H. Moseman
John F. Nelson 
L. Britt Snider 
Congressional Staff
Lorenzo Goco 
Arthur Grant
Greg McCarthy
Thomas M. Newcomb
Nick Rostov
DCI (1991-1993)
National Security Advisor 
(1993-1996)
Current DCI
DCI (1993-1995)
Interview Dste^
12/6/99
9/27/99
9/1/99
9/1/99
2/25/00
10/18/99
10/18/99
10/18/99
10/18/99
Former SSCI Chairman
Former HPSCI Member
Current SSCI Manber
Former HPSCI Chairman
Current Head of the PFIAB 
(former SSCI member)
Current CIA Director of 9/1/99
Congressional Affairs
Current DCI Chief of Staff 9/1/99
Current CIA Inspector General 9/1/99
Current SSCI Staff Member 10/18/99
Current SSCI Minority Staff 10/81/99
Director
Military Legislative Assistant to 10/18/99 
Senator James Inhofe
Current HPSCI Staff Director 10/18/99
and Counsel
Current SSCI Majority Staff 10/18/99
Director
^All interviews took place in Washington D.C. except: Robert M. 
Sates, who was interviewed at Texas A & M University; Anthony Lake, 
who was interviewed over the phone.
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Appendix B 
Ideological indexes
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TABLE 1
SENATE SELECT CCMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
102ND CONGRESS (1991-1992)
ASS
DEMOCRATS
David Boren, OK (Chairman) 45 45
Sam Nunn, GA 50 48
Ernest Bollings, SC 55 62
Bill Bradley, NJ 90 10
Alan Cranston, CA 85 0
Dennis DeConcini, AZ 50 45
Howard Metzenbaum, OH 100 0
John Glenn, OH 90 10
REPUBLICANS
Frank Murkoski, AK 5 86
John Warner, VA 20 76
Alfonse D'Amato, NY 15 86
John Danforth, MO 30 60
Warren Rudman, NH 20 60
Slade Gorton, WA 30 67
John Chafee, RI 60 24
Source: Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America, 1992,
The 102nd Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1991).
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TABLE 2
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT CCMMITTEE ON INTELLIŒNCE
102ND CONGRESS (1991-1992)
DEMOCRATS
Dave McCurdy, OK (chairmen) 30 26
Charles Wilson, TX 25 30
Barbara Kennelly, CT 80 0
Dan Glickman, KS 50 32
Nicholas Mavrolus, MA 85 10
Bill Richardson, NM 50 20
Stephen Solarz, NY 75 10
Norm Dicks, WA 70 5
Ronald Dellums, CA 90 0
David Senior, MI 95 0
Martin Olav Savo, MN 90 0
Wayne Owens, UT 70 11
REPUBLICANS
Bud Shuster, PA 15 95
Larry Combest, TX 0 95
Doug Bereuter, NE 10 85
Robert Doman, CA 10 95
C.W. Bill Young, FL 30 85
David O'B. Martin, NY 5 76
George Gekas, PA 5 90
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly's Politics In America, 1992,
The 102nd Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1991).
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TABLE 3
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
103RD CONGRESS (1993-1994)
DEMOCRATS
ADA èSi
Dennis DeConcini, AZ (Chairmem) 75 20
Howard Metzenbaum, OH 90 0
John Glenn, OH 80 11
Bob Kerrey, NE 90 0
Richard Bryam, NV 80 19
Bob Graham, FL 75 15
John Kerry, MA 100 0
Max Baucus, MT 95 4
J. Bennet Johnston, LA 70 23
REPUBLICANS
John W. Warner, VA 20 74
Alfonse D'Amato, NY 30 52
John Danforth, MO 25 74
Slade Gorton, WA 25 72
John Chafee, RI 40 44
Ted Stevens, AK 20 74
Richard Lugar, IN 10 85
Malcolm Wallop, WA 10 100
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly's Politics In America, 1994,
The 103rd Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1993)-
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TABLE 4
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
103RD CONGRESS (1993-1994)
DEMOCRATS
ADA ASB
Dan Glickman, KS (Chairman) 75 32
Norm Dicks, WA 75 33
Julian Dixon, CA 80 8
Robert Torricelli, NJ 85 16
Ronald Coleman, TX 85 13
David Skaggs, CO 90 8
James Bilbray, NV 70 33
Nancy Pelosi, CA 90 0
Greg Laughlin, TX 45 52
Robert "Bud" Cramer, AL 55 44
Jack Reed, RI 90 4
REPUBLICANS
Larry Combest, TX 10 100
Doug Bereuter, NE 20 79
Robert Doman, CA 5 100
C.W. Bill Young, FL 15 78
George Gekas, PA 15 88
James Hansen, UT 5 100
Jerry Lewis, CA 10 83
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly ' s Politics In America, 1994,
The 103rd Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1993).
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TABLE 5
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
104TB CONGRESS (1995-1996)
REPUBLICANS
ADA aCB
Arlen Specter, PA (Chairman) 55 46
Richard Lugar, IN 10 76
Richard Shelby, AL 30 55
Mike DeWlne, OH* 17 83
John Kyi, AZ 5 90
Jeunes Inhofe, OK* 0 100
Kaye Bailey Hutchison, TX 10 96
Connie Mack, FL 10 96
wlllleun S. Cohen, ME 40 45
DEMOCRATS
Bob Kerrey, NE 80 24
John Glenn, OH 80 4
Richard Bryan, NV 75 12
Bob Graham, FL 75 8
John Kerry, MA 95 0
Max Baucus, MT 85 0
J. Bennett Johnston, LA 55 22
Charles Robb, VA 60 12
* Based on voting record In House of Representatives
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly’s Politics in America, 1996,
The 104th Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1995).
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TABLE 6
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
104TH CONGRESS (1995-1996)
REPUBLICANS
ADA ACU
Larry Combest, TX (Chairman) 0 100
Robert Oornan, CA 0 100
C.W. Bill Young, FL 25 81
James Hansen, UT 0 95
Porter Goss, FL 10 86
Bud Shuster, PA 0 100
Bill McCollum, FL 0 95
Michael Castle, DL
DEMOCRATS
Norm Dicks, WA 65 14
Bill Richardson, NM 55 26
Julian Dixon, CA 75 10
Robert Torricelli, NJ 65 6
Ronald Coleman, TX 80 19
Nancy Pelosi, CA 90 0
Greg Laughlin, TX 50 60
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America, 1996,
The 104th Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1995).
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Tabl# 7
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
105TH CONGRESS (1997-1998)
REPUBLICANS
ADA èSS
Richard Shelby, AL (Chairman) 5 90
John Chafee, RI 40 60
Richard Lugar, IN 5 95
Mike DeWine, OH is 85
Jon Kyi, AZ 5 100
James Inhofe, OK 0 100
Orrin Hatch, UT 5 100
Pat Roberts, KS* 5 95
Wayne Allard, CO* 10 100
Daniel Coats, IN 10 100
DEMOCRATS
Bob Kerrey, NE 85 5
John Glenn, OH 95 10
Richard Bryan, NV 85 10
Bob Graham, FL 85 15
John Kerry, MA 95 5
Max Baucus, MT 85 20
Charles Robb, VA 80 20
Frcuik Lautenberg, NJ 95 0
Carl Levin, MI 85 5
* Based on voting record in House of Representatives
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America, 1998,
The 105th Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1997).
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Tabl# 8
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 
105TH CONGRESS (1997-1998)
REPUBLICANS
Porter Goss, FL (Chairman) 10 95
C.W. Bill Young, FL 5 88
Jerry Lewis, CA 5 83
Bud Shuster, PA 0 100
Bill McCollum, FL 0 95
Michael Castle, DE 25 60
Sherwood Boehlert, NY 50 50
Charles Bass, NH 0 100
Jim Gibbons, NV -
DEMOCRATS
Norm Dicks, WA 65 0
Julian Dixon, CA 90 0
David Skaggs, CO 90 0
Nancy Pelosi, CA 90 0
Jane Harman, CA 60 26
Ike Skelton, MO 40 50
Sanford Bishop, GA 60 30
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly's Politics In America, 1998,
The 105th Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1997).
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Table 9
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
106TH CONGRESS (1999-2000)
ADA acB
REPUBLICANS
Richard Shelby, AL (Chairman) 5 92
John Chafee, RI 45 32
Richard Lugar, IN 0 68
Mike Dewine, OH 10 64
Jon Kyi, AZ 0 96
James Inhofe, OK 5 100
Orrin Hatch, UT 5 80
Pat Roberts, KS 0 84
Wayne Allard, CO 5 100
DEMOCRATS
Bob Kerrey, NE 95 0
Richeird Bryan, NV 95 8
Bob Graham, FL 85 4
John Kerry, MA 95 4
Max Baucus, MT 80 5
Charles Robb, VA 80 12
Frank Lautenberg, NJ 95 4
Carl Levin, MI 90 0
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly's Politics In America, 2000, 
The 106th Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1999).
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Table 10
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 
106TH CONGRESS (1999-2000)
REPUBLICANS
AD& ACU
Porter Goss, FL (Chairman) 5 91
Jerry Lewis, CA 10 75
Bill McCollum, FL 5 84
Michael Castle, DE 30 42
Sherwood Boehlert, NY 60 24
Charles Bass, NH 10 63
Jim Gibbons, NV 20 92
Ray LaHood, IL 20 60
Heather Wilson, NM 0 83
DEMOCRATS
Julian Dixon, CA 100 0
Nancy Pelosi, CA 95 12
Sanford Bishop, GA 70 44
Norman Sisislq^ , VA 65 28
Gary Condit, CA 60 56
Tim Roemer, IN 65 44
Alcee Hastings, FL 80 5
SOURCE: Congressional Quarterly' s Politics In America, 2000,
The 106th Congress, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1999).
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Appendix C 
Lint of Congressional Hearings
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103rd Comgr###!
House
Director Woolsey— The Future of the Intelligence Caamunlty 
March 9, 1993
Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, 
and National Security Agency: Minority Hire,
Retentions, and Promotions October 28, 1993
The Current and Future State of Intelligence February 24 
1994
A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information March 16 
1994
NRO Headquarters Facility August 11, 1994
Hiring, Promotion, Retention, and Overall Representation of 
Minorities, Nomen, and Disabled Persons within the 
Intelligence Community September 20, 1994
Senate
Ikminatioa of Jt. Jammm Noolsoy February 23, 1993
Economic Intelligence August 5, 1993
NAFTA November 4, 1993
Commercial Imagery November 17, 1993
joint Security Caaamissioa March 3, 1994
Couateriatelligeacm May 3, 1994
NRO Headqumrters Project August 10, 1994
104th Congress
House
Intelligence Support to the United Nations Open Session 
January 19, 1995
^Note: Bold-fac* type indicates use of hearing in content analysis.
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104th Congrvsa, House, (cont'd)
IC21 : The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century
May 22, 1995; July 13, 1995; July 27, 1995; October 18 
1995; November 16, 1995; December 19, 1995
Human Resource and Diversity September 20, 1996
Senate
Worldwide Intelligence Review January 10, 1995 
Hearing on aumtastala April 5, 1995
Haminmtioa of John Jf. Oeuteh to bo Director of Central 
Intelligence April 26, 1995; May 3, 1995
Hearing on the N<mination of George J. Tenet to be Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence June 14, 1995
Director of Central Intelligence 30 Day Report June 21, 
1995
War Crimes in the Balkans August 9, 1995
Renewal end Reform: U.S. Intelligence in a Changing world
September 20, 1995; October 25, 1995; March 6, 1996; 
March 19, 1996; March 27, 1996; April 24, 1996
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the U.S. 
and Its Interests Abroad February 22, 1996
SconoBic Bmpioaage February 28, 1996
Hearings on U.S. Actions Regarding Iretnieui Arms Shipments 
into Bosnia May 21, 1996; May 23, 1996
Vietnamese Coaanandos June 19, 1996
Assessing the Regional Security in the Middle Bast and 
Saudi Arabia; Looking into the Future in Combating 
Terrorism; Executive Oversight July 10, 1996
CIA's Use of Journalists and Clergy in Intelligence 
Operations July 17, 1996
The Dayton Accords July 24, 1996
International Terrorism August 1, 1996
Congressional Notification September 15, 1996
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104th Congress, Senate, (cont'd)
Iraq September 19, 1996
Intelligence Assessments of the Exposure of U.S. Military 
Personnel to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert 
Storm September 25, 1996
Allegations of a CIA Connection to Crack Cocaine Epidemic 
October 23, 1996; November 26, 1996
Intelligence Analysis of the Long Range Missile Threat to 
the U.S. December 4, 1996
DCI Wrap-Up December 11, 1996
105th Congress
House
Record of Proceedings on HR 3829, The Intelligence
Ccxmunity Whistleblower Protection Act May 20, 1998 
June 10, 1998
Senate
Nomination of Anthony Lake to be Director of Central
Intelligence March 11, 1997, March 12; 1997; March 
13, 1997
iwasinstioo of Omorgm J. Tmnmt to bo Director of Control
Intolligoaco May 6, 1997
1985 Zona Rosa Terrorist Attack; San Salvador, El Salvador 
May 20, 1997; July 30, 1997
People's Republic of China September 18, 1997
Nomination of Lt. General John Gordon, USAF, to be Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence October 1, 1997
Current end Projected Mmtioaal Seeuritj Tiireeta to the
united Stmtee January 28, 1998
Diacloeure of Classified Information to Coagreaa February 
4, 1998; February 11, 1998
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105th Coagr###, Senate/ (cont'd)
Nomination of Joan A, Dempsey to be Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for CoimBunity Management May 21, 
1998; May 22, 1998
Nomination of L. Britt Snider to be Inspector General,
Central Intelligence Agency July 8, 1998; July 14, 
1998
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